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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a sociological analysis of the role of executive discretion in 
decisions about the release of restricted patients. Located in England and 
Wales, the thesis is an empirical study of the decision-making process, 
based on fieldwork conducted from 2005-2006 at the Mental Health Unit of 
the Home Office, and with non-government actors in the system including 
legal and clinical practitioners, and mental health and victim organisations.
Studying the intersection of mental health and criminal justice at the site of 
■the restricted patient system, the mechanisms for preventive detention within 
mental health policy have implications for the increasing effort to control 
dangerousness within criminal justice. Using key areas of literature from 
criminology, sociology and socio-legal studies, the conceptual tools of 
analysis include contemporary analyses of penal policy, particularly concerns 
to control risk; legal decision-making; and constructions of public opinion and 
their effects on criminal justice policy.
The thesis argues that, while the role of executive discretion was originally 
intended to meet the public protection agenda, much of the protection offered 
is symbolic, based largely on reassurance of public fears. The notion of ‘the 
public’ is constructed in opposition to the interests of patients, and through 
particular groups constitutive of the public, including victims of patients. The 
dominant conception in how the executive understands the public is as 
people fearful and at risk. This is a reflection of contemporary criminal justice 
policy which is increasingly looking for frameworks to control dangerousness 
in ways that the criminal law, because of its traditional reliance upon 
conviction and consequent sentencing, cannot offer; and whose objects are 
not only offenders, but other so-called risky individuals whose perceived 
threat to the public justifies an increasing range of mechanisms for 
containment.
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INTRODUCTION
Where a hospital order is made in respect of an offender by the Crown 
Court, and it appears to the court, having regard to the nature of the 
offence, the antecedents of the offender and the risk of his committing 
further offences if set at large, that it is necessary for the protection of 
the public from serious harm so to do, the court may, subject to the 
provisions of this section, further order that the offender shall be 
subject to the special restrictions set out in this section, either without 
limit of time or during such period as may be specified in the order; 
and an order under this section shall be known as “a restriction order” 
(Mental Health Act 1983:section 41).
This thesis examines the role and effect of executive decisions to release 
patients who have been subject to a restriction order in England and Wales. 
Restricted patients have been convicted of offences in a Crown Court. They 
have then been given a hospital order, requiring that they be detained for 
compulsory treatment of their mental disorder in a hospital, instead of a 
prison sentence for punishment of their offence. After making a hospital 
order, the court restricts that order on the grounds that the person poses a 
particular risk to public safety. The nature of the restriction is that any change 
in the location of the patient’s detention must be made under executive 
authority. Such changes include transfer to a less or more secure facility, 
leave privileges and discharge from hospital, either conditionally or 
absolutely. The executive’s authority is exercised under the powers of the 
Home Secretary. The Mental Health Review Tribunal also has the power to 
order conditional or absolute discharge of restricted patients, but has no 
power over the preliminary steps leading towards release.
At the time of my research a restriction order could be time limited by the 
Court in which the criminal matter was heard, for instance for five years. 
During this time the Home Secretary and Tribunal had the powers set out 
above, but once the time expired the restriction order was automatically lifted. 
However, most restriction orders were indefinite. Time limited restriction 
orders were subsequently abolished by the Mental Health Act 2007.
Once the Court makes a restriction order, the responsibility for the patient’s 
care and treatment rests with the detaining hospital. However decisions
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relating to the nature and place of detention in which that care and treatment 
are provided are made under executive authority. Each step in the progress 
leading towards release, including leave and transfer to less secure 
hospitals, is determined by the Home Secretary; and only the Home 
Secretary or the Mental Health Review Tribunal may authorise a patient’s 
discharge to the community. While the severity of the offence or a history of 
dangerous behaviour by the patient might be elements that lead to a 
restriction order being imposed, these are only some of the factors taken into 
account by the Court (Jones 2004). The purpose of a restriction order is to 
provide for public protection, and that purpose is the focus of my thesis.
Research Questions
At the time of my research, executive discretion over decisions about the 
release of offenders had declined significantly from its once-central role in 
criminal law. While executive discretion was re-emerging as a policy for 
dealing with politically sensitive and criminalised groups (such as immigration 
and asylum seekers and terrorism suspects), the restricted patient system 
was noteworthy because it had maintained executive discretion throughout 
the era in which government authority over most offenders had been handed 
to courts, tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies like parole boards. I was 
interested in exploring why executive discretion remained over the release of 
these people. The immediate answer, contained in statute, was that 
executive discretion was retained in the interests of public protection. This 
answer merely begged further inquiry. Restricted patients were a population 
of offenders who sat at the intersection of criminal justice and mental health 
policy. Legally they were patients not offenders. I wanted to investigate why 
these offender-patients were conceived of as posing such a particular risk to 
the public that it required the rare exercise of executive discretion over their 
treatment and release.
I undertook to examine the role and effect of executive discretion on the 
system, and how the executive met its agenda of public protection. My key 
research questions were as follows:
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i. How did other actors view the role and effect of the executive in the 
restricted patient system?
ii. How was the concept of ‘the public’ constructed and to what extent 
did it have an impact upon decision-making in this system?
iii. How did the executive meet its self-stated aim of protecting the 
public?
These questions were important because they struck at the central purpose 
of executive discretion. Here was a department of government traditionally 
responsible for criminal justice, exercising executive authority over a 
population of patients detained in hospital. That discretion was exercised in a 
context where criminal justice policy intersected with mental health, requiring 
the interaction of very different institutions, principles and personnel. The 
executive’s authority was retained for the purpose of public protection, yet 
there was no legal clarity as to what that meant. Thus exploring the ‘who’ and 
‘how’ of public protection was central to understanding the function and effect 
of executive discretion.
Outline of Chapters
Chapter One sets out the conceptual tools of analysis in this thesis through a 
review of several bodies of relevant literature. These are:
i. criminological literature on detention, prevention and protection;
ii. literature on victim involvement in the criminal justice system;
iii. the laws and existing research of the restricted patient system in 
England and Wales; and
iv. theories of risk in the management of mentally disordered 
offenders.
The project covered a range of perspectives across criminological and socio- 
legal theories and there was an extensive range of literature to consider. A 
complete review of all of it was well beyond the scope or analytical 
requirements of a doctorate. Therefore my literature review is selectively 
strategic, focussing on the theories and theorists most relevant to my 
sociological analysis of executive discretion in the restricted patient system. 
Chapter One does not constitute the only discussion of theory in this thesis.
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A number of areas of relevant literature are considered in subsequent 
chapters, including decision-making and conceptions of public opinion.
Chapter Two discusses my methodological approach. I explain the origins 
and design of the project and detail the methods undertaken to obtain the 
original empirical data introduced in subsequent chapters. The chapter sets 
out the conduct and progress of fieldwork and then provides a reflexive 
account of challenges encountered and how these were resolved during my 
research and analysis.
Chapter Three is the first substantive chapter of the thesis and introduces the 
Mental Health Unit of the Home Office which was the bureaucratic agency 
responsible for the supervision of and decision-making about restricted 
patients at the time of my research. The chapter begins with a discussion of 
the decision-making literature which was a key tool of analysis throughout 
this thesis and was not reviewed in the earlier discussion of relevant 
literature. Focussing on my central interest in the role of the executive in the 
restricted patient system, the chapter then examines the work of Home Office 
officials in monitoring and making decisions about restricted patients. In 
particular, it considers the processes and factors that influenced decisions to 
approve applications for leave and discharge and to revoke discharge by 
recalling patients to hospital. The chapter introduces a key element of my 
thesis that the protection of the public operated in part through a symbolic 
politics of protection.
Chapter Four examines the relationships between government and non­
government actors in the restricted patient system, specifically in relation to 
the role and exercise of executive discretion. Although practitioners generally 
accepted the role of the executive in the system, they were concerned at how 
the Home Office balanced the interests of patients with the public protection 
agenda. The chapter includes an analysis of multi-agency approaches to 
restricted patients as a framework for exploring some of the challenges that 
were raised by the intersection of criminal justice and mental health in this 
system.
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Chapter Five explores how executive decision-makers constructed ‘the 
public’. I argue that the public was constructed in particular ways through 
specific manifestations of people or groups with whom decision-makers came 
into contact. Notably, this included the victims of restricted patients. I suggest 
that the public was conceptualised as the object of executive decision­
making in opposition to the patients who were the subjects of those 
decisions.
Chapter Six analyses one aspect of law reform that took place from 2005- 
2006 during the period of my fieldwork, focusing on how the government’s 
objectives in that reform reflected its agenda for controlling dangerousness. I 
argue that the government’s focus on risk rather than treatment was largely 
attributed to the role of the Home Office in the reform process. As restricted 
patients were the key group of patients with whom the Home Office had 
contact, the executive’s views could have been informed by this group. Yet, 
mentally disordered offenders received very little attention in the debates that 
surrounded the process. Consequently, restricted patients constituted a 
group who defined much of the agenda yet were marginalised in the 
approaches to law reform of both government and non-government 
participants.
Chapter Seven is framed around the effect of international human rights 
instruments on the restricted patient system. Human rights were an important 
element of case law and legislation in the restricted patient system. I suggest 
that, by focusing on the implications of human rights for formal procedure, 
executive decision-makers relegated the protection of restricted patient rights 
to other actors in the system. My data showed that executive decision­
makers perceived their responsibility for patient rights to have been replaced 
when the authority to discharge was extended to the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal. At the same time, the Tribunal’s powers were relatively limited as a 
safeguard for the rights of restricted patients.
The brief of the Home Office changed just after the completion of fieldwork 
for this thesis. In its new structure the Home Office lost its traditional 
jurisdiction over institutions like courts and prisons; maintained the portfolio of
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policing; and acquired a new focus on counter-terrorism. At this time, 
responsibility for offender management shifted to the Department of Justice 
and with it went the Mental Health Unit. Nevertheless, the relevance of my 
research remains as a study of executive decision-making in the interests of 
public protection.
In conclusion, I argue that while protecting the public was the legislative 
objective of executive discretion, the way in which that agenda was 
constructed and achieved was determined by the politics of law and order 
that marked criminal justice policy at the turn of the last century. The public 
protection agenda was met in a number of ways, including by containing risks 
through preventive detention. However the protection offered to the public 
also operated through symbolic politics, based upon attempts by executive 
decision-makers to assuage fears and reassure members of the public that 
their decisions were in the public interest. In order to provide this protection, 
‘the public’ was necessarily conceptualised in opposition to restricted 
patients. While this construction attempted to provide clarity over 
responsibilities in decision-making, in practice it produced a dichotomy 
between the interests of patients and the interests of the public. In that 
dichotomy, patient interests were continually subsumed within the executive’s 
broad mandate for public protection. Not only did this attract criticism for 
preventing the progress of patients, but it also established an insurmountable 
barrier between the objectives of the executive and other actors throughout 
the restricted patient system.
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
There is a vast terrain of sociological, health, and legal analysis relevant to 
this project. There is also an established literature on the intersection of 
mental health with the criminal justice system, including how laws and courts 
should respond to mental disorder amongst offender populations, and the 
increasing challenge of mental illness within escalating prison populations. 
However there are certain populations within mental health law who have 
received very little attention in the literature. These are the offenders with 
mental disorder who are isolated and managed separately from both the 
general offender and the civil mental health populations. In particular there 
has been very little analysis of the decision-making processes and outcomes 
regarding this population. My research contributes a criminological 
perspective on the role of executive decision-making over restricted patients 
in England and Wales.
Purpose of this chapter
This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the issues I have researched 
and my analysis of key research questions in the thesis. These questions 
are:
i. What is the role and effect of the executive in the restricted patient 
system?
ii. How do other actors view the role and effect of the executive in the 
restricted patient system?
iii. How is the critical concept of ‘the public’, which plays a significant 
part in that system, constructed and to what extent does it have an 
impact upon decision-making in the system?
iv. How does the executive meet its mandate of public protection?
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In this chapter I cover four bodies of literature which frame how I shall answer 
these research questions in the ensuing chapters. They are:
i. criminological literature on detention, prevention and protection;
ii. criminological literature on victims;
iii. the laws and existing research of the restricted patient system in 
England and Wales; and
iv. theories of risk in the management of mentally disordered 
offenders.
The theoretical analysis in this chapter will frame discussions throughout my 
thesis. In the first area I use penal theory to consider the purposes of 
detention and the uses of indefinite, preventive and protective detention 
regimes. My thesis is situated broadly within theories of a contemporary 
practical penality in criminal justice. From the late 1960s to 1980s, penal 
policy was focussed on the aim of reducing the prison population (Ashworth 
1983). However a new penality has emerged in recent times, where declining 
general rates of crime, increasing rates of serious crime, and increased 
punitiveness are reshaping penal policy towards longer and harsher prison 
regimes. Contemporary penality is marked by contradictions at every level, 
including 'conflicts, interest groups, structural constraints’ and ‘cultural 
sensibilities' (Garland 2003:47). Most notably for my purpose, the punitive 
sentiments of this type of penality override alternative notions such as 
rehabilitation, therapeutic intervention and decarceration. The shift towards a 
more punitive penality has attracted numerous explanations. For example, in 
Garland’s thesis of penal modernism he suggests that,
what seems to have come into question now, after the acknowledged 
failure of the most developed form of correctionalism, and in a period 
when Enlightenment social engineering has become deeply 
unfashionable, is a basic principle of modern punishment - namely the 
presumption that crime and deviance are social problems for which 
there can be a technical institutional solution (Garland 1990:7; see 
also Garland 2001; 2003).
For Reiner, part of the inherent contradiction of contemporary penality lies in 
its discord with other aspects of public policy and debate.
The idea that there is a zero-sum contest between victims and 
offenders, causal explanation and moral responsibility, understanding
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and condemnation, is a key feature of the currently dominant politics 
of law and order... Punitive obsessions are the undeclared projection, 
not the obverse, of the evils they condemn (Reiner 2007:19).
Reiner attributes the characteristics of contemporary penality to neo­
liberalism which, he says, ‘is associated both with higher levels of serious 
crime than social democracies, and with more punitive and inhumane crime 
control’ (Reiner 2007:13).
I do not seek to conduct a detailed analysis of the identification of, and 
debates about, the changing nature of penal policy and inquiry. Rather, I am 
interested in how we can understand some of the shifts in mental health law 
through the changing agenda of penality. My discussion of penal theory in 
this chapter lays the groundwork for my substantive analysis later about how 
the preventive elements of mental health law were used to control 
dangerousness. Compulsory treatment under mental health law enables 
detention for preventive or protective purposes justified on the grounds of risk 
posed by particular individuals categorised as unpredictable and dangerous. 
As this broadens the scope of detention usually permitted within traditional 
criminal law, I conclude that there is a lesson for criminology in the scope of 
preventive and protective detention regimes that lie outside the formal 
reaches of the criminal justice system; particularly in the existence of regimes 
which increase the reach and effect of detention on the basis of future 
behaviour or risk.
I am also interested in criminological accounts of the rise (or return) of a 
victim focus in criminal justice. Garland and Reiner have talked about the 
shifting focus towards victims as evidence of the changing landscape of 
penal policy (Garland 2001; Reiner 2007). Examining the restricted patient 
system through a criminological lens enabled me to consider what effect 
these shifts towards a victim focus within criminal justice policy have had on 
alternative systems like mental health. From my analysis, I suggest that 
victims are increasingly understood as representatives of the general public, 
not just as members of it.
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The ‘public’ is a contested term and major questions for this thesis are who 
was meant by ‘the public’ and what effect that construction had on decision­
making. My discussion considers whether public protection was constructed 
in response to the challenges of caring for and managing restricted patients, 
or whether the care and management of restricted patients took place in 
response to concerns about public protection. For example, how did policy 
declarations feed into policy- and decision-making and its material 
expression in terms of outcomes for individual cases? I examine executive 
decision-makers and both legal and clinical practitioners to analyse these 
questions further.
I am also interested in the extent to which victims constituted a particular 
grouping within notions of ‘the public’. Exploring the interaction of victim 
interests and public policy enables an analysis of public perceptions of the 
restricted patient system, constructions of dangerousness, perceptions of 
risk, and the notion of protection. While the role of the public in policy 
development has a long-established tradition, criminal justice policy has 
taken a particular interest in victim issues in recent decades. I shall explore 
how this refocusing of criminal justice policy towards victim-related issues 
has had an impact upon the restricted patient system and particularly on the 
exercise of executive discretion therein.
This chapter also includes an explanation of the restricted patient system in 
England and Wales, which was the empirical site for my fieldwork. I begin by 
setting out the legal structure of this system, showing how restriction orders 
emerged from existing provisions for compulsory detention under mental 
health law, as a way of managing people regarded as posing a particular risk 
of dangerousness to the public. I then review existing research, focussing 
particularly on decision-making. I draw on some areas that are analogous to 
my subject to provide a context for my analysis in the absence of an 
established body of work on restricted patients themselves.
I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the various literatures on risk, 
specifically from sociological and psychiatric perspectives. Approaches to risk 
were integral to almost every operation in the restricted patient system. Risk
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theory has also been the subject of sustained sociological analysis. My 
discussion explores the challenges of attempting to weave sociological 
explanations of risk with the ways it is practiced in forensic psychiatry.
Although imposing a structure for the purpose of discussion brings these 
areas of literature into sharp relief, my intention is not to present them as 
distinct, finite bodies of work. The boundaries between them are actually 
quite fluid. In some cases they run into each other; in others they intersect; 
and frequently the analysis is relevant at both a theoretical and practical 
level. For example, the influence of penal policy on criminal law is not 
unidirectional but interactive, and both areas influence and are influenced by, 
public opinion. In part, my literature review attempts to elucidate the 
interaction of theory and practice per se, before examining it empirically in 
the context of the restricted patient system.
The range of theoretical and empirical literature relevant to my study is 
enormous and reviewing it all would take more than the word limit of a whole 
thesis. Consequently I have had to be strategically selective in the literature I 
have explored in terms of volume and how far I could engage with the 
material. The present chapter is intended to map out the landscape of the 
laws and system that underpin decisions about the discharge of restricted 
patients in England and Wales, and of the analytical tools I shall use to 
analyse them in the substantive chapters of my thesis. Several areas of 
relevant literature not covered in this chapter, including mental health and 
human rights, and legal decision-making, are reserved for discussion in 
subsequent substantive chapters.
Section I: Detention, Prevention and Protection
My research focused on people detained under mental health law. The 
purpose of their detention was therapeutic, for compulsory treatment of 
mental disorder; it was not punitive. However, I was interested in how public 
policy and the exercise of executive discretion dealt with the intersection of 
the therapeutic objectives of mental health law, on the one hand, and the 
policy imperative of controlling dangerousness on the other. I discuss the 
origins of the agenda to control dangerousness in the mental health system
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in a substantive chapter. However there were other ways to understand the 
origins of that imperative, not least from the terrain of law and order politics 
within criminal justice. In this chapter I shall set out some of the dynamics of 
that ‘law and order’ context.
In the following section I discuss criminological theories on penal policy. I 
begin with an analysis of the principles that have traditionally underpinned 
detention for the purpose of punishment. From here, I examine the growing 
landscape of preventive and protective detention regimes that have emerged 
over the last ten years. The purpose of this discussion is to inform 
consideration in later chapters of the uses of preventive detention in the 
restricted patient system.
Penality is one of the concepts I shall return to throughout my thesis. I use it 
in the sense that Garland has set out.
Punishment is taken here to be the legal process whereby violators of 
the criminal law are condemned and sanctioned in accordance with 
specified legal categories and procedures. This process is itself 
complex and differentiated, being composed of the interlinked 
processes of law-making, conviction, sentencing, and the 
administration of penalties. It involves discursive frameworks of 
authority and condemnation, ritual procedures of imposing 
punishment, a repertoire of penal sanctions, institutions and agencies 
for the enforcement of sanctions and a rhetoric of symbols, figures, 
and images by means of which the penal process is represented to its 
various audiences. ... I have tried to capture this sense of internal 
complexity by proposing the generic term 'penality' to refer to the 
network of laws, processes, discourses, representations and 
institutions which make up the penal realm, and I will use this term as 
a more precise synonym for 'punishment' in its wider sense (Garland 
1990:17).
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The purpose of punishment
The even-handedness of justice is that of universal conscription 
against a common enemy ... of the abstract definition of rights which 
places the ban upon anyone who falls outside of its rigid terms. Thus 
we see society almost helpless in the [grip] of the hostile attitude it has 
taken towards those who break its laws and contravene its institutions. 
Hostility towards the lawbreaker inevitably brings with it the attitudes of 
retribution, repression, and exclusion. These provide no principles for 
the eradication of crime, for returning the delinquent to normal social 
relations, nor for stating the transgressed rights and institutions in 
terms of these positive social functions (Mead 1918).
In traditional criminal law, detention has been utilised as, and sometimes for, 
punishment. Mead’s classic work posited that ‘retribution’ (deterrence to the 
offender) and ‘prevention’ (deterrence to others) were instinctive social 
responses that shaped public perceptions of criminal justice (ibid). The utility 
of Mead’s work today reminds us that many of the contemporary debates 
about penal policy are not new; and indeed, that penal policy has 
continuously shifted between expressions of harshness and other 
sentiments. Alternative approaches have also emerged, such as the growth 
of restorative justice initiatives. Yet, within the shifting terrain of penal 
policies, punitiveness has remained on the agenda in one form or another.
In my analysis I use the term ‘punitiveness’ to connote the use of detention 
not just as a form of punishment but for punishment. To explain this by way 
of example, a convicted offender might be sent to prison as punishment. 
Here, punishment is in the form of the deprivation of liberty that comes from 
being confined in prison. However, an offender who is sent to prison for 
punishment might expect a set of harsh conditions while in prison that are 
intended to make the prisoner experience fear or suffer in other ways.
In the case of mental health law, detention has traditionally been intended for 
the purpose of compulsory treatment of mental disorder. One of the 
questions I was interested in considering at the outset of my doctorate was 
whether the increasing punitiveness observed in criminal justice was being 
replicated in other systems, such as that of detention under mental health 
law.
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The idea of punishment over and above the fact of detention has gained 
increasing popularity. In the 1980s, even when the dominant theme of penal 
policy was a reduction of the prison population (Ashworth 1983), punishment 
remained on the policy agenda. For instance, Hawkins showed how parole 
boards utilised their decision-making powers to inflict punishment on inmates 
who misbehaved (Hawkins 1986). Suggesting that decisions were based on 
the form of an offender’s conduct, rather than its content, Hawkins argued 
that ‘parole board decisions often have little to do with judgments about 
“rehabilitation”, or “risk”, or other aspects of a prisoner’s future conduct’ 
(Hawkins 1986). Decisions about release were influenced by the behaviour of 
the offender whilst enduring their punishment through loss of liberty in prison, 
not simply because of it.
Penal theory has always posited punishment as a means to an end (Garland 
1990). Where Mead accounted for that in terms of controlling crime (Mead 
1918), other explanations suggested that punishment served more of a social 
role. For example, Durkheim believed that principles of punishment explained 
much about social order, and that penal sanctioning was a process that ‘both 
expressed and regenerated society's values’ (Garland 1990:23).1 By 
contrast, Foucault was interested in the ‘internal workings’ of punishments: 
the actual technologies of penal power and their mode of operation (Garland 
1990:131). Yet, as Garland argues, institutions are
never fully explicable purely in terms of their ‘purposes’ ... if we are to 
understand such artefacts we have to think of them as social and 
cultural entities whose meanings can only be unravelled by careful 
analysis and detailed examination (Garland 1990).
While theories of punishment are fascinating in themselves, they are not the 
subject of my research. However it is important to understand the social 
context in which punishment takes place and the purposes of it for my 
subsequent analysis of detention as a mechanism for controlling 
dangerousness.
1 Of course, Durkheim was also motivated by the search for ‘the sources of social solidarity 
which were, for him, the fundamental conditions of collective life and social cohesion’, as 
Garland goes on to point out in his critique (Garland 1990:23).
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Additional principles or frameworks which have an impact upon the utility of 
punishment can also provide some direction on the deeper meanings of 
punishment. One of the most important of these is the principle of 
proportionality. A key principle of penal theory is that the amount of time a 
person is deprived of their liberty should be proportionate to the offence 
committed. Building on a well-established tradition of scholarship in this area 
Lukes and Scull argued that the very nature of proportionality pointed to 
another purpose of punishment - that of prevention (1983). They argued that 
gradations in punishment were necessary to meet its preventive objectives. 
Proportionality is nonetheless a contentious issue in penal theory, not least 
for its applicability to criminal justice processes. Duff and Garland have 
outlined an argument made by many that, while proportionality may be an 
idealised principle in theory, it is almost impossible to achieve in practice.
F irst... we cannot in practice hope to achieve a proper proportionality 
between crime and punishment; second, that there are other principles 
such as that of parsimony in punishment which may conflict with the 
demands of proportionality; and third that an undue emphasis on strict 
proportionality stands in the way of making effective use of the wide 
range of ‘intermediate sanctions’ which are finding favour amongst 
penal policy-makers (Duff and Garland 1994:19).
Their critique hints at the irreconcilability of theories of proportionality on the 
one hand and the practical ways that punishment and detention play out on 
the other. This tension is also present in systems of control of mentally 
disordered offenders. For example, an issue that frequently arises is the 
question of how to respond to evidence of drug use by patients. An example 
from the jurisdiction of New South Wales (Australia) is a case in point. 
Wheeler looked at forensic patients who were on conditional discharge in the 
community, who subsequently tested positive for drug use (2003). Under the 
recall powers in that jurisdiction, the patients were returned to detention for 
breaching their conditions of release. Wheeler found that the fact of being 
subject to executive discretion could result in a patient being detained for 
months or years as a result of one positive drug test. Yet, had the person 
been charged, tried and convicted for that drug use in a criminal procedure, 
they would have been unlikely to receive a period of detention at all. Whilst 
the example is Australian, the implications have universal application for 
systems of executive discretion. Charged with protecting the public,
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executive decision-makers are unlikely to be deterred from returning 
someone to detention, simply because it might be a disproportionately harsh 
response. As Rose argues,
a whole variety of paralegal forms of confinement are being devised ... 
not so much in the name of law and order, but in the name of the 
community that they threaten, the name of the actual or potential 
victims they violate. It appears that the convention of ‘rule of law’ must 
be waived for the protection of the community against a growing 
number of ‘predators’, who do not conform to either legalistic or 
psychiatric models of subjectivity (2000).
The potential exists for restricted patients to suffer disproportionately greater 
penalties than people in the community or other offenders, by virtue of the 
unfettered discretion the executive has to respond to incidents that take place 
while a person is on a restriction order. Thus the principle of proportionality 
raises particular challenges in the context of these mentally disordered 
offenders.
Bean has argued that ‘special restrictions ought not to last longer than a 
period proportionate to the gravity of the offence for which they were 
imposed’ (1986). Indefinite detention, therefore, raises particular concerns in 
relation to proportionality. For Wood, because offenders with a hospital order 
do not have a set date of discharge, ‘the lottery of uncertain diagnosis and 
lack of clarity about appropriate places of detention leads to many clear 
examples of injustice’ (1993). This suggests that not only should the purpose 
of detention be clear, but the length of that detention should have regard to 
questions of proportionality, as well as clinical and other considerations.
Essentially, the principle of proportionality turns on the notion that prison 
sentences (or other measures involving the deprivation of liberty) should be 
limited with respect to the behaviour they are punishing. A logical extension 
of the principle of proportionality is that detention ought not to be indefinite. 
However there have been arguments adduced in favour of indefinite 
detention, primarily as a solution to the problem of dangerous or high rate 
offenders (Greenwood 1983). Indeterminate sentences and indefinite 
detention have been canvassed in relation to selective incapacitation, 
described by Wilson as a policy that ‘reserves the most [prison] spaces and
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longest terms for those offenders who commit the most crime while free on 
the street’ (Wilson 1983:279).
These arguments for indefinite detention are useful in considering the way 
incapacitation as punishment for offending has taken shape in various 
aspects of criminal justice policy. They are particularly important to bear in 
mind with respect to the restricted patient system, because of its position at 
the intersection of criminal justice and mental health policy. The purpose of 
indefinite detention in the mental health system contrasts strikingly with that 
in criminal justice policy. Under mental health law, indefinite detention is the 
basis for compulsory treatment of a mental disorder, for as long as it takes to 
treat that disorder such that it is no longer of a nature or severity to require 
compulsory treatment. As such, indefinite detention in mental health law has 
a therapeutic utility.
This leads to a question which underpins my thesis: what is the role of 
proportionality in a system where people are detained indefinitely for the 
purpose of treatment, but as a result of committing an illegal action? Tariffs 
provide one example of an attempt at proportionality. They are utilised in the 
UK through the provisions of discretionary life sentences for serious and 
violent offenders who pose a risk to society. However Mackay has argued 
that in Canada the contradictory objectives of sentencing policy rendered 
tariffs ineffective (1995). These provisions were intended to curb the use of 
compulsory detention under mental health law to detain mentally disordered 
offenders for disproportionately long periods of time. He found that capping 
periods of detention for people found unfit to plead or insane were 
undermined by simultaneously requiring minimum sentences for murder and 
other serious offences. Whilst capping periods of detention was intended to 
bring proportionality into the realm of detention of mentally disordered 
offenders, the objectives of punishment and therapy were simply 
irreconcilable in practice.
Protective sentencing and preventive detention
The principle of proportionality is challenged by the ever-increasing range of 
detention regimes designed to prevent future offending through the logic of
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containment (Reiner 2007). Concern about preventive detention is not a 
recent development in English criminal law. For example, reporting in 1963 
the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders argued that the 
preventive detention regime of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 was ineffective 
and contradicted the attempts at a more rehabilitative penal policy of the time 
(Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders 1963). It is a particular mark 
of modern penality that many of the issues at its core, and the strategies 
employed to address them, are not new. At the same time, sentencing 
legislation is an area of policy that changes constantly. These shifts make it 
an incredibly difficult area to review comprehensively. Yet, it is vital to 
consider sentencing in the context of notions of public protection and their 
effect on individual offenders. To that end, the following discussion focuses 
upon some of the characteristics of preventive detention in contemporary 
criminal justice policy.
In recent years protective sentencing regimes have emerged sometimes as 
an extension of existing preventive detention regimes and sometimes as an 
alternative framework altogether. These regimes are frequently justified on 
the grounds that ‘the harm predicted by any future criminal behaviour on the 
offender’s part is judged greater than the harm inflicted on the offender 
through the imposition of an additional period of incapacitation’ (Henham 
2003:58). As Henham argues, protective sentencing legislation has replaced 
the approach to sanctioning offenders for past offending behaviour with
policies aimed at public protection from predicted future harm The
focus of dangerousness assessment and its classification ... became 
a measure of the extent to which the public needed to be protected 
from such offenders (2003:59).
Henham argues that protective sentencing is ‘a social defence strategy 
whose political agenda is predicated on the social control of individuals whom 
the state declares have forfeited their right to be presumed harmless’ 
(2003:65). This echoes Mead’s concept of ‘instinctive punitiveness’. Yet 
protective sentencing also raises questions of legitimacy. To what extent 
should public policy be reactive to public attitudes such as punitiveness or 
the desire to be protected? Can we assume a clear, coherent structure to the
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development and implementation of policy in response to public sentiments? 
O’Malley has argued that contemporary penal policy is marked by ‘volatile 
and contradictory punishments’ in which the policy objectives and evidence- 
based outcomes are not only inconsistent but may even be diametrically 
opposed (1999). In other cases there may be a lack of clarity over whether 
such sentencing policy is punitive or preventive (Henham 2003). Indeed, the 
question of whether a penal policy is punitive or preventive assumes that 
sentencing should perform one task only, which is not necessarily the case.
Nevertheless, as the debates about protective sentencing illustrate, critics 
have been concerned to make a distinction between the punitive and 
protective elements of penal policy. In another example, Padfield studied 
discretionary lifer legislation which enables prolonged detention of offenders 
who are likely to re-offend on the grounds of public protection.2 She found,
no evidence that deterrence is likely to have an effect on those who 
commit the most serious crimes for which a life sentence is likely to be 
imposed. Nor can deterrence itself justify disproportionate penalties. 
As soon as one accepts that not all lifers are ‘dangerous’ one has 
admitted that the sentence is sometimes disproportionate. Nor can life 
imprisonment be easily justified as an incapacitation or as social 
protection: many people will be falsely included in the net of the 
incapacitated. ‘Risk’, as we have seen, is notoriously difficult to predict 
(Padfield 2002:152).
The implications are clear and manifold. Whilst the intention of protective 
sentencing is to protect the public through extended incapacitation, there is 
no guarantee that it is always successful. Moreover, incapacitation comes at 
the cost of an additionally punitive effect on the offender. Therefore, 
increasing degrees of punitiveness are justified on the basis of public 
protection.
In his analysis of contemporary mental health policy, Monahan observed a 
difference between the USA, which used mental health law to prolong control 
of convicted persons nearing the end of their sentence, and the UK, which 
sought to control those assessed as presenting high risk who had not
2 The likelihood of recidivism must be to a degree as severe as the index offence for which 
they were convicted. The sentence involves a tariff setting out the minimum term to be 
served for the purpose of punishment.
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necessarily been convicted (2004). In both cases, the protection of the public 
was used to justify a protective agenda which prolonged the detention of the 
mentally disordered offender. Indeed, as Fennell & Yeats argue, 
discretionary life sentences in England and Wales have resorted to protective 
sentencing in response to potential risks posed by mentally disordered 
offenders (2002). The relevance of this discussion to my thesis lies in the 
increasing conflation of punitiveness towards offenders and protection of the 
public, through extended periods of detention designed to prevent harm. The 
implication is that public protection is a justification used to mask 
punitiveness in longer periods of detention for particular populations. As I 
shall discuss in later chapters, the very low reconviction rates of restricted 
patients compared with offender populations were used by some in the 
system to suggest that these patients were being detained for far longer 
periods than was warranted either for their treatment or for public protection.
My research revealed that protection of the public was the key consideration 
of government decision-makers in the restricted patient system. Yet there 
had been little inquiry in to whether or how the protective trends in alternative 
systems had affected the restricted system. For example, what was the effect 
of the protection agenda in a system where the purpose of detention was not 
punishment but was therapeutic intervention? I consider this question in 
subsequent chapters of my thesis.
A final consideration regarding punitiveness rests on the priority given to the 
prevention of risk in penal policy. Undoubtedly, imprisonment itself is still a 
relatively infrequent penalty considered as a proportion of all convictions. 
However, my discussion has focused on aspects of prison punishment to 
enable subsequent analysis of some of the comparisons and contrasts 
between the purposes of detention in mental health law and criminal justice. 
In the latter context, one of the ways the purposes of detention have been 
blurred is through the increasingly punitive effect of attempts to control risk by 
preventing future acts (Brown and Pratt 2000). Hope & Sparks argue that this 
preoccupation with risk is not entirely new (2000). Rather, it is the result of ‘a 
series of curious hybrids, whose common context is an intense attention to 
the process of punishment and to politician’s increasingly extravagant claims
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to be able to buttress social order through the incarceration of offenders’ 
(Hope and Sparks 2000:7). I am interested in whether this hybrid model is 
reflected in the restricted patient system. Peay argues that the ability to 
provide effective intervention to offenders with mental disorder is limited 
(1993). At an individual level this can serve to undermine the interests of the 
mentally disordered person in question, such as via compulsory treatment. At 
a more structural level the preoccupation with risk that underpins 
contemporary sentencing practices has the potential to leave mentally 
disordered offenders ‘being dealt with more harshly’ (Peay 2002:747). 
Perhaps the elements of punitiveness that pervade penal policy are simply 
unavoidable in the restricted patient system.
The quotation above from Hope and Sparks points to the politicisation of 
penal, policy towards greater punitiveness. A detailed analysis of the 
relationship between public perceptions of criminal justice and the shaping of 
penal policy is beyond the scope of this thesis. However these are important 
elements of the decision frames operating in the restricted patient system. 
This means they have an influence on the environment in which these 
decisions are made. In the thesis I explore the interaction between 
punitiveness and public opinion as it effects government decisions about 
restricted patients. Questions considered to this end include whether 
punitiveness is a factor in this system and if so, how? As Peay notes, for the 
systems responding to criminal offending by people with mental illness, the 
competing demands of crime control (protection of the community on the one 
hand, punishment or treatment of the offender on the other) mean that these 
systems are ‘subject to conflicting pressures deriving from societal and 
individual interests’ (Peay 1993:44).3 If punitiveness is present in this system, 
does it determine public opinion? Is it a response to public opinion? Or is 
there a more complicated process of interaction? I will return to these issues 
in my analysis in later chapters.
This discussion has introduced the elements of punitiveness, protection and 
proportionality in contemporary penal policy to provide some terms of
3 These conflicting pressures are the subject of further analysis in subsequent chapters.
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reference for the various uses of detention in contemporary policy. As I 
discuss below, the purpose of detention in mental health law contrasts 
strikingly with that in criminal justice. Far from punishment, it is intended to 
ensure the therapeutic application of mental health care to people who may 
not choose it of their own volition. And yet, as my thesis unfolds what will 
become clear is the potential for these very different purposes of detention to 
be increasingly blurred by a policy priority on public protection at the 
exclusion of individual rights and liberties.
Section II: Victims
One of the original research questions for this project was how the increasing 
focus on victims in criminal justice policy was affecting executive decision­
making about the release of restricted patients. Through my empirical work it 
became clear that the role of the executive was firmly embedded in the 
agenda of public protection. Within this framework, victims became 
subsumed within a broader research question of what ‘public protection’ 
meant. Who was protected and how? This led to a theoretical re­
conceptualisation of victims not just as a unique group in isolation but also as 
constituent of the public. These considerations form the substance of 
subsequent chapters. I introduce them here with a discussion of the rise (or 
re-emergence) of the victim in recent decades firstly in criminological 
research, and then in criminal justice policy.
Attention to Victims in Research
Victims have burst onto the stage of criminological research and public policy 
over the past two decades. This is reflected in a notable (indeed 
monotonous) trend in most victimological literature to tell the story of this 
phenomenon. Most discussions of victims begin with a precis of the origins of 
interest in victims and the sudden analytical and political currency of victims. 
These narratives are generally repetitive and far more detailed than I present 
here. Rather than cover this ground again I am interested in why these 
explanations should be felt necessary in so much of the literature. I suggest 
that it is in part an acknowledgement of just how recent and pervasive the 
shift towards victims has been. Importantly for my research, the recent
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timeframe accounts for the disparity between the evidence of the 
considerable body of victim-related research, and how the orientation of 
policy towards victims manifests itself in public policy.
The notion that victims were ‘the forgotten man’ in criminal justice was central 
to the early stages of criminological inquiry into victims (Shapland et al 
1985:176). Historically, victims had a much more central role in criminal 
justice processes and even shouldered the financial and evidentiary 
responsibilities for prosecution (Shapland et al 1985; Bianchi 1994). 
Contemporary liberal criminal law emerged out of the political control of the 
population by Norman kings, which developed the notion of crime as an 
offence against the state, rather than as conflict between citizens (Bianchi 
li994).4 Over time, this shift resulted in the bureaucratisation of a system for 
responding to crime, with the victim ‘no longer playing a role of importance 
and no longer able to stop a criminal procedure by settlement without the 
consent of the state’s prosecutors’ (Bianchi 1994:17; Rock 2004b). Since 
then and until very recently, victims were only incorporated in criminal justice 
as witnesses, if at all. ‘Victim’s interests were subsumed within the public 
interest, [believing] that, in the long run, the state’s correctionalist policies 
would work to the interest of both the public and the offender’ (Garland 
2001:121).
It is no longer the case that victims are forgotten by criminal justice policy 
(Zedner 2002). In a very short time a veritable canon has developed on the 
subject of victims in the fields of criminology, sociology, social policy, law, 
health, psychology and geography (see for example Shapland et al 1985; 
see for example Christie 1986; Fattah 1986; Rock 1986; Mawby and 
Walklate 1994; Newburn and Stanko 1994; Davies et al 1996; Stanko 2000; 
Zedner 2002; Rock 2004; Walklate 2007). Moreover, as Walklate notes, ‘a 
concern with and for the victim of crime has become not just a symbolic 
reference point in government policy but the dominant one’ (Walklate 
2007:7). Reviewing this entire literature is neither necessary nor relevant
4 Interestingly, Bianchi suggests this as one explanation for the origins of punitiveness, as 
'crime was no longer viewed as a regulable conflict but as a social heresy, the state's 
business’ (Bianchi 1994:17).
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here. Instead, I wish to focus on several themes in the literature which I will 
draw on throughout my thesis.
Firstly, the ‘ideal victim’, conceptualised in Christie’s classic work, has been a 
key theme in much of the literature (1986). Christie defined the ideal victim as 
constituted by his or her (relative) powerlessness. Using the example of 
women as victims of crime, Christie argued that as women gained greater 
economic power, they would have greater power to demand recognition as 
victims. However as their power increased their status as ideal victim would 
diminish.
In being an ideal victim, she (or sometimes he) must be strong enough 
to be listened to, or dare to talk. But she (he) must at the very same 
time be weak enough not to become a threat to other important 
interests. A minimum of strength is a precondition to being listened to, 
but sufficient strength to threaten others would not be a good base for 
creating the type of general and public sympathy that is associated 
with the status of being a victim (Christie 1986:21, emphasis in 
original).
As important as Christie’s work has been in scholarship about victims, the 
notion of an idealised victim type has been challenged by other work pointing 
to the utilitarian and sometimes competitive aspects of victim status. In their 
analysis of the introduction of hate crime laws in the USA in the 1980s, 
Jacobs and Potter pointed to the structured hierarchies of violent offending, 
and by extension of victims, that were created through these laws.
It might be tempting to conclude that jealousies and resentments over 
exclusions from the hate crime laws can be avoided by drafting these 
laws to include all salient prejudices. While that would solve the 
problem of disparaging some groups’ victimisations in comparison to 
others’, it would also negate the primary purpose of the hate crime 
laws: to specially condemn offenders with certain prejudices and 
specially recognize their victims. Hate crime laws only make sense if 
certain bigoted offenders are condemned more forcefully and 
punished more severely than offenders who commit the same crimes 
but for nonprejudiced reasons. It is the exclusion that gives these laws 
their symbolic power and meaning (Jacobs and Potter 1998:133, 
emphasis in quotation).
In other words, attaining victim status is a mark of power in a competitive 
landscape of identity politics.
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Writing more recently, Rock notes that ‘victim’ is not necessarily an 
‘appealing term’, connoting contradictory images of pariah and saint. These 
contradictions are also evident in the multiple meanings ascribed to victim 
status:
it tends preponderantly to convey stigmatised meanings of weakness,
loss and pain On the other hand, becoming a victim can have its
rewards: sympathy; attention; being treated as blameless; the ability to 
bestow meaning and control on an untoward and disturbing 
experience; the receiving of exoneration, absolution, validation and 
credit, exemption from prosecution, mitigation of punishment and 
financial compensation (Rock 2002:14).
Secondly, and despite the idealisation of victim types, empirical research has 
found very high correlations between victim and offender demographics, 
particularly in the shared experience of victimisation by many offenders. 
What it means to be a ‘victim’ is complicated even further, for instance, by the 
secondary stigma associated with the families of offenders, which can lead to 
both direct and indirect victimisation (see for example Condry 2007). 
Moreover, there are particular characteristics shared by those most likely to 
offend and those who have suffered the severest victimisation, as Rock has 
noted.
They tend to be those at the margins of groups and the feet of 
hierarchies: the young, male, members of minority-ethnic groups, 
offenders, squatters, single adults, the geographically mobile, the 
homeless and the residents of inner city and satellite estates (Rock 
2002:21).
Thirdly, and by contrast, as victimised populations have been increasingly 
scrutinised, research has simultaneously examined the success of victim 
claims, particularly the way in which certain voices have been privileged over 
others within the terrain of victim’s interests. Zedner argues that,
criminological understanding of victims’ needs is largely reliant on 
views expressed by victims themselves - a source that is necessarily 
problematic. Vocal, determined, or well-connected victims may 
express their needs forcibly, ironically at the expense of those whose 
needs are greatest but whose very vulnerability or inability to ask for 
help ensures their silence (Zedner 2002:431).
One important consequence of this has been that the success of particular 
political claims of victims may not reflect the range and diverse objectives of
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all victims. Zedner attributes the political currency of victims to successful 
lobbying, but argues that it is disproportionately greater than their actual 
needs within criminal justice processes (2002). In other words the loudest 
voice is not always the most representative.
Media and political messages play a role here producing ‘opposing 
distortions ... where innocent victims tend to be depicted as the very 
antithesis of wicked criminals’ (Rock 2002:14). Rock posits one account for 
this inability to reconcile the connections between victims and offenders as 
the failure to consider victimisation as ‘interaction’ (Rock 2002:18). But it is 
the policy and process outcome that I shall focus on in chapters to come; that 
is, the hegemonic positioning of victim interests over other groups in criminal 
justice policy and process.
The point of this discussion is not to excuse offences committed by people 
who have also been victimised. Rather, it is to acknowledge that the notion of 
victims and offenders as two distinct, opposing categories does not reflect 
the reality of lived experience for many people. To what extent this reality is 
reflected in policy is another matter. At the point where research and policy 
intersect, there has been an acknowledgement that policy responses do not 
always meet the aims and objectives of victims themselves. Rock suggests 
that, in the priority placed on victims at the Home Office, ‘victims and 
witnesses came ineluctably to take some part of their character from their 
relation to the twin imperatives of crime reduction and public confidence’ 
(Rock 2004:38). However victims themselves recognised that the politics of 
the system meant that their own concerns would have an impact only in so 
far as they suited government objectives of the day (Rock 2004). In other 
words, the success of victim advocacy may depend upon broader political 
objectives, which may also mean that the responses to that advocacy are not 
necessarily what was sought. The extent to which these complexities are 
engaged with by government responses to both victims and offenders in the 
restricted patient system is something I consider at length in subsequent 
chapters.
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Attention to Victims in Policy
Earlier I suggested that the standard precis of the rise (or re-emergence) of the 
victim is an acknowledgment of the phenomenal developments around crime 
victims in a very short space of time. However it can also be seen as an account 
of the disjunction between the evidence that has emerged from victimological 
research and how systems respond to victims in practice. Most research on 
victims does not claim to be definitive about the origins, intentions or effects of 
victim engagement with criminal justice. However, there is a clear mismatch 
between what has been well-established within the literature and the directions 
taken in how policies respond to victims.
The best example of this disjunction is the persistent idea that victims and 
offenders are distinct, opposing categories. As Christie argued, ‘the more ideal a 
victim is, the more ideal becomes the offender’ (Christie 1986:25). Thus 
offenders are often defined against, or understood in relation to their victims. 
This attitude has become entrenched in public policy in particular ways, one of 
which is the use of victim surveys. Stanko suggests that ‘the crime survey 
provides an opportunity to gain a wider picture of crime by allowing the public to 
give their own account of criminal harm and express anxiety about its potential’ 
(2000:15). Crime has been increasingly understood in relation to the 
identification of victims; and its severity increasingly measured (in part) by its 
correlative impact upon victims. ‘If a problem of crime is to be taken “seriously”, it 
seems that a crime survey is one of the major devices used to demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of an issue and to advocate for sympathetic treatment of newly 
identified “victims’” (ibid). This is despite questions raised about both their 
validity and application. As Hough and Roberts note, some survey responses 
are a direct product of the methodologies employed and therefore ‘the correct 
political response is to disregard what is essentially unreliable evidence’ (Hough 
and Roberts 1998:13). Meanwhile, Rock has suggested that surveys influence 
perceptions and behaviour no matter how unrepresentative they are:
although public attitudes can assume many shapes, surveys do have a 
most important effect on political and social conduct. ... Ironically, what 
may initially appear to be sociologically naive is actually a fairly literal and 
exhaustive definition of one manifestation of the phenomenon of society's 
attitudes (1986:34).
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Defining social attitudes in this way serves an instrumental purpose in 
providing a tangible basis for public policy. The representativeness of these 
attitudes is not called into question. Nevertheless, surveys have been a factor 
in shaping public perceptions of crime. This framework allows for little nuance 
in perceptions of victims and offenders. If the fact and severity of crime is 
understood by its effect on victims, then victims and offenders can only be 
understood as opposing forces.
This runs counter to the evidence, outlined above, of the correlation between 
experiences of victimisation and offending. However, it also runs counter to 
the objectives of many victims in terms of the outcomes of their offender’s 
cases. For example, in characterising victims and offenders as having 
dichotomously opposed interests, victim interests are easily conflated with 
punitiveness. As I shall discuss in subsequent chapters, this is as much 
reflected in relation to restricted patients as to other offenders, where media 
coverage is frequently accompanied by distraught or enraged messages of 
vengeance from victims. Yet there is significant evidence to suggest that 
victim concerns are often far from this. Some of the earliest work on victim 
involvement in criminal justice found that victims were not ‘particularly 
punitive in the sentences they wanted their offenders to receive’, focussing 
instead on things the victim wanted directly from the offender such as 
compensation (Shapland et al 1985:177). In restricted patient cases Rock 
found similarly that victim involvement was motivated by a desire to see 
systemic reform rather than individuals punished (1996). These findings bore 
out those of Hough and Roberts about public opinion more generally (1998). 
Examining public opinion on sentencing trends, they found that most public 
opinion was in response to specific, targeted polling, expressed in the 
absence of detailed knowledge about the issue in question.5 When informed 
about sentencing policy and trends, public opinion had a much closer 
‘convergence with actual sentencing decisions’ (Hough and Roberts 
1998:23). Perhaps, then, the notion of a definitive victim standpoint is as
5 Once again, the distinction between public opinion and public knowledge was not a new 
one. Writing in the 1970s, Gardiner had noted that, ‘unless some unusual event publicizes 
the policies followed by enforcement agencies and makes them particularly salient to the 
mass public, the attitudes of the average citizen may not be particularly relevant to the 
process of law-enforcement policy-making’ (Gardiner 1970:33).
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much a product of the questions asked of victims and the way they are 
reported, than of the content and detail of what victims actually want.
A good example of the divergence between the characterisation of victim 
interests and the interests themselves comes from the restricted patient 
system. As I discuss in this thesis, the victim organisation most involved in 
the restricted patient system was The Zito Trust. A key element of its 
advocacy platform has been systemic reform to ensure mentally disordered 
offenders receive adequate care and treatment to reduce their likelihood of 
offending. This is not to suggest that victims and offenders are actually 
seeking the same outcomes. The Zito Trust’s approach to.care and treatment 
includes ensuring that offender-patients are compliant with prescribed 
medication, which some argue is punitive from an offender’s perspective. My 
point is simply to acknowledge how complex and multifaceted victim 
perspectives are in the area of criminal justice and mental health.
By the time of my research, criminal justice policy was characterised by 
slogans that talked of ‘placing victims at the heart of criminal justice 
processes’ (Home Office 2006). Attention to victim interests was increasingly 
at the fore of reforms and policy initiatives, and victims were attaining formal 
recognition as stakeholders in criminal justice processes and outcomes. As 
my data will show, the strength of the political currency of victims in executive 
decision-making about restricted patients was undeniable. Yet there has 
been little research on the extent and effect of victim involvement on 
executive decision-making models, and in relation to mentally disordered 
offenders. Throughout my thesis I shall consider a number of questions in 
this regard, including the extent to which policies introduced as a response to 
victim lobbying reflected what victims themselves wanted; and the extent to 
which victims became integral to constructions of the public interest more 
generally.
Chapter 1: Literature Review [35]
Section III: The Laws and Existing Research of the Restricted Patient 
System
The discussion so far has examined criminological literature about trends in 
contemporary penal policy and the return of the victim to having a central 
focus within criminal justice. This analysis sets a theoretical context for 
examining the effects of criminal justice on mental health policy and on the 
management of restricted patients throughout my thesis. In the following 
discussion I introduce the mental health system which was the object of my 
study.
I begin by setting out how the restricted patient system operated in terms of 
law. I then explore the research in the field up to the time of my fieldwork and 
sociological debates about the construction of mental illness and mentally 
disordered offenders. These discussions set out the terrain which I analyse in 
the rest of the thesis.
Restriction Orders
Restriction orders are a category of hospital order contained in the law of 
England and Wales, as set out in the Mental Health Act 1983 (Part III). A 
hospital order is the process by which a court, after convicting a person of a 
criminal offence, orders the offender to be treated in hospital for his or her 
mental disorder. A standard hospital order allows a hospital to release an 
offender when it is clinically appropriate to do so (Dell and Grounds 1995). 
Sometimes a convicted person might be discharged from hospital and then 
taken to prison to serve their sentence. By contrast, a restriction order is 
made when a court entertains concerns about risks to public safety posed by 
the offender (Potts 1995). While the offender never serves a prison sentence, 
his or her discharge can only be determined by the Home Secretary or the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal. A court may impose a time limited restriction 
order, meaning that the patient must be discharged once the time has 
expired, if not before.6 When this occurs, the limited period is five years on
6 This provision was removed with the introduction of the Mental Health Act 2007, following 
the completion of my fieldwork.
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average (Street 1998). However it is rare for courts to impose a time-limited 
restriction order (Peay 2003). Most restriction orders result in an offender 
being detained indefinitely and, until 1983, his or her release could only be 
determined by the Home Secretary. Case law from the European Court of 
Human Rights required the establishment of a process of independent review 
for all hospital orders (Verdun-Jones 1989), and led to amendments to the 
Mental Health Act 1983 empowering the Tribunal to release restricted 
patients. However, in restricted cases the Tribunal does not have any power 
over the processes leading to the point of discharge, including transfer to less 
secure facilities and leave. Nor does the Tribunal have a role in monitoring 
patients in the community on conditional discharge. The Tribunal’s power 
over restricted patients is limited to conditional or absolute discharge. (The 
European and UK human rights frameworks have been extremely important 
in shaping this legal regime and are considered in detail in Chapter Seven.)
Mentally Disordered Offenders as Social Construction
My sociological approach to this field is informed by some of the classic 
literature dating from the 1960s and 1970s as well as by contemporary 
analysis. Central to this literature has been the development of the idea that 
mental illness was socially constructed. Thomas Szasz, himself a 
psychiatrist, posited that mental illness was ‘a metaphorical disease’ (Szasz 
1974:x) and that ‘psychiatry is not a medical, but a moral and political, 
enterprise’ (Szasz 1974:xiii). Szasz’s viewpoint is included here not to argue 
whether or not it is true but to point to the myriad perspectives of analysis 
and criticism to which psychiatry has been subject over the years. For my 
own purpose, the strength of Szasz’s critique lies in the attribution of social 
values to medical processes.
The temptation to embrace all medical interventions as forms of 
therapy, or to reject them all as forms of social control, must be firmly 
resisted. It behoves us, instead, to discriminate intelligently and to 
describe honestly the things doctors do to cure the sick and things 
they do to control the deviant (Szasz 1974:69).
My own structuralist approach is informed by this framework. I do not seek to 
discount the function or utility of psychiatry, an exercise which would lead to 
a different thesis altogether and would undermine the very site of my
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empirical fieldwork.7 The point of departure for this study is that a legal 
process, involving psychiatric diagnosis, has resulted in a restriction order. 
Thus I am interested in examining restricted patients through the intersection 
of medical as well as legal models of practice. However, I am also interested 
in how social perceptions such as fear influence decision-making in this 
arena. The challenge of reconciling medical and sociological approaches in 
the literature in this chapter is analogous to the empirical challenge of 
examining the intersection of health and legal frameworks in the restricted 
patient system.
Goffman’s work was also important in shaping my approach to fieldwork and 
analysing the attitudes of actors within that site. Goffman argued that ‘mental 
patients distinctively suffer not from mental illness, but from contingencies’ 
(Goffman 1961:126). Whilst the detention of people in psychiatric hospitals 
can be justified by those outside (‘in society’), in reality the distinction 
between who is inside and outside may be relatively arbitrary. The legacy of 
this argument resonates in critiques of the randomness of the classification of 
people as mentally disordered offenders, discussed below. Goffman did not 
take a nihilist view that mental illness does not exist. Rather, he was 
interested in people who were detained because of their mental illness. 
Understanding detention as a result of contingencies complicated the notion 
of madness as an objective, diagnosable, physiological condition and 
situated it within broader social processes of inclusion and exclusion.
Goffman was also interested in the question of protection of the public. As he 
saw it, ‘part of the official mandate of the public mental hospital is to protect 
the community from the danger and nuisance of certain kinds of misconduct’ 
(Goffman 1961:307). For Goffman, the elements of danger and nuisance 
posed by people with mental disorder were key in justifying detention for the 
purpose of social exclusion. Goffman’s work is also relevant to this study 
methodologically. His essays on psychiatric asylums integrated theoretical 
discussion of the purpose of incarceration with the analysis of the processes 
and people engaged in those institutions. He examined the relationships
7 Of course medical and scientific processes are themselves socialised, the discussion of 
which would take me away from the aims of my thesis.
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between staff and inmates in asylums, showing how those processes 
produced meaning themselves, as well as being shaped by the impact of 
institutional imperatives and expectations upon them. Goffman found that 
relationships between psychiatrists and inmates were,
doomed by the institutional context to a false and difficult relationship 
and are constantly funnelled into the contact that will express it: the 
psychiatrist must extend service civility from the stance of a server but 
can no more continue in that stance than the patient can accept it 
(1961:320).
Goffman’s interest in what he termed the ‘governed’ and the ‘governors’ was 
instrumental in turning sociological inquiry towards the interaction between all 
the players in institutions of incarceration, not simply the inmates. My interest 
in decision-making is underpinned by this philosophy that values inquiry into 
the origins and practices of power, not simply its objects.
Mentally Disordered Offenders: the Legal Context
According to Peay, the notion of ‘mentally disordered offender’ as a 
meaningful category ignores the ‘plurality’ of mentally disordered offenders 
as neither a homogenous nor exclusive population, who challenge accepted 
notions of illness and offending behaviour (Peay 2002:746; see also Peay
2004). James et al also note that the singular nature of a classification of 
‘mentally disordered offender’ obscures the many differences amongst the 
people included within it, such as between people who have been convicted 
of an offence and diverted to hospital prior to serving a sentence; people who 
have been transferred out of prison into hospital for compulsory treatment; 
people who have been found unfit to stand trial because of their mental 
disorder; people who have been acquitted on the grounds of insanity; and 
people who have been convicted of an offence but diverted to hospital for 
compulsory treatment of their mental disorder instead of serving a prison 
sentence (2002).
Most restricted patients fall into the last group and have often committed very 
serious offences which may involve violence or harm to others, including 
manslaughter. However, restricted patients are not necessarily serious or 
violent offenders. The specific criteria for a restriction order are based upon
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the court having concerns about the protection of the public. While this 
concern should be in relation to the nature of the offence and the risk of 
further offences, it does not necessarily follow that the offences involved will 
be violent in nature. The important point here is that the category of ‘mentally 
disordered offenders’ masks a wide range of mental conditions, criminal 
offences and histories of contact with the institutions of mental health and 
criminal justice. Whilst it is important to acknowledge the wide application of 
the term, and consequently the problem of deriving clear meaning from it, 
nonetheless it is a construction that is dominant in the language of the 
system on which my thesis is based, and does not have a feasible 
alternative. Accordingly, I use it in my work with all the caveats that the 
discussion above necessitates.
Prins notes that, historically, the criminal law imposed punishment regardless 
of the mental state of the accused (1995). However the criminal law currently 
has multiple procedures to classify someone as a mentally disordered 
offender, enabling their criminal matter to be disposed of in a way that takes 
account of their mental state. A hospital order is one such mechanism, 
facilitating compulsory treatment in hospital if an offender is mentally 
disordered. Other mechanisms include voluntary treatment in prison and 
transferring a sentenced offender to hospital from prison. There are also legal 
frameworks allowing mental disorder to be considered in trial proceedings. 
For example, the principle of fitness to stand trial embodies the requirement 
that the accused be of sound mind adequate to understand their charge. 
When a person is not of sound mind they may be found unfit to stand trial. 
Until recently, fitness proceedings were rarely used in England and Wales, 
partly because a finding of unfitness automatically resulted in the accused 
being hospitalised indefinitely, and partly because the finding did not allow a 
determination on the facts of the case itself (Kearns and McKay 2000; Peay 
2003). However the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 
1991 introduced greater flexibility in disposal options for people found unfit to 
plead. That Act also introduced a new procedure to enable a ‘trial of the 
facts’, ‘which applies to all cases where the jury has decided that the accused 
is unfit to plead and requires the prosecution to prove that the accused “did 
the act or made the omission charged’” (Kearns and McKay 2000:532). As a
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result, a steady and significant increase in fitness proceedings in recent 
years has been reported (McKay et a/2007).
Mental illness defences are another avenue by which criminal responsibility 
may be mitigated in the light of mental disorder. In this discussion I touch on 
two defences that are particularly relevant to restricted patients. The first is 
the partial defence of diminished responsibility in relation to charges of 
murder. If successful, a defence of diminished responsibility reduces a 
conviction of murder to manslaughter. 50% of restricted patients are charged 
with acts of violence, approximately 40% of which relate to murder or another 
form of homicide (Ly and Howard 2004). Although diminished responsibility is 
rarely used, one study found that almost 50% of verdicts of diminished 
responsibility resulted in a restriction order (McKay 2004:155). This finding of 
diminished responsibility in a large number of restricted patient cases is 
important to bear in mind given that, as I shall discuss later in my thesis, 
restricted patients are often considered in terms of their offending behaviour.
The second defence that is relevant to my analysis is insanity, based upon 
the 1843 M’Naghten Rules in which a person must know the nature of the act 
committed, or that the act was wrong, to warrant a conviction. Although 
important in principle, the insanity defence has never been widely used 
(Loughnan 2007). Explanations for the low rate of use of the insanity defence 
include the severity of the test applied according to the M’Naghten criteria 
(Prins 1990). Another explanation is the introduction of diminished 
responsibility in 1957 which replaced many insanity pleas (Verdun-Jones 
1989; Taylor and Gunn 1999). Moreover, it has long been argued that 
insanity no longer corresponds to psychiatric conceptions of moral 
functioning (see for example Smith 1980). Whilst research suggests that 
courts interpret the insanity defence more broadly than the M’Naghten Rules 
intended, Peay points out that the original Rules became anomalous both 
with clinical practice and with legal frameworks shaped by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Peay 2003). Where once the insanity defence 
was an avenue for disposing of some serious cases more leniently, the 
abolition of capital punishment has also contributed to the waning 
attractiveness of the M’Naghten Rules.
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The other key reason the insanity defence was often avoided was because it 
resulted in indefinite detention at Her Majesty’s pleasure. Depending on the 
nature of the possible conviction and consequent sentencing policy, an 
accused who pleaded insanity could spend more time being detained 
following an acquittal on the grounds of insanity than if they had been 
convicted (Prins 1990; Mitchell 2003). As I discuss in subsequent chapters, 
this has significant implications in the restricted patient system. Restriction 
orders have been widely perceived as being preferable to the indefinite 
detention of a successful M’Naghten’s plea. Yet, I argue that there is very 
little difference between the two, as a result of how the executive exercises 
its discretion to release restricted patients.
The insanity defence has now been the subject of a range of legislative 
reforms. Firstly, the Mental Health Act 1983 shifted the status of those 
acquitted on the grounds of mental illness to equate with that of restricted 
patients (Verdun-Jones 1989). This ensured that people detained following a 
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity had recourse to independent review 
via the Mental Health Review Tribunal in the same way as restricted patients. 
Secondly, the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 
expanded the options available to courts following a successful insanity 
defence, so that they included a hospital order without restrictions, a 
guardianship, supervision and treatment order, and absolute discharge 
(Mackay and Brooksbank 2005). This significantly widened the options 
available to courts in these matters, and theoretically increased the 
attractiveness of the insanity defence.
However, with the introduction of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims 
Act 2004 the options available shifted once again. Firstly, defendants found 
unfit to plead or not guilty by reason of insanity could only be given a hospital 
order if they met the criteria for compulsory detention under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 (a safeguard which had been missing from the original 
provisions). Secondly, the possibility of a guardianship order, which enabled 
an accused to receive care and protection rather than medical treatment, was 
removed from the disposal options available. Thirdly, supervision and
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treatment orders, modelled on probation orders but including psychiatric 
treatment as a condition, were replaced by, ‘a single supervision order which 
allows supervision by the most appropriate professional and now applies 
conditions of treatment to include not only psychiatric treatment for mental 
disorders but also medical treatment for physical disorders’ (Morris et al 
2006:608). Finally, the provision that raised considerable anxiety in much of 
the literature was the removal of the requirement that a court heard evidence 
from the receiving hospital, coupled with the court gaining the power to order 
an offender to a specific hospital.8 These changes were criticised by both 
practitioners and scholars who were concerned that hospitals may have to 
admit patients without any prior knowledge of the patient’s history or mental 
state and without necessarily agreeing with the medical evidence that was 
heard by the court (Morris et al 2006).
Despite the disposal options for mentally disordered offenders in criminal 
justice policy, Verdun-Jones has argued that the ‘issue of mental disorder 
has been effectively removed from the arena of criminal responsibility and 
transferred to the process of sentencing’ (Verdun-Jones 1989:20). He notes 
that the hospital order replaced a sentence in many cases and that it ‘does 
provide a more humane method of dealing with mentally ill offenders than the 
alternative of sending them to prison’ (ibid). However, Bean has argued that 
traditional theories of punishment were not capable of responding 
appropriately to mentally disordered offenders.
Retribution, based on deserts, cannot apply; mentally disordered 
people cannot be said to deserve punishment if they lack the 
necessary responsibility to be aware of their crime. Similarly, individual 
deterrence cannot apply; mentally disordered people are not 
responsible for their actions whilst they remain disordered. 
Rehabilitation will not apply either, for the prison medical services (as 
currently constituted) cannot provide the necessary treatment (Bean 
1986:92).
From this argument, the law has not been able to establish a consistent, 
coherent system for a category of offenders who challenge the principle of 
criminal responsibility and the purpose of outcomes like sentencing. At the
8 The DVCVA 2004 also removed the requirement that patients be subject to an order 
issued by the Secretary of State before a hospital could admit them. Consequently, the 
cou rt’s hospital order is sufficient to require a patient be admitted by a hospital.
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same time, the critique of criminal responsibility presupposes a complete loss 
of capacity on the part of the accused, which is not the case for many 
mentally disordered offenders.
One of the greatest problems of the inadequacies of the laws’ response to 
mentally disordered offenders is its randomness, including whether a 
defendant is given a psychiatric or penal dispositional outcome. For example, 
studies of case law have shown that the same legal arguments have 
produced different outcomes for defendants (Peay 1993; Prins 1993). This 
creates serious challenges for managing offenders post trial. As Rock has 
argued, mental disorder lies on the boundary between psychiatric practice 
and models of punishment and the mentally disordered offender is one with 
whom the prison system cannot cope (Rock 1996). Yet the extremely high 
rates of mental illness amongst offender populations are consistent 
irrespective of where they are detained (in prison or in hospital), and 
regardless of whether they are formally categorised as mentally disordered 
(Rock 1996). As Padfield notes,
once a person is labelled a restricted patient, he or she has different 
procedural rights than does the ‘dangerous’ person detained in prison. 
Yet people with similar characteristics may find themselves in one, 
rather than another, category. And, conversely, the people within the 
different categories do not necessarily share the same characteristics 
(Padfield 2002:124).
Over forty years ago Goffman made the same arguments about psychiatric 
patients in hospital.
Society’s official view is that inmates of mental hospitals are there 
primarily because they are suffering from mental illness. However, in 
the degree that the ‘mentally ill’ outside hospitals numerically 
approach or surpass those inside hospitals, one could say that mental 
patients distinctively suffer not from mental illness, but from 
contingencies (Goffman 1961:126).
Importantly, then, the category of mental disordered offender is characterised 
- at least in part - by an element of arbitrariness. It may not be random; it is a 
classification which is produced by the application of particular systems and 
beliefs, not least about the law, mental health and moral responsibility. It is
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also a classification that is affected by particular attitudes, or what some 
describe as stigma or discrimination. Part of the clamour for reform of mental 
health law in recent years has been in order to move away from the notion 
that patients of mental disorder should be subject to deprivation of liberty for 
treatment, when patients of physical disorder are not (this is an issue I shall 
address in greater detail in Chapters Six and Seven, and see for example 
Thornicroft 2006; Richardson 2007). Recognising the arbitrariness of the 
notion of mentally disordered offender challenges the meaningfulness of 
clear distinctions in the criminal law between sentenced offenders, those 
under a hospital order, and those under a restriction order. Yet the ability of 
offenders to access appropriate treatment for their mental disorder is 
determined by whether they fall within one of these categories. In other 
words, not withstanding the fact that the classification of someone as a 
mentally disordered offender may be arbitrary, there are a range of systems 
in place in response to that classification, one of which is the subject of study 
for the present doctorate.
One of the protections against the random application of these categories 
has emerged through the human rights framework established by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Peay 2002; Richardson 2005; 
Robinson and Scott-Moncrieff 2005). The Convention has been significant in 
(re)shaping legislation and processes to ensure they adequately protect the 
human rights of their subjects, such as in the reform of the Mental Health Act 
1983. The human rights framework has enabled procedural improvements 
such as the granting of determinative powers to the Tribunal. Yet, as I argue 
in Chapter Seven, the mere presence of such a safeguard does not 
necessarily resolve the problems posed by indefinite detention within this 
system. In any event, the increasing prevalence of indefinite detention 
warrants interrogation per se. As discussed earlier in relation to sentencing 
policy, the purposes of detention as a form of punishment have .been 
increasingly undermined by ‘volatile and contradictory’ penal policies that are 
constantly in flux (O'Malley 1999). The utility of indefinite detention for 
managing mentally disordered offenders might indicate another system of 
control for general offender populations.
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This discussion has introduced two important features of the restricted 
► patient system that will be discussed in later chapters. Firstly, restricted 
patients are a group for whom the objectives of care and treatment operate in 
tandem with the imperative of control. Secondly, categories such as offender 
or patient symbolise straightforward philosophies of punishment and 
universes of social action, implying a distinction between criminal offending 
and treatment for mental illness that is far more complicated in reality.
The question of whether and to what extent legal status is determinative of 
individual outcome is central to my thesis. Restricted patients provide a case 
through which to consider the intersection of criminal law and mental health 
models of intervention. The discussion of mental health law in this chapter 
has shown the discrepancies and arbitrariness of the allocation of offenders 
to the mental health system. In subsequent chapters my analysis of decision­
making by the Home Office about decisions leave and discharge will show 
how different are the criteria for those decisions.
Section IV: Theories of risk and the management of mentally disordered 
offenders
My discussion of the classification of ‘mentally disordered offender’ 
introduced the arbitrariness with which it is applied. This idea is important for 
understanding the effect of social processes like classificatory systems on 
legal outcomes, and underpins the following discussion which focuses on the 
development of forensic psychiatry and the criterion of risk. So far I have 
outlined the major areas of penal policy and the legal framework that bring 
people into the restricted patient system. My research is actually focused on 
the point of exit from this system and the role and effect of executive 
decision-making in this regard. Executive decision-making is grounded in a 
public protection agenda that turns upon the notion of risk. In the final section 
of my literature review, I set out the sociological and clinical approaches to 
mentally disordered offenders and risk that inform my analysis of decision­
making in subsequent chapters.
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Forensic Psychiatry
There is an established literature on forensic psychiatric practice, much of 
which underpins the policies and processes of the restricted patient system. 
Importantly, there is also a body of work which critically appraises forensic 
psychiatry as a discipline. I seek to draw out elements of both bodies of work 
in this section.
The best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term
future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong (Monahan quoted in
Gigerenzer 2003).
Throughout my thesis, I use the term ‘forensic psychiatry’ to refer to the 
practice of psychiatry in relation to some form of criminal justice process. The 
patients of forensic psychiatry are convicted offenders, including restricted 
patients; people found not guilty by reason of insanity; and remandees. 
Forensic psychiatry is practiced in hospitals and prisons and in the ongoing 
mental health monitoring of offenders in the community. There are varying 
interpretations of the scope and meaning of forensic psychiatry. Some 
psychiatrists identify the practice through its patients and the importance of 
having skill and experience in assessing risk of dangerousness and violence 
amongst offenders (Maden 2007). Others argue that there is no discipline of 
‘forensic psychiatry’, particularly in those jurisdictions where there is no 
formal training or qualification for such a specialty, such as Australia (Shea 
2003). Those critiques ignore the reality of the particular demands and 
expectations upon psychiatry within the criminal justice system. The 
preoccupation with risk and dangerousness may not be isolated to forensic 
psychiatry. But psychiatric care for mentally disordered offenders is unique 
for a number of reasons including the need to understand criminal as well as 
mental health law; an ability to work within secure settings; the nature of the 
clinical and behavioural histories of the patients; and the constraints upon 
options for rehabilitation that are consequent on the conditions often attached 
to the release of offenders into the community.
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Nevertheless some of the criticisms of forensic psychiatry are useful for 
understanding its role in contemporary criminal justice policy. In a scathing 
critique, its origins have been described as:
examining the psychological and social meaning of whatever 
constituted ‘criminal behaviour’ (in a legal sense) rather than the 
intrinsic nature of the behaviour itself, increasingly focussing on issues 
about ‘dangerousness’ of individuals to ’society’, irrespective of the 
nature of the society. In other words, psychiatry (and forensic 
psychiatry) did not take an ethical position on what constituted 
criminality - it merely accepted the definition proposed by the state 
(Fernando 2000:53).
Of course, violence against members of society is not simply an ideological 
construct. Nonetheless, Fernando’s critique is useful for a consideration of 
the role forensic psychiatry has played within broader debates about crime 
and criminality. It is the state that defines the criminal law, and practitioners 
who work within it must accept those definitions. However law is also open to 
interpretation and the interpretations of psychiatrists are as important as 
those of lawyers when dealing with mentally disordered offenders. As 
empirical evidence in later chapters will show, this has raised concern among 
some psychiatrists and underpinned important criticisms of the approach to 
risk assessment within the restricted patient system. These concerns 
contrast strongly with Fernando’s critique, in which he blames psychiatry for 
the construction of mental disorder through notions of dangerousness.
Others have argued that psychiatry’s ‘claims to scientific neutrality, objectivity 
and rationality’ have lent an authority to the construction of mentally 
disordered offenders as inherently dangerous (Kendall 2005:46). These 
claims include expertise in the assessment and management of mentally 
disordered offenders and, perhaps most importantly, in the protection of the 
public from any risks these offenders might pose (ibid). The implication is that 
the emerging specialisation of forensic psychiatry has, by definition, forged 
the conflation of mental disorder with dangerousness and criminality.
Not surprisingly, many of these criticisms have been firmly rejected not least 
by psychiatrists themselves. Monahan and Steadman, whose work has 
contributed key scholarship on risk and the treatment of mental disorder,
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have attributed the conflation of mental disorder and dangerousness to the 
law’s misunderstanding of what psychiatry can offer (1994). The legal 
concept of ‘dangerousness’ confounds the variables on which a prediction is 
based, the type of event being predicted, and the likelihood of the event 
occurring. For research purposes ‘dangerousness’ should first be 
disaggregated into three component parts: ‘risk factors’, the variables that are 
used to predict violence; ‘harm’, the amount and type of violence being 
predicted; and ‘risk level’, the probability that harm will occur. Secondly, the 
‘harm’ that is being predicted should be scaled in terms of seriousness, 
rather than being treated as a dichotomous variable. Thirdly, ‘risk level’ (or 
simply, ‘risk’) should be seen as a continuous probability statement, rather 
than a dichotomous variable as in risk or no risk. Fourthly, since risk levels 
are often not stable but fluctuate over time and context, estimates of risk 
should be in the form of ongoing ‘assessments’ rather than one-time 
‘predictions’. Finally, given that the goal of public health intervention is the 
prevention, rather than the treatment, of harm, ‘risk management’ as well as 
‘risk assessment’ should be a goal of research (Monahan and Steadman 
1994:2).
For Monahan and Steadman, the process of risk assessment is a complex, 
lengthy process based on probabilities, not absolute numbers. Moreover, it is 
a process which acknowledges the social factors of an individual’s situation. 
Perhaps, then, it is unfair to attribute the conflation of mental disorder and 
dangerousness to psychiatry alone. Often it is the political imperatives, 
including protecting ministers and maintaining public confidence in a system, 
that lead to over-reliance on, or use of, information in unintended ways. In the 
restricted patient system the political agenda includes public confidence in 
the system as well as public protection. Representing risk assessment as a 
straight-forward, comprehensive and accurate process serves the purpose of 
reassuring the public on both those grounds. It implies risk assessment is a 
formalised, clearly documented process. But the practical reality is that it is a 
fluid process with constantly shifting variables dependent upon the familiarity 
and experience of those making the assessment. Moreover, the process of 
assessing risk and proposing how to manage it is different from deciding 
what levels of risk are acceptable. Many psychiatrists argue that their skill lies
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in the former, but it is those elected or appointed to represent the public who 
should determine the latter (Maden 2007).
The question this raises is who makes the claims about the promise of 
forensic psychiatry? As Rose argues, psychiatry is not a definitive science, 
but a site of practice where ‘research is under way, conflicting theories and 
hypotheses abound, competing programmes are suggested and occasionally 
implemented and failure rather than success is the norm’ (Rose 2002:5). 
Psychiatrists themselves are well aware of how little is known about effective 
risk management. The quotation from Monahan at the beginning of this 
section reflects a much-used legal folklore. It is a self-criticism, but also an 
acknowledgment of reality. Reviewing his own and other psychiatric practice, 
Monahan found a 33-50% range of accuracy for clinical (that is, non- 
actuarial) risk assessment (2004:254). Yet there is little latitude within legal 
and political discourse for the limitations of psychiatry. This is evident in the 
tension between the dictates of law and public policy - that risk be assessed 
accurately and be managed to provide public protection - and the opinions of 
psychiatrists as to whether they are capable of undertaking this.
Beyond the question of whether psychiatrists actually can assess and 
manage risk in this way, there is the equally important question of whether 
they should. As Mullen argues:
surely it is obvious that the chances of a mentally disordered person 
acting violently should be carefully evaluated and every step taken to 
prevent such a consequence. It is, perhaps, not quite as obvious that 
a central, if not the primary, responsibility of a mental health 
professional is to the wider community rather than their patient. It is 
not entirely obvious how a responsibility to predict risk is to be 
discharged. It is certainly not obvious how a clinician should act if they 
do suspect their patient is more probable to act violently. And finally, it 
is far from obvious that we should allow concerns about the risk which 
some of our patients may present to others to become a major 
determinant of our approach to all our patients (Mullen 2002:xv).
The implications for the restricted patient system are clear. As Szmuckler 
asks, ‘the worry is that if predictions are limited (often, extremely limited) in 
accuracy, how do we justify the ongoing preventive detention of people who
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are deemed to be unacceptably risky as a result of a risk assessment’ 
(2005:776)?
What emerges is the demand for forensic mental health professionals to 
discharge both a clinical responsibility for the care and management of their 
patients and the political responsibility for controlling this population for the 
protection of society. Hence Rose terms these professionals ‘control workers’ 
who,
whether they be police or psychiatrists, ... have a new administrative 
function - the administration of the marginalia, ensuring community 
protection through the identification of the riskiness of individuals, 
actions, forms of life and territories (Rose 2000:333).
Similarly, Seddon has charted the move from understanding offenders as 
dangerous to perceiving them in terms of risk, a framework which dissolves 
dangerous individuals into a combination of risk factors (2007). Drawing 
parallels with Simon and Feeley’s work on actuarial justice (1995), Seddon 
perceives this as a policy shift towards managing groups not individuals 
(2007). This is a useful critique as it reminds us of the institutional forces at 
play even in the level of individual case decisions, such as those made by the 
Home Office about restricted patients. Yet, like the penal policy discussed 
above, this was another area rife with contradiction. The manifestations of 
the public protection agenda sit uncomfortably with the realities of skill and 
resource that shape not just what mental health services can offer, but also 
how effective they are (Maden 2007). Whilst actuarialism has not taken over 
psychiatric practice, it does influence the approach to offender populations at 
a systemic level which, at the time of this research, was managed by the 
Home Office. In a sign of the pervasiveness of preoccupations with risk, the 
Home Office had started to term as ‘risk workers’ police, probation and parole 
staff and mental health care workers by virtue of the client groups with which 
they worked.
Risk and Dangerousness
While the protective element of restriction orders suggests a danger posed 
by restricted patients, in fact risk and dangerousness are separate issues.
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Under section 41 of the Mental Health Act 1983, a restriction order can only 
be made if there is a risk of serious harm. However, the court must already 
have accepted that the person meets the criteria for compulsory treatment 
under section 37 of the 1983 Act; and that a hospital order is the best way of 
dealing with them. In other words, restriction orders are not in themselves an 
indication of dangerousness posed by the offender. While this may be a legal 
technicality, it is an important one particularly with regard to attempts to use 
mental health law to control dangerousness.
Accepting that a preoccupation with risk shapes the policy framework for 
dealing with all mentally disordered offenders (Solomon 2005), the important 
point to note is that risk is definitive in a restriction order. It is the risk of a 
patient’s mental disorder, if untreated, leading to similar behaviour in the 
future that justifies the hospital order; and the potential for serious harm to 
the public (as evidenced by conviction for a serious or violent offence) that 
restricts their release to the discretion of the Home Secretary or Tribunal. 
Risk is codified within legislation and policy in relation to serious harm to the 
public, as though it were a clear, unambiguous concept (Mental Health Act 
1983:section 41). However it is a concept that may be defined in numerous 
ways, and has attracted an entire body of theory in its own right. Moreover, 
the element of serious harm to the public as the defining requirement for a 
restriction order ignores some important questions such as the actual nature 
of the risk posed by mentally disordered offenders and the subjective 
processes involved in assessing that risk. The following discussion 
introduces some of the theory relevant to a critical understanding of these 
concepts, in order to inform subsequent analysis of the function of risk and 
dangerousness in decision-making about restricted patients.
Giddens argues that the preoccupation with risk is an inherently modern 
phenomenon.
Modernity is a risk culture. I do not mean by this that social life is 
inherently more risky than it used to be; for most people in the 
developed societies that is not the case. Rather, the concept of risk 
becomes fundamental to the way both law actors and technical 
specialists organise the social world (Giddens 1991:3).
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It is important to heed the modernist argument that the concept of risk is not 
itself new; only the particular centrality we give it in contemporary research, 
policy and practice. Indeed, Goffman saw risk as integral to the management 
practices of asylums:
moving up and down the ward systems means, then, not only a shift in 
self-constructive equipment, a shift in reflected status, but also a 
change in the calculus of risks. [...] appreciation that a given risk level 
is itself merely a social arrangement is a rarer kind of experience, and 
one that seems to help to disenchant the person who undergoes it 
(1961:153).
Even earlier, the risk of contamination was an important factor in the 
segregation policies of late eighteenth century penal institutions (Strange and 
Bashford 2003). Moreover, the notion that the assessment of risk is a 
process steeped in social values goes back half a century at least. 
Nevertheless Giddens’ point is that the pervasiveness of risk as the defining 
characteristic by which whole systems operate is a uniquely modern feature. 
By recognising that the risk agenda has come to shape not only assessments 
of individuals, but the practices of whole institutions, we begin to see how 
mental health care in general, and the restricted patient system specifically, 
have become systems which rest solely upon the criterion of risk (Giddens 
1991; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Rose 2000).
Meanwhile Douglas has been interested in the language of risk. She argues 
that it asserts a certainty that the only possibilities are negative.
Risk is unequivocally used to mean danger from future damage, 
caused by the opponents. How much risk is a matter for the experts, 
but on both sides of the debate it has to be taken for granted that the 
matter is ascertainable. Anyone who insists that there is a high degree 
of uncertainty is taken to be opting out of accountability (Douglas 
1992:30).
Thus if public policy and perception are shaped by the risk agenda, its 
connotations are necessarily negative. For Douglas, this leads to a 
politicisation of the concept of dangerousness. However for others, risk is 
itself a politicised term, utilised in relation to certain populations only, and not 
others. For Rose, risk is applied to ‘the usual suspects’:
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the poor, the welfare recipients, the petty criminals, discharged 
psychiatric patients, street people. The logics of risk inescapably 
locate the careers and identities of such tainted citizens within a 
regime of surveillance in which they are constituted as actually or 
potentially ‘risky’ individuals (Rose 2000:333; see also South et al
2005).
Any individual subject considered a risk is irrevocably tarred with the brush of 
dangerousness.
Risk is a self-fulfilling concept: there can never be zero risk. Forensic risk 
assessment seeks to establish the factors that lead to a person’s instability 
from their mental disorder, including possible offending behaviour. Risk 
management is how these factors can be controlled to reduce the chance of 
the behaviour being repeated. Thus clinical risk assessment depends upon 
an understanding of the individual’s behaviour within the social factors that 
shape their life and the control of those factors constitutes risk management. 
It is, therefore, ironic that the criminal law is unable to take cognizance of 
these factors.
Yet, if we consider the risks associated with mentally disordered offenders, 
the most striking factor is the risk they pose to themselves. A Department of 
Health inquiry found that 22% of suicides by people under mental health care 
in England and Wales were believed to have been preventable by care 
teams, with the figure even higher for those who were in-patients at the time 
of their suicide (Department of Health 2001). Moreover, in their key English 
study of homicides by people with mental illness, Taylor & Gunn found that 
the number of people with a mental disorder who committed homicide has 
remained constant since the 1970s, and the proportion of homicide offenders 
they represent has actually decreased (1999). This finding was repeated in a 
follow up New Zealand study by Simpson et al (2003).
The dominance of the risk agenda necessarily casts mental health patients 
within a negative light. The conflation of mental disorder and criminal 
offending further relegates these patients to perceptions of dangerousness, 
both in the public imagination and via legal classification. Thus, it is
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prevention of harm to the public that defines restricted patients categorically, 
despite the fact that the greatest danger they pose is to themselves.9
Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed literature on penal policy, victim involvement in 
criminal justice, the restricted patient system, and the social and medical 
constructions of mentally disordered offenders. The purpose of this review 
was to introduce the key themes and debates about treatment versus control, 
and individual rights versus public protection, which are the principles that 
underpin the restricted patient system. What should be evident are the 
complexity of the terrain and the diversity of opinion on these issues, despite 
the clarity with which they are often expressed politically, publicly or in the 
media. Indeed this disparity between the complexity of practice and its 
oversimplification in public discourse is a major theme running throughout my 
thesis, as I inquire into the central question of who constructs the public 
interest, and how that interest is protected in the face of decisions about the 
release of restricted patients. In the next chapter, I discuss how I set about 
answering those questions.
9 This understanding informs my critique of the risk agenda in relation to mental health law 
reform and Home Office decision-making in later chapters.
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODOLOGY:
ACCESS, FIELDWORK AND DILEMMAS IN THE ‘RESTRICTED’ ZONE
Introduction
The present chapter outlines the methodology for my empirical research in 
this thesis. Whilst the chapter is not a review of methodological theory, I 
discuss studies and approaches that have informed my work 
methodologically. Through this discussion I situate my own position in 
relation to my research and consider how that position affected the data I 
collected and my analysis of them. I also set out the specific methods used to 
obtain empirical data for this project and how I negotiated access. I conclude 
with the ethical dilemmas that were presented by my relative ease of access, 
including my attempt to strike a balance between protecting my participants 
and being ‘true’ to my data.
Doctoral Research Project
Origins of the Research
My doctoral research examines the role of executive decision-making in the 
release of restricted patients in England and Wales. I arrived at this project 
from my professional background managing the forensic jurisdiction of the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal of New South Wales (NSW), Australia. 
Although they carried a different legal status, forensic patients in Australia 
were essentially the equivalent of restricted patients in England and Wales. I 
was responsible for the conduct of Tribunal hearings on the leave, transfer 
and discharge applications of forensic patients. I was also responsible for 
liaison with criminal justice agencies, legislative reform and working with 
individual victims and their representative organisations. Through that work I 
became interested in why the jurisdiction retained a role for government 
decision-making about offenders, when executive discretion had been 
eradicated from most other areas of the NSW criminal justice system. There
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was concern amongst practitioners, supported by much of the literature and 
jurisprudence, that overly cautious decision-making by government was 
constraining the therapeutic progress of patients. Yet some of those involved 
in the system, including victim support groups, emphasised public protection 
over the interests of individual patients. I wanted to investigate whether the 
interests of patients and of the public were inevitably in conflict; and how 
these interests manifested themselves in the practice of executive decision­
making. I did not want to conduct my research in NSW. I was too close to the 
system personally and there had been so little criminological enquiry into this 
area in Australia that there was a dearth of literature within which to position 
my analysis. Instead, I chose to study the process in England and Wales. As 
the jurisdiction from which the NSW legislation was derived, it was relatively 
similar and there was an established body of research and literature with 
which I could ground my own analysis.
My professional background in the field affected the progress of the research 
in a number of ways. Firstly, I commenced my research with a significant 
degree of background knowledge and a clear conception of the project I was 
undertaking. This proved to be an efficient approach to the often-trying 
process of doctoral research. Secondly, I quickly identified the various actors 
in the system and had some insight into the dynamics of their relationships 
with each other. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, my professional 
experience was a considerable advantage to negotiating access. I did not 
anticipate the bounty of data I would obtain as a result. I presented myself 
and was perceived by many working in the system as a colleague. 
Consequently, those who agreed to participate in my research were open 
and candid with me. Their openness created some challenges for me 
because I felt that they told me things they might not have told an 
anonymous researcher. Ironically, as I analysed my data I became involved 
in precisely the sort of process I was studying: a balancing exercise between 
protecting the interests of individual decision-makers whose candour might 
get them into trouble and the public interest which was best served by a frank 
and fearless account of my research.
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Through reflection on my role as a researcher and unpicking expectations 
which derived from my experience in an analogous but different system, I 
came to a more balanced view on the process and findings of my research. I 
realised how strongly my approach was influenced by my experiences in 
NSW. There, the system had operated extremely defensively, with poor 
relationships between government and practitioners, and low confidence in 
the system by those working in it as well as by the public. Decisions by the 
executive had been under the authority of the Minister for Health and had 
been shielded by a wall of secrecy surrounding the evidence upon which 
decisions those were based and the reasons for them (for a full account of 
this system see Boyd-Caine and Chappell 2005). Even as a staff member of 
the Department of Health I had been unable to penetrate these walls. I was 
expecting a similar culture of mistrust and caution from my doctoral field site 
and initially attributed the candour of my participants to incautious behaviour 
on their part. It was only once I acknowledged my prejudicial expectations 
and put them aside that I came to see how the responsiveness of my 
participants reflected a different approach to accountability in the system in 
England and Wales. Indeed, that openness became an important aspect of 
my data and is the subject of further discussion in later chapters. I move now 
to outline how I arrived at a methodology for my research.
Research Questions
Although the executive was formally indivisible from the parliamentary 
cabinet, in practice the authority of the executive was vested in the Secretary 
of State for the Home Department. That authority was supported 
bureaucratically by the operations of the Home Office. The initial premise of 
my thesis was to explain the role of executive decision-making in community 
leave and discharge of restricted patients. I had arrived at the short 
explanation very quickly: the system-wide objectives of the Home Office were 
to protect the public and to maintain public confidence in the system. 
However this begged a series of much more detailed questions.
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As explained in Chapter One, my research questions were:
i. How was the concept of ‘the public’ constructed and to what extent 
did it impact upon decision-making in this system?
ii. How did the executive meet its mandate of public protection?
iii. How did other actors view the role and effect of the executive in the
restricted patient system?
Firstly, I was interested in who was understood as ‘the public’? How were the 
public considered in decision-making, and what effect did that consideration 
have on individual decisions? Was the public an all-encompassing term for 
anyone and everyone who might ever come in to contact with a restricted 
patient? Or were there particular groups who constituted the public? For 
example, from my own professional experience I knew that victims could 
experience the criminal justice system in a range of ways, from feeling 
marginalised and voiceless, to being a powerful and persuasive lobby group. 
In some parts of Australia, victims constituted an important group of people in 
forensic mental health, not quite direct participants in the way doctors and 
patients were, but nonetheless involved because of their specific relationship 
with a patient. I wanted to investigate the involvement of victims in the 
restricted patient system in England and Wales and how that influenced 
conceptions of the public? In order to answer these questions I would need to 
see whether and how this responsibility was set out in policy documents and 
job manuals. However I would also need to speak to decision-makers directly 
and to observe (if possible) their practices in this regard.
Secondly, how did the Home Office maintain public confidence in the 
restricted patient system? Did public confidence interact with the public 
protection agenda or were they two separate aspects of the system? Did 
maintaining public confidence require preventing or managing media 
attention, or attention from other quarters? Did it extend to protecting the 
reputations of the Home Secretary and other ministers? Did maintaining 
public confidence in the system entail responsibility for the organisations and 
agents that were independent of the Home Office, such as the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal of England and Wales, or clinical practitioners? What effect 
did the Home Office perceive mistakes or embarrassments to have on public
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confidence and did such concerns influence decision-making about individual 
restricted patients?
Here again there might be initial answers to these questions in the written 
documents of the system, particularly in the Home Office. But equally, these 
were complex questions that might have unpredictable consequences in 
practice. How they were resolved would require consideration and judgment 
and would be likely to depend on the circumstances of each matter. I needed 
to speak to people to probe them on these issues and listen to their 
explanations and examples in order to understand the processes involved.
Finally, I wanted to hear the opinions of other actors in the system; people 
who had regular, professional contact with executive decision-makers and 
who were affected by their decisions. Even if I had good access to the Home 
Office, that would only give me a partial picture (albeit an essential part). The 
responses of those acting on behalf of the executive would reflect their own 
roles and responsibilities, and instincts of self-preservation would be likely to 
imbue their responses with particular accounts and justifications. I wanted to 
hear what others thought of the process, the actors, and the effects of the 
decisions made. I needed to go outside the Home Office to develop a 
perspective on what I observed within it.
Policy Relevant and Critically Engaged
At the time I was preparing my research, criminology was awash with 
criticisms that it was obsessed with evaluative research at the cost of 
theoretical and empirical analysis; and that over-reliance on quantitative 
methods had led to a renaissance of positivism, abandoning the more 
effective processes of social inquiry (see for example Hayward and Young 
2004; Young 2007). Some theorists had called for criminological research to 
be ‘counter-hegemonic’ (Hillyard 2004) and to resist the lure of evaluative 
research as merely administrative criminology that was inherently 
atheoretical (Hope 2005; Walters 2005). Underpinning these criticisms was 
the important concern that rigorous criminological research was being 
ignored by policy-makers, or was being manipulated by governments to suit 
their own political ends (Hillyard et al 2004b; Hope 2005; Loader 2006).
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I was attracted by these calls to a progressive, critically engaged discipline. 
The call to counter administrative or political hegemony, reminds us that 
independent and rigorous research is a worthy pursuit, even (and perhaps 
particularly) if it does not meet the public policy objectives of the government 
of the day. However these critiques were predicated on an assumption that I 
found questionable: that policy-relevant research was inherently conservative 
or uncritical. I disagree, and suggest instead that the value of policy-relevant 
research depends upon the theoretical and empirical approach of the 
analysis. The important - if small - body of research into the ongoing use of 
executive discretion in the criminal justice system is a good example here 
(see for example Hawkins 1992; Padfield 2002). Examining the exercise of 
these powers could be analogous to interrogating state power, a pursuit often 
represented as the pinnacle of radical intellectual inquiry (Cohen 2001; see 
also O'Malley 2001; Green and Grewcock 2002). Moreover, as Downes and 
Rock pointed out decades ago, the alternative to research that scrutinises 
government policy and practice is a kind of utopianism which reifies ‘the 
system' and allows flaws to continue unattended (Downes and Rock 1979).
My own commitment to research that is theoretically and academically 
rigorous parallels my commitment to research that is informative and relevant 
for public purpose. Consequently this thesis is unapologetically policy­
relevant. But I aim for it to be critically engaged also. By contributing to a 
‘critical narrative’ of criminological inquiry I did not seek to criticise everything 
I have observed in the conduct of my research (Walters 2005:7). Such an 
approach would assume one knew the answers in advance of the research. 
States, governments and bureaucracies have problems to resolve which are 
obdurate and complex. Some policies are well-constructed while others are 
far from perfect. It was not my intention to reject what I observed on this 
basis. Rather, by engaging critically with the field, I meant to question and 
probe the issues that I had observed; to interrogate the status quo; and to 
consider alternative possibilities and explanations for how executive decision­
making functioned.
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Methodology
Under part three of the Mental Health Act 1983 the executive authority in the 
restricted patient system was held by the Home Secretary. A quick search of 
the Home Office website revealed an entire section of the Home Office called 
the Mental Health Unit which was working within the Home Secretary’s remit 
under the 1983 Act. This presented the first step. I needed to establish how 
the decision-making process was constructed between the formally ascribed 
powers of the Home Secretary, and the bureaucracy that worked under 
him.10
My methodology was largely informed by Hawkins’ extensive work on legal 
decision-making, particularly his notions of the ‘decision frame’ (1986) or 
surround (2003). These concepts provided useful ways of describing the 
environment in which decision-making took place: the ‘structure of 
knowledge, experience, values, and meanings that the decision-maker 
shares with others and brings to a choice’ (Hawkins 1986). According to 
Hawkins,
one of the major tasks for those interested in legal decision-making is 
to understand why and in what circumstances decision-makers accord 
changing priority to competing decision frames. This is a massive task, 
however, because it requires close and careful investigation of the 
fundamental decision model employed by legal decision-makers. It 
means, to begin with, lengthy and detailed exploration of the jungle 
(1986:1242).
The idea of ‘changing priority’ reflects the constant state of flux of criminal 
justice policy described in Chapter One. Hawkins’ framework enabled this 
phenomenon to be brought front and centre in my analysis of decision­
making.
Equally, Hawkins’ description of ‘the jungle’ was an apt analogy for my field 
site. Analysing the decision frame of the executive in the restricted patient 
system necessitated establishing which agencies and personnel were 
involved in the decision-making process, including those beyond the
10 At the time of conducting my research, the portfolio of Home Secretary was occupied by 
two men: initially Charles Clarke, and subsequently John Reid. By the time of writing, the 
portfolio had moved to the first female Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith.
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machinations of the government in parallel decision-making bodies like the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal and hospitals. Each of these institutions was 
engaged in processes that operated in tandem, in support of or in opposition 
to those of government. I was interested in how these processes reflected 
back upon government decision-making.
I identified the following people and organisations involved in the restricted 
patient system:
i. the Home Secretary;
ii. the Home Office;
iii. the Tribunal;
iv. clinical practitioners, including doctors, nurses, social workers and 
other health professionals;
v. legal practitioners who represented restricted patients;
vi. patients;
vii. non-government organisations active in this system; and
viii. ‘the public’.
This list ranged across government departments, non-government 
organisations, practitioners, patients and other individuals, so I adopted the 
term ‘actors’ as a collective way of referring to participants in the system. I 
wanted to examine how the various actors engaged with the system and 
interacted with each other. Were particular interests served by specific 
aspects of process? How did the principles of natural justice and procedural 
fairness, outlined in Chapter One, feature in executive decision-making about 
restricted patients? How did the intersection of health and legal frameworks 
operate in practice? Was there a balance to be struck between procedural 
fairness and natural justice on the one hand, and access to patient 
information by victims or ‘in the public interest’ on the other? Were there 
hierarchies in the importance attached to the views of some actors over 
others? My methods needed to capture both the detail of information 
contained in documentation, and the human nuances of practice and 
perspective represented by these actors. My methods also needed to be 
responsive to the unpredictability and changing nature of the people and 
processes I was studying.
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Methods
Hawkins advocates qualitative research methods for understanding legal 
decision-making. He argues that quantitative methods fail to capture the 
nature of decision-making as largely bureaucratic, affected by social realities 
such as resource constraints, the involvement of administrative staff and the 
impact of community values (Hawkins 1986). Of course, quantitative methods 
can give a useful idea of the number, distribution and trends of outcomes or
outputs; but very little about how they are constructed and what they
condense. Hawkins also argues that quantitative methods are unhelpful 
when analysing legal decision-making because of their function to ‘predict 
decision outcomes rather than to explain decision-making processes’ 
(/b/c/:1186). My study was a sociological inquiry of the decision-making 
process of actors and agencies engaged in a complex, interactive process. 
My analysis included but was not limited to outcomes. Indeed, outcomes 
were an important aid to understanding process, as well as being of interest 
themselves. But analysing outcomes and processes were complementary 
aspects of the study. To that end, quantitative data were helpful for 
illustrating some trends. Beyond this I followed Hawkins’ model and adopted 
a qualitative methodology, using the following methods:
i. document analysis;
ii. observation; and
iii. interview.
Each method was intended to obtain a particular type of data for my thesis. 
Documentary analysis enabled me to trace the case histories and 
correspondence determining patients’ progress through the system. There 
were also written instruments such as legislation, policy and job manuals 
documenting the roles and operations of each agency involved in the system.
I could have described the decision frame solely by analysing this 
documentation. However, written guidelines do not necessarily capture the 
nuances of how processes operate in practice; the contexts of knowledge, 
shared understanding, and rules that operate in working environments; the 
deviations from policy that are necessary to make a process work smoothly; 
nor the informal relationships established to facilitate information-sharing.
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I supplemented documentary analysis with observation of processes and with 
the participation of the individuals administering them. Here, I relied upon 
formal interviews or discussion during my observations. Observation 
provided an opportunity to cross-reference written procedure with staff 
practice and to elicit further information from staff as inconsistencies and 
differences emerged. Interviews also assisted my analysis of the different 
priorities in the system; where they overlapped or diverged; and how they 
were resolved.
Each of these methods was designed to yield a proportion of the empirical 
data I needed. In their discussion of methodology Genders and Player note,
it would be a mistake to conceive of each element of the methodology 
as constituting a discrete area of research ... Rather, they were 
overlapping and complementary components which needed to be 
pursued and understood in relation to each other, in order to produce 
a coherent picture of the life of the institution. Collectively they enabled 
the cross-checking of information and made it possible to identify the 
internal consistency of particular findings which, it is hoped, will act to 
strengthen the validity of the final conclusions (1995:20).
In much the same way, combining research methods enabled me to attain a 
broader array of data to understand the complexities of the decision frame 
and strengthen my analysis overall. It also enabled a flexible approach in 
data collection, so that I could determine the most efficient and relevant 
method to obtain data at each field site. At some field sites I used all three 
methods to ensure the most comprehensive analysis.
As stated above, the role of the Home Secretary was delegated to the Mental 
Health Unit of the Home Office. The Unit had approximately 60 staff at the 
time of my research. Their total caseload covered a population of up to 6000 
restricted patients. Not all of these cases were ‘live’, which meant a case 
where an application had been received (for example for leave), or where 
particular behaviour by a patient had called into question the appropriateness 
of his or her current arrangements, such as concerns by a family member 
about someone discharged to the community (see also Dell and Grounds 
1995). As the institution responsible for making decisions on the part of the
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executive, the Mental Health Unit was the single most important aspect of my 
field site. Consequently I employed all three of my methods there.
Because of the Unit’s focus on applications, a particular methodological 
danger in this research was over-reliance on the individual case as the 
primary unit of analysis. Hawkins contends that,
one implication of a claim that a case is decided ‘on its merits’ is that a 
case exists as a discrete entity, and decisions are made about its fate 
quite independently of wider forces and constraints. ... In fact, while an 
individual may readily be seen as responsible for making a particular 
decision, a very great deal of legal decision-making is a collective 
enterprise in which several people, either formally or informally, take 
part in deciding. ... the idea of the 'case' needs to recognise that a 
criminal justice decision is often the product of different officials acting 
at different times making decisions serially in the context of other 
decisions (2003:194).
To avoid over-emphasising individual cases, I explored the work of the Unit 
beyond patient applications. As I discuss in substantive chapters, staff were 
engaged in a range of monitoring activities throughout the system. They also 
prepared statements by the Home Secretary for Mental Health Review 
Tribunal hearings; and briefs in response to and in anticipation of issues that 
might arise about specific restricted patients.
The extent to which the Mental Health Review Tribunal would feature in my 
study was unresolved at the commencement of my fieldwork. As already 
acknowledged, my interest in this project originated from my professional 
experience at the equivalent tribunal in NSW. Professionally I was curious 
about the similarities and differences between the two organisations. 
However from the outset it was unclear to me what relevance the Tribunal 
would have to my thesis. There was already an extensive body of work on 
the Tribunal in England and Wales (see for example Peay 1989; Richardson 
1993 and 2005; Perkins 2003). While my research was situated within the 
broad field of decision-making in forensic mental health, my empirical focus 
and original contribution were on the role and processes at the Mental Health 
Unit. At the same time, ignoring the Tribunal would leave important gaps, not 
least in analysing the Home Office’s decision frame. Thus I included the 
Tribunal’s administrative Secretariat and panels amongst my field sites. My
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interviews, observation and documentary analysis of the Tribunal provided 
essential background information for me, drawing a picture of the interaction 
across the system from perspectives other than those of the Home Office, 
and enhanced my comprehension when the Tribunal was mentioned by other 
participants. I also observed Tribunal hearings and lawyers preparing for 
these hearings with their clients, which further developed my understanding 
of the dynamics affecting individual actors within the system. This fieldwork 
yielded specific data, for example on the role of principles like natural justice, 
and enriched my analysis of the Home Office. Throughout my thesis I use the 
Tribunal data where they help to illustrate a point but do not draw on them 
extensively, in order to maintain my central focus on Home Office decision­
making.
I was interested in the individual experiences of patients and victims, and 
their perspectives on decision-making in the system. However, interviewing 
patients or victims would have required navigating a daunting tier of health 
bureaucracy as each National Health Service maintained its own process of 
ethical research clearance. Although I was not opposed to this per se, my 
focus on government decision-making already required exploring an 
unknown bureaucratic terrain to establish access for my research. I was also 
concerned not to expose patients to more stigmatisation than they might 
have already encountered from their involvement in the restricted system. In 
the end I obtained these perspectives through advocacy and representative 
organisations. By interviewing representatives who were already known in 
the public domain, and who were experienced and confident in their 
positions, I was able to hear from people with direct experience of being 
patients or victims, but whose representativeness meant that they were not 
required to speak from personal experience unless they chose to.
Analysing the ways in which ‘the public’ was constructed within this decision­
making was one of the major theoretical challenges of my thesis. It was 
equally challenging for the research design to come up with a starting point 
from which to explore this ‘actor’ in the system. Conceivably, the concept 
would be clarified during my fieldwork. Correspondence in patient files might 
indicate specific attributes of ‘the public’, or from certain actors’ perspectives;
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and these examples might show how the public could affect or be affected by 
the decisions being made. However, it was equally possible that there would 
be no common conception at all: that views of Home Office staff would differ 
from or contradict each other; or that ‘the public’ would be as nebulous a 
concept to my participants as it appeared to me. I needed a working 
definition of ‘the public’; a category broad enough to capture various 
manifestations of the public that emerged while simultaneously allowing me 
to classify the public for the purpose of my analysis.
The working definition I established was based on exclusion. The public 
included anyone who was not formally associated with or in the restricted 
patient system. In other words, it became a residual category of ‘others’ 
comprised of people lying outside the boundaries of the system. This 
excluded the Home Office, the Tribunal, health care professionals, lawyers 
and patients. It included families and friends of patients; victims and their 
families or friends; non-government organisations that were involved in 
issues relevant to but not solely focussed on the restricted system; and 
anyone else that might appear in files or other documentation. Defining the 
category of public in this way enabled me to build a picture of how the public 
was constituted as a factor within decision-making processes and to see 
what influence the public might have on determinations. At the point of 
research design, this was my own resolution of the problem of defining ‘the 
public’. In subsequent chapters I explore how the decision-makers 
themselves understood the public in their work.
Negotiating Access
The Mental Health Unit, Home Office
I had identified the actors and sites relevant to my field of study. The next 
challenge was obtaining their participation in my research. From the outset of 
the project the likelihood of gaining access to the Home Office was a 
concern. My original conception of the project depended upon it, but there 
was no guarantee that the Home Office would be receptive to my requests 
for access. I commenced seeking access three months into my doctorate in 
December 2004. Using a contact of my co-supervisor who was a senior
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official in the Mental Health Unit I sent a letter to introduce myself, outlining 
the project and requesting a meeting to discuss the research. I received a 
prompt reply inviting me to contact the Unit directly to set up a meeting. The 
meeting took place in January 2005. The official was interested in my project 
and positive about the likelihood of my gaining access to the Unit. He advised 
me to follow up our meeting with a detailed outline of the research and the 
specific access I was seeking. Serendipitously, the meeting was scheduled 
on a day when the Unit was hosting an ‘away day’: a regular workshop to 
facilitate good working relationships where members of hospital and 
community treating teams visited the Home Office to meet Mental Health Unit 
staff and discuss processes and procedures. I spent the day meeting Unit 
managers and observing their interaction with care teams. I was also given 
staff work manuals and policy folders to read. It was a positive start.
In the follow-up correspondence I set out my proposed research and access, 
and foreshadowed possible concerns about confidentiality and use of the 
data obtained. From the defensiveness I had observed in Australia, I 
anticipated that the Home Office would be concerned about being exposed to 
scrutiny. While other researchers told of positive experiences gaining access 
to the Home Office for their research, I was still anxious about my project. I 
expected strict terms of access which might include the right to vet and veto 
any output from my research. I stated that I would anonymise any patient- 
specific information and that I was willing to discuss any further concerns that 
might be raised. I did not want to be too specific at this stage to maximise my 
options for negotiation should the Home Office seek to impose restrictions on 
my access.
I followed up this second correspondence on several occasions. I spent 
weeks dialling unanswered numbers, only to be told eventually that the Unit 
had moved. Several more weeks passed with me leaving messages at the 
Unit’s new numbers and trying to speak to staff to establish the status of my 
research request. After some time it emerged that my correspondence had 
been mislaid. It was months after my first meeting at the Home Office that I 
received an email from the Mental Health Unit which included the following 
statement:
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In principle, we are happy to allow access to MHU documents and 
staff for interviews for your doctoral research on mentally disordered 
offenders. However, there are some issues which we would like to 
discuss further with you - in particular how we would protect the 
confidentiality of our patient files, and how we would provide that your 
research does not (whether intentionally or not) undermine public 
confidence in the system for dealing with dangerous mentally 
disordered offenders.
Following this correspondence a second meeting was arranged, this time 
with the administrative head of the Unit. In my concern about strict limitations 
on access, I had prepared a detailed set of options to negotiate. Again, 
reception to the project was positive, and the discussion turned to questions 
of confidentiality at the end of the meeting. I reaffirmed my offer not to use 
identifying details of patients in my work, something I neither needed nor 
wanted to do anyway, and to anonymise any cases that I did discuss. The 
anonymity of other individuals such as family members or victims was not 
discussed. I would anonymise any personal information about family 
members and victims for their own protection and because revealing their 
details would be unlikely to serve any purpose in my thesis. But it was 
interesting that this was not mentioned by the Mental Health Unit.
At that meeting it was agreed that I could interview staff about their work, and 
read documentation including job manuals, policies, reports and patient files. 
The Mental Health Unit also suggested that I shadow staff to observe how 
they conducted their work. There was no discussion about my use of the data 
obtained directly from Home Office staff. Officials explained that they were 
‘not opposed to scrutiny’ but were concerned to ensure that there were 
‘adequate safeguards in place’. However what they meant by ‘adequate 
safeguards’ was never qualified: there was no consideration of whether I 
could name or quote staff; there was no suggestion that Unit staff should be 
anonymous in the study; and anonymising patient data was the sum total of 
discussion about what form such safeguards would take. At my suggestion 
the Unit was willing to read drafts, but this was not stipulated as a 
requirement on any output from my research. Moreover, officials qualified 
that they would only read drafts for the purpose of fact-checking, not to vet 
my analysis.
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I was surprised and relieved at the absence of any constraining conditions on 
my access, and excited to have succeeded in gaining access to my primary 
field site. It did not occur to me that lack of specified conditions could prove to 
be a dilemma at a later stage. I regarded unfettered access as the best 
possible outcome. Accordingly I did not seek to clarify the Home Office’s 
expectations or assumptions about what data I would obtain and how I would 
use them. This caused me some consternation subsequently.
The Mental Health Unit had advised me that they would seek the Home 
Secretary’s approval for my research and would inform me of the outcome. I 
spent weeks following up that advice, trying to establish whether it had been 
sought and what the decision was. My calls and emails were rarely 
answered, and no-one seemed to know the status of the matter. It had been 
seven months since my first contact, but despite an initially positive response 
there appeared no concrete progress on access. Trying a different approach, 
I emailed the head of the Unit and proposed dates to visit the office and 
commence my fieldwork. This was a bluff: I thought it might prompt the Unit 
to follow up the formal approval of access, which I doubted had seen any 
progress at all. To my surprise I received a response the next day proposing 
an itinerary for me to come in immediately and begin my research. The 
itinerary included ‘shadowing’ at least two members of staff from each tier of 
the Unit’s hierarchy, and an appointment with the Victim and Confidence Unit 
to discuss the development of policy on victim involvement in the restricted 
patient system. Subsequently the Unit also arranged for me to interview the 
Probation and Parole Service, whose responsibility it was to support victims 
associated with restricted patient cases.
There was no further discussion about confidentiality of the information to 
which I would have access during the course of my project. There was no 
suggestion of formalising an agreement about the conditions of my access. 
Moreover, and as I will discuss further below, the question of how to ensure 
that my research did not damage public confidence in the system was never 
discussed, despite having been mentioned in the email cited above. The only 
documentation I had about the entire process of negotiating access was 
contained in my own notes of the two meetings that took place. The ease
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with which I gained access to the Home Office for my research indicated a 
refreshingly open attitude towards independent research and a transparency 
about its processes and operations. Indeed, as I shall discuss in Chapter 
Five, elements of that transparency were also evident in the Mental Health 
Unit's relationships with care teams involved in the management of restricted 
patients also.
Other Actors
Compared to the length of time it took to confirm the Home Office’s 
participation in my research, gaining access to other actors was quite quick. 
Whilst my negotiations with the Home Office were in train, I embarked on 
recruiting participants from my other field sites. At the time of my fieldwork, 
the draft Mental Health Bill 2004 was the subject of scrutiny by a joint 
committee of both Houses of Parliament. Submissions to the scrutiny 
process had been received from government and non-government 
organisations, practitioners and services, and patients. I analysed these 
submissions to identify organisations specifically addressing the criminal 
justice sections of the draft Bill, and contacted their authors to determine the 
extent to which they worked on issues relating to restricted patients. Many 
were interested in my research and its outcomes, and so agreed to 
participate on the basis that the findings would be useful for their 
organisations. Frequently organisations that were not relevant to my study 
referred me to others that were. Through this process of exclusion and 
referral, I developed a list of non-government organisations and practitioners 
to follow up for interview. At that stage the parliamentary scrutiny process 
proved to be the major vehicle of recruitment for participants outside the 
Home Office. It was only months later that its significance as a source of data 
would also emerge.
In the Field
My primary strategy for approaching research participants was as an 
‘insider’. This was particularly useful at the Mental Health Unit and Tribunal, 
whose work most closely accorded to my own professional experience. I had 
a working knowledge of the tasks their staff had to undertake and the
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challenges they faced on a daily basis. My previous work with practitioners 
also meant that I had a good understanding of their roles and responsibilities, 
despite being neither a lawyer nor a clinician. Genders and Player consider 
this process of building rapport between researchers and their participants in 
the following terms.
At its most basic level the reality is that researchers involve 
themselves in a human situation, in which demands are made upon 
their personal resources, to such an extent that it is their own social 
skills which are in large part central to the success of the whole 
venture (Genders and Player 1995:18).
Genders and Player argue that the ability to gain the confidence of one’s 
research participants and to establish a balance between participants’ 
demands for reciprocity and the researcher’s own professional need for 
rapport are instrumental in the research process. Undoubtedly, I relied upon 
my experience to establish my competence within the field; but the wealth of 
data I obtained was as much in response to my interest in hearing about 
participants’ experiences and perspectives as it was to any sense of shared 
history.
My collegiate approach was largely successful in building rapport with 
participants and in reducing the amount of time necessary to cover 
background information during interviews and observation sessions. It also 
established certain expectations among research participants, which did not 
necessarily accord with my own perspective on my role and responsibilities 
as a researcher. For example, in discussing a difficult issue during an 
observation or interview, Mental Health Unit staff would frequently ask for my 
advice or how I might have dealt with similar issues in Australia. I was 
concerned that this exchange might conflict with my role as a non-participant 
observer, and initially I found myself uncertain how to respond. My hesitation 
highlighted my own assumptions about objectivity in research, and my belief 
in a notion of impartiality on the part of the researcher; ideals which had 
subtly imbued my approach to fieldwork.
As I became more engaged with the research, and better-acquainted with my 
research participants, these ideals became less important. Reciprocity was a
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matter of courtesy. Resisting it would obstruct my ability to gain the trust of 
my research participants. More importantly, these interactions with 
participants were data in themselves. To avoid them would be counter­
productive to my research. From their research at Grendon Prison, Genders 
and Player describe how ‘the staff and inmates ... made it impossible for us 
passively to observe what was going on. Within a short period of our arrival 
staff and inmates directly sought out our opinions or advice’ (1995:39). In 
much the same way I had to accept the reality that participants might seek 
my input about issues they faced in their work because of my background in 
the field.
The clearest example of this was when I questioned participants about a 
victim-participation policy introduced by the Tribunal during my fieldwork. As I 
discuss in Chapter Five, posing those questions had a direct effect on 
participants, many of whom had given little consideration to the policy before 
I interviewed them. I did not regard these exchanges as problematic. They 
were common to research, particularly in the social sciences where research 
and practice are often closely aligned. Genders and Player reflect that:
the effects which we, as researchers, had upon the fieldwork m ust... 
be understood as part of an interactive process, in which we were both 
shaping and being shaped by the social environment of the study 
(1995:45).
Accepting that my presence might influence processes or outcomes in 
unintended ways, I came to see this as an inherent and positive possibility of 
any research.
Taking Stock of Data
Data Collection
I conducted my fieldwork from January 2005 to September 2006. At its 
completion I had collected documentary material in the form of discussion 
papers, policies, procedures, minutes of meetings, transcripts of evidence, 
patient reports and correspondence. These documents established a picture 
of how the system operated at the time, and its origins and development 
since the Mental Health Act 1983. These documents also demonstrated how
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the various actors engaged with each other and performed their roles in the 
system.
I had observed casework staff determining applications at the Mental Health 
Unit; lawyers preparing for Tribunal hearings and hearings themselves; and 
the Joint Scrutiny Committee hearings of oral evidence relating to the draft 
Mental Health Bill 2004. I had interviewed staff in the Home Office; lawyers 
who represented restricted patients; psychiatrists and nurses doing clinical, 
policy and research work in forensic mental health; and representatives of 
mental health and victim organisations.
Response Rate
It was difficult to measure a response rate for my research because of the 
nature of my recruitment strategy. As I shall discuss in Chapter Six, the Joint 
Scrutiny Committee’s review of the draft Mental Health Bill 2004 presented 
itself as an opportunity to recruit participants to my research. The Committee 
held public hearings from October 2004 to March 2005. These were attended 
by a large number of organisations and individuals that I was interested in 
speaking with for my research. I approached them all at the Committee 
hearings, where I either secured interviews on the spot, or obtained contact 
details to follow up with colleagues from their organisations or others who 
would be better placed to participate in my research.
It was unfortunate and disappointing that The Zito Trust never participated 
directly in my research. As the sole organisation specifically representing 
victims of mentally disordered offenders, the Trust was integral to analysing 
the effect of victim involvement in the restricted patient system. Despite my 
numerous approaches over the course of the fieldwork, in person and via 
written and telephone contact, and their declared interest and willingness to 
participate in the project, neither the Patron nor Executive Director were ever 
able to meet with me. However I have drawn substantially from The Zito 
Trust’s submissions to the Joint Scrutiny Committee and from other sources 
including their website. In the meantime I was able to meet with 
representatives of other victim organisations, some of whom had been
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involved in high profile incidents of homicide leading to restriction orders for 
the offenders involved, as well as policy development in the area.
In sum I conducted formal interviews with six Home Office staff, including 
three officials from the Mental Health Unit; and observed the work and 
decision-making processes of nine staff. I interviewed five psychiatrists and 
two allied health professionals; four lawyers who represented restricted 
patients at Tribunal hearings or with the Home Office; two representatives of 
mental health organisations and two victim representatives. I also observed a 
Mental Health Review Tribunal hearing and the lawyer-client meetings that 
took place before and after the hearing; and interviewed a judicial (presiding) 
member of the Tribunal. I also observed some staff in the Tribunal 
Secretariat who processed applications for the Tribunal’s restricted patient 
hearings, and interviewed two senior officials there.
As explained above, the only organisation I approached but was unable to 
interview or observe was The Zito Trust. There was one lawyer I observed in 
a Mental Health Review Tribunal hearing who I wanted to interview, but who 
never responded to my invitations to participate in the research. Beyond 
these two negative responses, everyone I approached to participate did so 
either by way of interview, provision of documentation, or willingness to be 
observed. A table of all participants in my research is included at Appendix 1.
Recording the Data
Thirteen interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed in full. 
Although all interviewees were offered a transcript of their interview, only one 
participant took this up, from a non-government organisation. All other 
participants were satisfied to review the relevant sections of the thesis once 
written. I took notes at the remaining interviews and at all observation 
sessions and additional meetings. I would subsequently review my notes and 
supplement them with a diary or record of unspoken aspects of the 
interaction such as mood, location or the nature of rapport between myself 
and the participant. I was able to photocopy many of the documents I 
analysed, including those at the Home Office Mental Health Unit. Most 
additional documents were policy statements available online or from
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photocopies, such as reports or correspondence. In total I collected three 
large ring-binder folders of documents over the course of my fieldwork.
Confidentiality
As already discussed, ensuring that individual patients, family members or 
victims were not identifiable was my major concern in terms of confidentiality 
in my study. Extensive patient-specific information was provided to me by the 
Mental Health Unit and only one staff member removed identifying 
information from documents before providing them. By contrast clinicians 
were extremely careful not to provide any identifying details about patients or 
families in the examples they discussed. Equally legal practitioners did not 
divulge personal details unless they were referring to case law.11 On one 
occasion I observed a restricted patient’s Tribunal hearing and his 
consultation with his lawyer before and after the hearing. The lawyer had 
taken instructions from his client who consented to my attendance and 
observation. I devised an elaborate numerical codified system during my 
fieldwork to use case studies in my analysis. However when it came to 
writing, this simply was not necessary. I have referred to examples discussed 
by participants in unidentifiable terms and patients are cited only in relation to 
media or official reports which were already in the public domain.
Access Denied
Only two of my requests for information from the Mental Health Unit were 
denied. The first was for the formal correspondence setting out the 
delegation of authority from the Home Secretary to the Unit, which I had 
requested to see its form and the level of detail it set out. It was denied on 
the grounds that it was private ministerial correspondence and not available 
to the public. However its contents and the processes surrounding the 
delegation were explained to me comprehensively and consistently on a 
number of occasions. Thus, whilst there might be aspects to the
11 Despite these precautions, as I became more familiar with the system and patients in it I 
began to detect key stories; the same examples that different people across the system drew 
on to demonstrate a point. While these were actual cases, they took on a folkloric dimension. 
They were illustrative of a particular problem or development in the system, but they were 
not necessarily representative of frequency; indeed it was more likely the opposite, given the 
small number of anecdotes that were relied upon widely.
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correspondence that would be interesting to note, I do not believe this denial 
significantly diminished the validity of my findings.
The second request related to legal advice the Unit had sought in the 1990s 
on the interaction of victims with the decision-making process. That advice 
led to policy and then legislation on what information may be divulged to 
victims about specific restricted patients. As such it went to the heart of the 
balance between natural justice and patient confidentiality in the restricted 
patient system. I sought this advice on several occasions from different 
senior members of the Unit, to no avail. In both cases the denial of access to 
these materials was justified on the basis of principles of freedom of 
information or because of legal privilege over information, yet it was 
noteworthy given the open access I had at the Home Office for the rest of my 
research.
Ethical Considerations
There was no formal ethical approval process required for my research 
project. This stood in stark contrast to the position I was familiar with in 
Australia where formal ethics approval was obligatory in any research 
involving human participation.12 As already discussed, the ethical concerns of 
the Home Office focussed upon ensuring anonymity of patient data, and 
there is no identifying information about either patients or victims contained in 
my thesis. All other participants were involved in a representative or a 
professional capacity. Nevertheless none are identified beyond their 
professional position, and all quotations are included anonymously. Prior to 
submitting my thesis for examination, I sent a summary of findings to all 
those who participated and offered to send more detailed excerpts or the 
thesis as a whole, or to meet and discuss the research in person, should they 
so desire.
Only the Home Office asked to see all quotations from its staff. Upon review, 
officials drew attention to six quotations which they requested be expressed
12 In fact, by the time I had completed my PhD there was a more rigorous ethical process in 
place for research than at the outset of my doctorate. My project still satisfied the new 
requirements.
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as reported speech instead of verbatim. They left the decision up to me and 
noted ‘absolutely no desire to shade’ my meaning. Several of the quotations 
they selected had been rare insights into the thought processes of officials 
and I was hesitant to lose the force of the verbatim statements. At the same 
time, I was conscious of a tacit agreement with the Home Office through the 
support it had provided for my research, and I did not want the primary 
participants in my study to feel mistreated. Consequently I converted the 
quotations to reported speech as requested.
Despite the absence of any formal requirements, I faced some ethical 
dilemmas at the completion of my fieldwork and in the early stages of my 
analysis. I had been given open access to the personnel, policies and 
procedures of the Mental Health Unit and other relevant areas of the Home 
Office. When I first began to analyse my data from the Home Office, I was 
concerned that officials had been too candid with me because they perceived 
me as a colleague. There were some issues I observed and positions put to 
me by participants that could have been legally challengeable. This did not 
mean they were illegal. But as my thesis will show, there were many aspects 
of the restricted patient system that were open to interpretation, and 
interpretation varied depending on the standpoint of the actor in the system. I 
wanted to conduct a detailed investigation of executive decision-making; I did 
not want to render vulnerable to criticism any of the people who participated 
in my research.
It was in considering these issues that I returned to the Home Office’s 
concern that my research should not undermine public confidence in the 
system. I was unsure what this actually required of me. What expectations 
did the Home Office have about my use of data, largely obtained from their 
staff? Did they expect me to be as mindful of public confidence in the system 
as they were required to be?
On closer analysis of my data a picture emerged of actors throughout the 
system who were sympathetic and willing to acknowledge the competing 
priorities of the system, and by extension the tensions between the various 
actors. Executive decision-making about restricted patients in England and
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Wales was more transparent than the system to which I had become 
accustomed in Australia. The decisions made every day in the restricted 
patient system were not easy. Many of them were complex, and involved 
arbitration of conflicting interests. But the actors engaged in these processes 
were the first to acknowledge these tensions. They readily admitted that they 
were not always right; that mistakes had been made and would be made 
again in the future; that the system had a high profile and its actors were 
fallible; and that everyone did the best they could within the resource and 
other constraints of the system. It was also a system that had rendered itself 
open to scrutiny by academics and other researchers long before I conducted 
my research, and I hoped would continue to do so. While I was initially 
concerned that my research might lay individual participants open to 
unanticipated scrutiny, I came to see that review of decision-making 
processes was an integral aspect of the system as a whole. The access the 
Home Office had provided me was no different in form to the sorts of access 
it provided to care teams and hospital staff who worked in the restricted 
patient system.
From the reflections I have outlined in this chapter, my anxieties about the 
potential harm or other unintended consequences of my own research 
diminished. In drawing on examples from fieldwork throughout my thesis and 
complementing these with alternative perspectives wherever possible, I have 
undertaken to present a fair and frank analysis of executive decision-making 
in the restricted patient system.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HOME OFFICE MENTAL HEALTH UNIT
Introduction
The broad aim of my research was to examine the role of the executive in the 
restricted patient system. In law the executive’s powers were held by the 
Home Secretary, but in practice they were delegated to the Home Office, and 
were carried out by the Mental Health Unit (the Unit). Conducting fieldwork 
presented an opportunity to get ‘inside’ the Home Office and consider the 
actual practice of executive decision-making about restricted patients. The 
operations of the Unit had been the subject of empirical research a decade 
earlier when Dell and Grounds examined the discharge and supervision of 
restricted patients (1995). However, theirs was a study of the supervision of 
conditionally discharged restricted patients in the community. Whilst the 
study examined some of the issues around the process of Home Office 
decisions to release, it was interested primarily in the attitudes of care teams 
and patients towards those decisions, rather than how the Home Office 
arrived at them (Dell and Grounds 1995:xi). My research sought to contribute 
a glimpse into the little-explored aspect of the decision-making process itself, 
examining the complex and negotiated character of how the executive’s 
mandate was implemented.
This chapter begins that task through a descriptive analysis of the work of the 
Home Office in the restricted patient system. I seek to establish how the 
framework for decision-making by the Home Office was constructed in 
judgements about release, specifically through applications for leave or 
discharge of restricted patients into the community, and how this in turn 
formed an implied theory of risk at the Home Office. I shall start with a review 
of some of the literature on decision-making, leading to a discussion of the 
exercise of executive discretion within the restricted patient system. I then 
move to a detailed analysis of the Mental Health Unit as the bureaucratic 
department to which the Minister’s authority was delegated.
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Home Office staff clearly understood their mandate to be protecting the 
public. I was interested in what officials meant when they asserted that all 
their operations were informed by the public protection agenda; and how they 
met that agenda. How did protecting the public shape the decisions made by 
Mental Health Unit staff about individual patients? Was the path to public 
protection clearly marked at all times, or was this complicated and difficult 
terrain? In particular, how was risk ‘managed’ by the Home Office, in order to 
provide public protection? In the present chapter I begin to engage with these 
questions, which are central to my analysis throughout the thesis.
Decision-Making in the Literature
A key objective of my thesis was analysing the challenges and processes 
involved in decision-making which took place at the intersection of mental 
health and criminal justice. In Chapter One, I reviewed the literature on the 
'lottery' by which offenders are determined as mentally disordered or not; and 
how the specific status accorded as a result of this determination has an 
impact upon how, where and for how long mentally disordered offenders are 
detained (see for example Peay 1989 and 2002; Grounds 1995; Prins 1995; 
James et al 2002; Padfield 2002; Grounds et al 2003). There is also an 
important body of work examining the operation of mental health tribunals 
(Peay 1989 and 2005b; Mohan et al 1998; Wood 1999; Perkins 2003) and 
analyses of the effect of judicial review, including upon bureaucratic decision­
making (see for example Machin and Richardson 2000). Tribunal decision­
making was a central aspect of the restricted patient system, but was so 
significantly different from the focus of my own research into the executive 
that a thorough analysis would detract from the objective of my thesis.13 Of 
more direct relevance to my work was the literature about legal decision­
making processes, particularly at the point of exit from the system. I introduce 
this literature now, to set the context for my analysis of the operations of the 
Mental Health Unit.
Legal decision-making processes can be both formal, such as the recognised 
processes of a court; and informal or unacknowledged, for example the work
13 I shall return to the question of Tribunal decision-making in Chapter Seven.
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of court staff who support judicial decision-making in the preparation and 
presentation of information (Hawkins 2003). Hawkins has also contrasted 
case-specific decision-making with policy decision-making. In policy-based 
work legal rules are implemented by what he describes as street-level 
bureaucrats. These are members of formal organisations for whom,
very often the environment of a legal decision, so far as the official is 
concerned, is partly made up of existing decisions which comprise a 
policy purporting to inform the handling of particular kinds of cases in 
particular ways (Hawkins 1986:1171).
Hawkins’ analysis requires us to take a broad approach to defining the terrain 
of decision-making, so that we look beyond the formal institutions that are 
readily identifiable to the structures that support those institutions. He 
suggests that decision-making research needs to:
get away from approaches which focus on ‘criteria’ or ‘factors’ said to 
have been taken into account in making a particular choice. The 
argument, instead, is that decisions can only be understood by 
reference to their broad environment, particular context, and 
interpretive practices: their surrounds, fields and frames (Hawkins 
2003:189).
Hawkins’ analysis informed my own approach to the operation of executive 
discretion in the restricted patient system. I was not just interested in the final 
decisions but in the policies, personnel and other factors which lead to those 
decisions being made. To recapitulate from Chapter Two, these were the 
factors of the ‘decision frame’, a ‘structure of knowledge, experience, values, 
and meanings that the decision-maker shares with others and brings to a 
choice’ (Hawkins 1986:1191).
Executive decision-making might not be readily obvious as a form of legal 
decision-making. The very nature of a decision being made by an elected 
representative contrasts with what is traditionally considered as legal 
decision-making such as by the judiciary or via tribunals.14 Nonetheless 
executive discretion in the restricted patient system was bound by legislative 
frameworks, such as in the exercise of compulsory powers under the Mental 
Health Act 1983, that clearly constituted a legal decision-making
14 That excludes those jurisdictions where criminal justice officials are elected, for example 
some states in the United States of America.
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environment. In the restricted patient system, describing Home Office staff as 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ would imply that they were merely lay people 
without relevant knowledge or experience beyond the machinations of 
government. Of course, there is an established role for lay people in mental 
health law. Loughnan suggests that “recognising the role of lay 
understandings of mental illness is important because it reminds us that the 
'battle' about the way criminal law deals with mentally incapacitated 
defendants is fought on three fronts” (Loughnan 2005:37). Loughnan posits 
that the jury in the trial process contributes a third level of lay knowledge to 
those of the legal and medical (psychiatric) forms of knowledge already 
embedded in criminal procedure. But even accepting this structure, staff of 
the Mental Health Unit formed something of a fourth layer of decision-maker. 
They were not employed for their expertise in forensic mental health. There 
was no requirement that staff had a background or training in the areas of 
law, criminal justice or mental health, and only one staff member participating 
in my research acknowledged their training in psychology as a reason for 
wanting to work in the Unit. On the contrary, some staff members described 
themselves as members of the public representing the interests of the non­
expert in the restricted patient system. Indeed, Unit staff had a breadth of 
experience and carried responsibility for individuals including patients and 
their families that extended well beyond those of lay actors like jurors.
The decisions of the Mental Health Unit were what Hawkins would call 
‘negotiated decisions ... made in private with a low degree of visibility of 
process and result’ (Hawkins 1986:1170). Such decision-making has raised 
concerns that it can lead to 'arbitrary, inconsistent or unfair decision-making' 
(Holloway and Grounds 2003). However these criticisms are not unique to 
executive decision-making. In their study of Mental Health Review Tribunal 
decisions in a regional secure unit, Mohan et al questioned ‘whether MHRTs 
act with sufficient independence to balance the rights of both the public and 
the detained patient, or whether they are unduly receptive to the 
[Responsible Medical Officer’s] views’ (1998:63). That critique points to the 
important assertion that decision-making takes place within social contexts, 
political values, resourcing and demands upon prioritisation that may
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compete with the interests of those making or effected by the decisions 
themselves.
While informative and analytically helpful, the existing literature did not wholly 
account for the nature of executive discretion as it operated in the restricted 
patient system. The executive occupied a nebulous space between (or 
outside of) the legal decision-making structures commonly considered by the 
literature such as courts and tribunals. Executive decision-making shared 
some but not all of their characteristics; and it contributed new elements to 
the picture. For example, the idea of flexibility in executive decision-making 
was repeatedly mentioned by people interviewed in this research. As I will 
examine in Chapter Six, the government relied heavily upon the element of 
flexibility in its agenda for law reform. Developing a greater understanding of 
how notions like ‘flexibility’ translated into practice was one contribution of 
this empirical research. Above all, I sought to contribute to the significant gap 
in the literature on the operation of executive decision-making.
Executive Decision-Making in Practice
The role of the Mental Health Unit
Whilst the exercise of discretion is the focus of this chapter, it is important to 
commence by clarifying the meaning of executive. The Mental Health Act 
1983 provided statutory authority to the Secretary of State to permit restricted 
patients to take leave from a secure hospital facility, to transfer to a different 
facility, to be conditionally or absolutely discharged to the community, and to 
be recalled to hospital (sections 41 and 42).15 It was the Home Secretary 
who exercised the legislated power of the executive in this system. In 
practice the power was delegated to the bureaucracy of the Home Office, 
specifically the Mental Health Unit (the Unit). This delegation was effected 
not by way of statute but by agreement between the minister and his or her 
department. As explained to me by senior Unit officials, a memorandum of 
understanding was sent to each newly appointed Secretary of State (Home 
Department), outlining the scope of decisions previously taken by the Unit,
15 This was reaffirmed in the amendments to the Mental Health Act that were introduced in 
July 2007, after the completion of fieldwork for this thesis.
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and seeking confirmation that the new minister wished this process to 
continue. Through this process the Unit was given authority to make 
decisions using the Home Secretary’s authority under the Mental Health Act 
1983. I was not permitted access to the documentation surrounding this 
process of delegation during my fieldwork on the grounds that it contained 
‘confidential recommendations’ and that the Unit ‘don’t publish the advice that 
we give to ministers’.16
Importantly, the delegation of power comprised direct authority to the staff of 
the Unit. With a population of almost 5000 patients, no single person could 
determine each case individually, least of all a cabinet minister with a 
portfolio as broad as the Home Secretary’s. The decisions taken by the 
Mental Health Unit were signed by the individual staff member, not ‘for or on 
behalf of the Home Secretary. As one official from the Unit stated:
Not so long back, five years ago, the great majority of significant 
decisions like discharge and transfer to low security were taken 
personally by ministers. Now they’re not. Ministers have delegated 
most decision-making to [the Unit].
There was very little scrutiny from the ministerial level towards the operation 
of the Mental Health Unit. On the contrary, the Minister only became involved 
in a matter if it was handed up from the Unit. Indeed, some Unit staff I 
interviewed said that they found the decision-making process ‘isolating’, as a 
consequence of the lack of review of the decisions they made. Nevertheless 
the Home Secretary was ultimately accountable for these decisions, by 
legislative mandate under the Mental Health Act 1983. How the Home 
Secretary ensured oversight of the decisions being made under his or her 
authority seemed to rest with the confidence with which the bureaucracy of 
the Home Office met its mandate.
There was a clear hierarchy, strongly adhered to, which provided 
bureaucratic support in the form of avenues available for advice when staff 
doubted their decisions. It was an example of what DiMaggio and Powell 
would have termed a structural simulacrum of rational decision-making, that
16 This was also in accordance with standard provisions under the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000 (part ii, section 35).
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is internal processes that monitored the decision-making process at every 
level (1983). There was a strong presumption towards caution in all areas of 
decision-making, but particularly in decisions about discharge. In many ways 
staff acted as gatekeepers by exercising caution in decision-making, 
ensuring that neither the minister nor the system fell into disrepute.
Executive discretion in the restricted patient system essentially involved a 
form of bureaucratic decision-making. At the government level the Home 
Secretary remained the challengeable authority in this domain. Should a 
patient wish to mount a legal challenge against a decision in their case the 
responding party would be the Home Secretary. But it was civil servants who 
made the decisions in all but exceptional cases. Their role raised a number of 
questions including the dual responsibility of both advising and taking 
direction from ministers and the realpolitik of criminal justice policy at the 
time. These issues pointed to a set of dual mandates operating in the 
system, and made it even more pertinent to have a detailed analysis of the 
operations of the Unit. I turn to this task now.
The work of the Mental Health Unit
The main role of the Home Office in the management of restricted 
patients is to protect the public from serious harm. ... Our task is to 
scrutinise proposals relating to restricted patients ... looking for 
evidence of thorough risk assessment and effective risk management. 
We need to satisfy ourselves that any risk to the public has been 
properly identified and evaluated, and that sound measures have been 
taken to guard against any risk (Mental Health Unit Casework Guide, 
March 1998, 1A.1.2).
I conducted fieldwork at the Mental Health Unit of the Home Office from 
January 2005 to March 2006. The data in this section are taken entirely from 
that fieldwork. At the time of my research the Unit had approximately 60 staff. 
Unit staff were predominantly case workers, which meant their work revolved 
around the cases of specific restricted patients. Staff had two primary roles: 
dealing with routine applications such as leave requests; and responding to 
unusual or complex matters, for example a proposed leave plan to the 
community where a patient had lived and committed their index offence (the 
offence for which the patient had been convicted). As I will show, although 
many offenders had histories of dangerous or offending behaviour prior to
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their status as restricted patients, the index offence was regarded as a 
significant indicator of risk and potential harm posed by the patient. Individual 
staff members each had about two-hundred ‘live’ files in which patients were 
awaiting a decision on an application. Around one-quarter of those were 
likely to be patients on conditional discharge in the community.
There was a widely held perception amongst Unit staff I spoke to that the 
total time spent on a restriction order was approximately four years, from 
detention after conviction to absolute discharge. This figure was a notable 
underestimate of Street’s findings that the average stay of restricted patients 
in hospital was nine years, not counting time spent on a conditional discharge 
in the community (1998). Discharge was rarely achieved straight from 
hospital. It usually involved a lengthy process of testing a patient’s 
compliance with treatment and therapy as the patient moved from maximum 
through to minimum levels of security in hospital. Patient progress was also 
measured through periods of leave from hospital, where a patient’s ability to 
remain safe in the community was tested over initially short, and then 
increasingly long periods of time while they continued to be formally detained 
in a hospital.
The progress of patients through the restricted system was tracked through 
files maintained at the Unit which contained all paperwork on a case 
including correspondence, reports, minutes of the Unit’s actions and any 
other material associated with the patient. The Unit might receive 
correspondence from a solicitor, but the application for discharge (or anything 
else) came from the patient’s medical officer. Staff described a strong sense 
of responsibility for their caseload, acknowledging that the sheer volume of 
cases they monitored might lead them to miss something that later proved 
important. Indeed it was a large population spread well across the country, as 
the following figures show.
The restricted patient population in England and Wales
A number of datasets were provided by the Unit during my fieldwork to give a 
snapshot of the population at the time. They are unpublished figures derived 
from internal Unit records. At this time the Unit was in the process of
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transferring its records from a paper-based to an electronic system. Thus 
these figures were indicative rather than definitive of the population at the 
time.17
Table 1: Patient population monitored by the Mental Health Unit (as at 
11 August 2005)
Detention Status of Restricted Patient Number of Patients
Detained patients
Restricted hospital order (section 37/41) 2347
Other* 1118
Sub-total of detained patients 3465
Conditionally discharged restricted patients 1306
TOTAL 4771
* The category of ‘other’ included the rarely used provisions of the Mental Health Act 
1983: section 45a where a sentenced prisoner with psychopathic disorder could be 
directed to hospital admission for compulsory treatment before being sent to prison; 
sentenced prisoners transferred to hospital for treatment (section 47); and other 
prisoners such as those on remand or detained in immigration centre who were 
transferred to hospital for treatment (section 48).
Notwithstanding their limitations, these figures provided some general 
information about the population being supervised by the Unit. Most notably, 
almost one-third (27%) of all restricted patients were on conditional release in 
the community. That meant a significant amount of the Unit’s work was 
focussed on supervision in the community. Yet a number of Unit staff 
believed that the Home Office had the wrong balance in its workload. During 
my observation of their work they commented that, whilst they spent most of 
their time determining applications for leave and monitoring patients in 
detention, they believed they ought to be concentrating on patients 
conditionally discharged to the community. Even though conditionally 
discharged patients only represented one-third of the Unit’s caseload, staff 
believed that those patients warranted the most attention in terms of the risks 
they posed to public safety. It was interesting that staff felt that the monitoring 
of patients who were already in the community was more important than the 
decision to discharge a patient from hospital in the first place; a decision
17 There are some obvious gaps in these data, for example in the inconsistencies in the 
totals between Table 1 and Table 2; and they reflect the usual problems of census-style 
data, including the effect on population of movement through the system at the time. The 
flow data presented elsewhere in Chapter 3 provide a more reliable picture of the system.
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which staff might conceivably have felt was a greater burden in terms of their 
responsibility for public safety. But as I shall discuss shortly, the Unit actually 
made very few discharge decisions compared with the Tribunal. Thus the 
area about which staff had the greatest concern in their own work was the 
monitoring of patients in the community, and decisions that might arise in 
relation to patient behaviour while there.
Table 2: Dispersal of restricted patients (as at 11 August 2005)
Location Number of Patients
High security hospitals 713
Other hospitals (medium, low, open) 2652
Community 1306
TOTAL 4671
The Unit’s workload covered a total of 1159 hospitals in England and Wales 
in which restricted patients could be detained. In practice the actual spread of 
patients at any one time was likely to be far less. The three special hospitals 
of Broadmoor, Rampton and Ashworth maintained the highest level of 
security and they accounted for 713 restricted patients (20% of the total 
restricted patient population) at the time of this research. The remaining 
hospitals were medium- and low-security and open hospitals (facilities with 
no capacity to secure patients on the site). Very few restricted patients were 
detained in open hospitals, because it was argued that if they no longer 
required such security, then they could be conditionally released. 
Consequently there was a concentration of patients in the three high-security 
facilities and a large spread of patients throughout the medium- and low- 
security hospitals of England and Wales.
Table 3: Discharge to the community by decision-making authority 
(year to date, as at 11 August 2005)
Discharging Authority Number of Discharges
Home Office 250
Mental Health Review Tribunal 1056
TOTAL discharges 1306
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The breakdown of conditional discharges by decision-making authority was 
an important source of data. These data pertained to all patients living in the 
community on conditional discharge at the time of the research (August 
2005). The population ranged from people who had been released since the 
Tribunal received the power to discharge under the 1983 Act, to people who 
were discharged up to June 2005, just before the commencement of my 
fieldwork. From these data, Home Office decisions to discharge represented 
only 19% of all conditionally discharged patients, indicating that the Tribunal 
was the primary decision-maker for conditionally discharging patients. These 
data went a long way to explaining the perception by Unit staff that problems 
with risky patients in the community arose from Tribunal decisions, an issue I 
shall discuss below.
Beyond these demographics the majority of the data available from the Unit 
were outcome-specific, recording the actions of the Unit’s staff in response to 
applications received. ‘Output measures and performance indicators’ were 
aspects of the Unit’s work that were quantifiable and were measured on a 
monthly basis for each team within the Unit. Key indicators included 
applications for every different form of leave, for example escorted and 
unescorted leave, discharge proposals, Tribunal statements and responding 
to letters from patients or members of the public. Initial performance was 
measured by recording things like the number of applications for leave 
received against the number where a decision had been made. However 
performance was also measured by timeliness, such as whether a case was 
completed within ten days, two weeks, three weeks and so on up to one 
year. Some of these performance indicators also had targets. For instance, 
leave applications had a completion target of three weeks while discharge 
applications had a target of two months from the date of receipt of the 
request (excluding any time taken to request further information). 95% of 
letters from the public were supposed to be answered within three weeks, a 
target that was met at the time of my research. Some targets were set 
externally, such as replies to parliamentary questions which were determined 
by the Private Office.
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Performance indicators and targets had become commonplace throughout 
the civil service (see for example Home Office 2006b). Importantly, these 
indicators were a quantitative measure of performance, which necessarily 
delineated the sorts of processes that they could cover. At the Mental Health 
Unit, performance indicators measured discrete, case-specific decisions 
about restricted patients. However Hawkins cautions that ‘this individualistic 
view is partial ... and fails to describe the real character of criminal justice 
decision-making which has instead to be seen in an holistic or systemic 
perspective’ (Hawkins 2003:194).
According to Hawkins, analysing decisions without examining the 
environment in which they are made tells us very little about the decision­
making process. Nevertheless performance indicators did shed light on the 
administrative priorities of the Unit. These related to measures of efficiency 
and to how matters progressed through the Home Office system. They were 
an important tool for justification and were something of which senior Unit 
staff were proud. The Unit consistently scored well against its performance 
indicators, which enabled managers to demonstrate that the Unit was doing 
its job efficiently.
Although the Mental Health Unit’s performance indicators were a reflection of 
a particular aspect of the Unit’s work, they could not be viewed as an overall 
summary of its entire workload. Notably, performance indicators did not cover 
the supervision of patients in the community. Monitoring conditionally 
discharged restricted patients was an area of work that Unit staff found 
particularly stressful because it involved the greatest likelihood of interaction 
between patients and the public. The nature of monitoring and supervision of 
the restricted patient system was central to the Unit’s work and the hardest 
aspect of that work to quantify through discrete numerical values. At the 
same time, the process of setting performance indicators and targets had 
effected the structure of the work of the Unit and these ‘organisational 
decisions’ came to take on a specific significance because they could be 
measured as indications of performance (Hawkins 2003). I shall return to the 
nature of measurable processes and decisions later in this chapter. Before
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that, I turn to examine the unquantifiable aspect of the Unit’s work: monitoring 
in the restricted patient system.
Monitoring in the restricted patient system
Monitoring occurred at every stage of the process, beginning with patients in 
hospital right through to progress on conditional discharge in the community. 
In a new case, staff would examine the index offence and the medical reports 
(including the clinical assessment of the index offence), and would assess 
these measures against the Unit’s checklist that was provided as a reference 
point for Responsible Medical Officers to make applications and for 
caseworkers to assess them (the checklist is reproduced at Appendix 2). 
Some factors were considered routinely, including the extent to which risk 
factors were being addressed in the care plan; whether and how risk was 
being reduced; and whether there was a consistent and complete picture 
about the patient’s care plan and progress being conveyed by the treating 
team. If the treating team’s recommendations had changed, Unit staff would 
seek an explanation. They also monitored staff changes within care teams to 
ensure an ongoing familiarity with a patient’s history. Unit caseworkers 
interacted regularly with care teams and even sometimes with patients’ 
families in their monitoring and supervision work.
Whilst there was no set template, conditions of discharge generally required 
a patient to accept psychiatric supervision, prescribed medication and 
supervision from a social worker or nurse; and to reside at a stipulated 
hostel, residence or other address as approved by the care team. Conditions 
might also include an exclusion zone or restrictions on drug and alcohol 
consumption. Conditions of discharge were an important component of the 
strategies for public protection undertaken by the Unit even though, as I 
discuss below, conditions were not necessarily enforceable.
The Unit monitored patients to see whether their restrictions were still 
necessary; whether their current conditions were appropriate; and if not, 
whether recall was necessary. The actual nature of these assessments 
varied across the Unit. One official interviewed explained how she would first 
check the patient’s previous convictions. She would then check the patient’s
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medical history, to establish whether there was evidence of his or her mental 
illness prior to the offence. From this she would make a judgment about 
whether the patient’s mental condition was likely to have contributed to the 
offending behaviour, or whether it was more likely to have been sparked later 
such as when he or she was arrested. This official believed that the 
documents in a patient’s file were adequate for gleaning these facts. As 
Hawkins points out, decision-makers ‘are rarely, if ever, totally passive 
participants in the decision-making process’ (Hawkins 2003:201). I was 
beginning to see how the process of the decisions being made might vary, 
depending on the individual staff member making them.
There were certain markers of behaviour that came to assume importance in 
decision-making. For example the pro forma applications for leave and 
discharge included information on the person’s mental state, behaviour, 
treatment plan and offending history (specifically, whether or not they were a 
sex offender). The form also asked for information on any victim or public 
involvement in the case; the patient’s attitude to the victims; and whether the 
patient posed any risks of absconding. Thus, while it was not the role of Unit 
staff to contribute expert knowledge to the process, they did structure the 
information they received along collectively identified avenues, and a 
common work culture structured around the priorities of the Home Office.
It could be difficult for Unit staff to explain the processes they followed to 
other actors in the system. An official described a recent interaction with a 
doctor who had been frustrated when the Unit rejected a transfer application 
on the basis of the risks to other patients if the patient was transferred. The 
doctor asked for a copy of the Unit’s ‘risk assessment document’. In 
response, the staff member sent him a copy of her file notes. As she 
explained to me, risk assessment was not an actuarial process: it did not 
involve a routine approach in each case. Rather, it was ‘a matter of personal 
consideration’, taking into account the sorts of issues outlined above. Yet 
another staff member describing Home Office risk assessments said that 
they were ‘fairly actuarial’. The use of ‘actuarial’ here could have referred to 
the systematic process of assessing risk discussed in Chapter One, for 
example by scoring behaviour with numbers that eventually enabled the
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calculation of a probability of risk. However it seemed to me that staff were 
using the term instead to describe the routine nature of the processes 
involved. These processes were embedded within an organisational context 
whose institutional priorities and policies influenced but did not determine the 
outcomes of decisions. As such, they defied simple description, particularly to 
anyone working outside the Unit.
Another area of monitoring by the Mental Health Unit was in relation to 
Mental Health Review Tribunal decisions about restricted patients. The Home 
Office monitored Tribunal decisions to make sure they did not step outside 
the Tribunal’s mandate, and the Unit could seek judicial review if it believed a 
Tribunal had acted beyond its purpose or powers. As one senior Unit official 
commented, the Home Office found it hard to keep the Tribunal’s powers 
closely defined, but judicial review of Tribunal decisions provided one avenue 
for this.18 Additionally, Tribunal hearings were monitored for reasons of public 
protection. One official told me of a case involving a homicide offender whose 
mental disorder had cleared up fairly quickly after admission to hospital. The 
care team were preparing an application for release, either conditionally or 
unconditionally, because the patient no longer met the criteria for detention 
under the 1983 Act, but the Home Office was concerned that the patient 
might reoffend. Given the severity of the offence, officials believed the patient 
exhibited a clear risk to the public and so opposed his discharge, regardless 
of whether he continued to meet the criteria for compulsory treatment under 
the Act. The Home Secretary was represented by counsel at the hearing, and 
the Tribunal granted a deferred conditional discharge. As this official 
explained, the Home Office had never expected the patient’s detention to 
continue; the most the Home Office could hope for was the conditional 
discharge that eventuated. But officials had ‘pulled out all the stops’ to show 
they had done everything the Home Office could to protect the public.
18 See for example R (on the application of the Secretary of State for the Home Department) 
v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2001JA.C.D. 62 (High Court), wherein the Home Office 
sought review of a Tribunal decision to adjourn a hearing to seek further information about 
an assessment for transfer. The review was based on the fact that transfer was out of the 
Tribunal’s power, and therefore not a legitimate reason for an adjournment.
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This focus on the Tribunal by the Unit indicated an unofficial mandate that lay 
outside the executive’s official role in relation to restricted patients. These 
were aspects of the ongoing work of the Unit, yet they were not part of the 
clear and coherent description of the Unit’s role and responsibilities that had 
been laid down formally in policy. There was no statutory duty of oversight by 
the Home Secretary in relation to the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Tribunal’s 
powers derived from its independence as a quasi-judicial body working in 
parallel to the executive. Yet the Mental Health Unit perceived its role of 
maintaining public confidence as well as public protection to necessitate the 
review of any decisions made about restricted patients, even under the 
authority of the Tribunal. The informal status of that monitoring was further 
reinforced by the absence of performance indicators in relation to it; and by 
the absence of policy or documentation about it. Yet, the internal review of a 
Tribunal decision could result in a formal process such as a judicial review. 
Thus it was an important and sensitive aspect of the work of the Unit.
Monitoring Tribunal decisions was separate from the statutory responsibility 
of the Home Secretary to provide statements in response to medical reports 
submitted in support of applications for discharge. These were also 
undertaken by the Unit which furnished an explanation as to why the Home 
Secretary was opposed to the patient’s discharge (and therefore had not 
released the patient already). In practice, Unit staff told me that the Home 
Secretary ‘was expected’ to comment not only on psychiatric reports but on 
all reports received by the Tribunal for a hearing (including, for example, 
nursing or social worker reports). This was a huge task administratively: there 
were 4000 Home Secretary statements each year. Yet completing these 
statements was a matter of routine administration.19 The distinction between 
providing statements to the Tribunal and monitoring its decisions provided 
some indication of the broad scope allowed for in the Home Secretary’s 
mandate. The provision of Home Secretary statements on discharge 
applications to the Tribunal was required by law. The informal monitoring of 
Tribunal decisions was not. Yet both these aspects of the Unit’s work were
19 Dell and Grounds found that they were generally discounted by Tribunals because they 
were little more than a summary of information already available to the Tribunal (1995).
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considered central to the mandate for public protection that underpinned the 
work of the Home Office.
The monitoring of Tribunals indicated how much attention the Home Office 
paid not just to the risks taken in terms of patients coming in to contact with 
the public, but also about being seen to be acting in the interests of public 
protection. Padfield et al have talked about the extent to which Parole Board 
Discretionary Lifer Panels were similarly concerned about the public 
appearance of their decisions, such that it became a standard part of their 
decision frame (2003). Indeed, Hawkins argues that decisions to lift the 
criminal sanction are particularly vulnerability to criticism on these grounds.
A successful decision outcome (the released person who readjusts to 
life in the community, or who successfully completes his or her period 
of supervision) is invisible; only failure has the potential to come to 
public attention. To the extent this setting makes decision-makers 
more cautious, its effects are unlikely to show in conventional 
corelational research. In analysing decision-making about the risk of 
offenders, one aspect to take into account is that conceptions of risk 
have to be understood also as about risk to the decision-makers 
themselves (Hawkins 2003:211)
This process reflected the sorts of assessments staff engaged in on a daily 
basis. It could be argued that these were decisions requiring clinical or legal 
expertise. Indeed, Unit staff based their decisions about patients upon clinical 
information in the form of medical reports, and legal documents in the form of 
court transcripts and submissions from lawyers. These views then informed 
the approach staff took when assessing applications. There were also 
elements of the decision-making process wherein the idiosyncrasies of 
individual staff might produce a different method or approach to how 
caseworkers did their jobs. As another staff member commented to me, it 
was the care team’s responsibility to interpret the patient’s behaviour, but the 
Mental Health Unit’s responsibility to monitor that behaviour at all times.
As Hawkins has argued, understanding the environment and context of 
decision-making is central to analysing its process.
Chapter 3: The Home Office Mental Health Unit [97]
To understand the nature of criminal justice decision-making better, a 
connection needs to be forged between forces in the decision-making 
environment, and the interpretive processes that individuals engage in 
when deciding a particular case (Hawkins 2003:189).
In the restricted patient system, the exercise of executive discretion took 
place within the bureaucratic environment of the Home Office. However, that 
environment - or what Hawkins terms the ‘surround’ - was only one part of 
the picture. Some of the processes that caseworkers followed could have 
been interpreted as simply reading the information in a patient’s file to 
familiarise themselves with a case. Yet the process instilled in them a sense 
of familiarity that enabled them to judge for themselves the quality of the 
information they were receiving and - by extension - the effectiveness of the 
steps being proposed by the care team.
One Mental Health Unit member explained that while caseworkers didn’t 
necessarily operate identically at every point, they did so at a broader, 
institutional level. Essentially, their approach relied upon the fact that Unit 
staff were neither lawyers nor clinicians, but were intelligent and educated 
members of the public who were looking at the information coming in from 
care teams and lawyers. In that sense, he said, the brief of the Unit differed 
significantly from that of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. Rather than 
substitute their own judgment for that of the clinicians making an application, 
Unit officials would assess the information received, including what might be 
missing from it, and would ask questions of its authors. Consequently, while 
there might be variance in the individual approaches of caseworkers, 
decision-making at the Unit was consistent in the emphasis it placed on the 
interests of public protection.
As I suggested earlier, the work and responsibilities of Unit staff situated 
them somewhere in between lay and professional actors in the forensic 
mental health system. Based upon their experience, staff were trying to 
ensure a consistency of process in a genuinely bureaucratic approach. 
However it was also important to some staff that they identified with and as 
members of the public. When I asked whether staff had any training in mental 
health or illness, one official replied that it was better to have less knowledge
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about mental illness when you were working in the Unit, because it enabled 
staff to examine cases ‘like a normal person’. This meant the ability to assess 
risk issues for the public, as members of the public. Staff would pick up an 
understanding from doctors reports ‘as we go along’, but they didn’t need a 
detailed understanding of mental illness in order to make determinations 
about risk.
A growing body of literature has talked about the deprofessionalisation of 
approaches to criminal justice. In Garland’s critique, he attributes this 
process to the greater emphasis placed upon public and victim-focussed 
perspectives.
The dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the 
practitioner but that of the long-suffering, ill-served people - especially 
of 'the victim' and the fearful, anxious members of the public. A few 
decades ago public opinion functioned as an occasional brake on 
policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source. The 
importance of research and criminological knowledge is downgraded 
and in its place is a new deference to the voice of 'experience,' of 
'common sense,' of'what everyone knows' (Garland 2001:13).
Professional assessments were still a central element of Home Office 
decision-making, as evidenced by the reliance upon care team’s reports 
when considering applications. Yet the Home Office’s role was to assess 
those reports in the interests of public protection. In pursuing that mandate, 
the public perspective was given equal weight (at least) to that of the 
professional.
Sociology has long been interested in ideas of common-sense. As Douglas 
argues, classical sociologists believed that, in order to mark it as a ‘science’, 
sociology had to be ‘independent of and in opposition to common sense 
ideas about man and society' (1971 :ix). That assumption shifted with the 
recognition that, unlike rocks and planets, the forces that moved human 
beings were the ‘meaningful stuff of ‘ideas, feelings, motives’ (ibid). 
Meanwhile Edelman had been interested in the utility of common sense 
within political realms, positing that common sense served ‘as a reassuring 
symbol evocative of an acquiescent mass public response’ (Edelman 
1964:55). For my own analysis, these theoretical approaches to the role of
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common sense in public (and particularly criminal justice) policy provided a 
useful framework for understanding what was happening at the Unit. It was 
their own experience as members of the public that Mental Health Unit staff 
related to and claimed was most important for their decision-making in terms 
of public protection. In a sense, they occupied a hybrid position as experts of 
the public interest, combining their professional experience of reading and 
assessing information by experts, with their personal experience as members 
of the public. This perception of staff directly representing the public interest 
is something I return to later in the chapter.
From the discussion so far, it was clear that the distinction between 
monitoring and decision-making was actually quite blurred in practice. In 
some of the examples I have given, it was the unofficial monitoring of a 
patient that created the need for a formal decision, such as whether to recall 
a patient or seek judicial review of a Tribunal decision. However, I maintain 
this distinction as an analytical tool to focus on the application-driven part of 
the Unit’s work, which required specific decisions in response to applications 
or to other situations that arose on an ad hoc basis. I turn now to consider in 
greater detail the decisions made by the Unit.
Determinations
The purpose of executive discretion in decisions about the release of serious 
and violent offenders essentially came down to a question of rights versus 
control: the rights of the patient to be released as balanced against the 
interests of the public to be protected. In the contemporary political and policy 
terrain, this meant that every decision made by the Unit was reduced to the 
question of risk. The challenge for decision-makers was that, even accepting 
this rights-versus-control dichotomy, there were a range of risks that 
emerged within that dichotomy, and it was rare for one course of action to 
alleviate them all. In the world of mentally disordered offenders, risk had a set 
of clinical connotations, based in science and research, which were integral 
to how a patient’s progress was assessed. In the context of public and 
criminal justice policy, risk of dangerousness to the public was one major 
element; but equally important were risks to the reputation of the decision­
maker, the system and ultimately to the Home Secretary. These risks were
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real, as was evidenced by the fall of at least one Home Secretary during the 
period of my research. In the following discussion I examine how risks were 
assessed and permitted in decisions that brought restricted patients into 
contact with the community. I focus on decisions for leave and conditional 
release.
Leave applications
Applications received at the Unit generally related to requests for leave, 
transfer or conditional or unconditional discharge. In each of these cases the 
concern with risk and public protection was paramount to the decision­
making process. Beyond this, the extent to which Unit decision-making was 
informed by therapeutic concerns varied. The consideration of leave 
applications was a good example. The ‘Guidance for Responsible Medical 
Officers’ set out the framework within which doctors applied for leave and the 
Unit considered their applications. The Guidance stated:
Leave programmes should be designed and conducted in such a way 
as to preserve public safety, sustain public confidence in the 
arrangements as a whole, and respect the feelings and possible fears 
of victims and others who may have been affected by the offences 
(Mental Health Unit, March 2005:page 2 at 4).
Interestingly, the specified criteria against which applications were assessed 
had changed little in ten years.20 Four separate documents outlining the 
leave provisions for restricted patients made the same points with similar 
emphasis.21 A cover letter accompanying the revised ‘Guidance to RMOs‘ 
that was issued by the Unit in April 2005 noted, ‘it does not introduce any 
major changes ... generally the guidance has been improved to reflect not 
only the views of RMOs and other users, but also by making the language 
clearer and the layout more helpful’ (SI 4/05, ‘Revised Guidance for RMOs: 
Section 17 Leave’, para 2). As I shall explore in Chapter Seven, the 
operations of the Unit came increasingly to focus on risk after the introduction 
of the Mental Health Act 1983, and particularly throughout the 1990s. Yet,
20 A lot of the documents I analysed were undated. This reflected my own professional 
experience of working in the public service, where documents rarely recorded their author or 
date. Any assessment of change over time on the basis of documentary analysis needs to 
keep this proviso in mind.
21 These were Potts (1995) at Annex B; ‘Chapter 7, Mental Health Unit Casework Manual’, 
March 1998 at Checklist in Annex A; 'Guidance to RMOs (leave)’, 2001 (provided by the 
Mental Health Unit); and 'Guidance to RMOs (leave)’, 2005 (also provided by the Unit).
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even with this renewed focus, it was noteworthy that the processes 
themselves remained unchanged.
These data confirmed that public protection was the single most important 
factor taken into account in determining leave applications by Unit staff. Yet, 
from observing those staff, it was equally clear that how the public protection 
agenda featured in these decisions was a complicated and variable issue. 
One staff member stated that there needed to be a justification for a leave 
arrangement, ‘even if the purpose is made up’. She conceded that doctors 
might be frustrated by this, but insisted that the Home Office could not simply 
grant patients ‘a nice time’ (ibid). The need for a justification indicated a set of 
internal criteria for decision-making, based upon the perception of those 
decisions and the ability to justify them. There is a well-established 
sociological literature that explores how such processes of justification are 
integral to the maintenance of social order. For example, Scott and Lyman 
argued that accounts of decisions or behaviour were ‘a crucial element in the 
social order since they prevent conflicts from arising by verbally bridging the 
gap between action and expectation’ (Scott and Lyman 1968:46). In 
particular, they noted that ‘the rules of bureaucracy, for instance, make 
available accounts for actions taken towards clients - actions which, from the 
viewpoint of the client are untowards’ (ibid:54). In the case above, the 
justification given took heed of a number of different factors. On the one 
hand, detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 was intended to serve the 
social order through a therapeutic, rather than a punitive, function. 
Nevertheless, any decision to discharge a patient from that detention needed 
to fit demonstrably within a model that was both therapeutically appropriate 
and accountable to the public.
Systemic tensions arising from the different objectives of administrators and 
professionals are not new, but recent criminological analysis has been 
interested in these tensions as one of the factors influencing the shifts in 
contemporary penal policy. For Garland, new management styles and 
working practices have produced an ongoing tension between 'sections of 
the practitioner community and political decision-makers' (2001). Decisions 
about leave for restricted patients provided a case in point. Administrators
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were concerned to make sure they could account for their decisions in the 
face of potential public scrutiny as well as clinical advice, even though the 
wishes of the public might not coincide with the therapeutic aims of treating 
teams. This tension reflected a disjuncture between clinical responsibilities to 
patients and the objective of maintaining public confidence in the system. 
The Mental Health Unit occupied the space in the middle, balancing the 
competing demands that were made of it from all sides.
Beyond the existence of the checklist for leave applications discussed above, 
Unit staff were keen to explain that they did not use a single, specified risk 
assessment tool. While clinicians and care teams might have relied upon 
such tools in their own assessment of patients’ risks, the process of 
assessing applications at the Home Office was not standardised via a 
prescribed formula or tool. Yet there were factors identified in other forms 
which were regarded as essential to risk assessment. For example, in one 
patient file there was a document marked To Be Kept on Top of Current 
Submission]’. The document contained a half page of text, commencing with 
the patient’s name and medical record number, and then a heading of ‘Key 
risk factors’. Under this heading were three brief bullet points. The first noted 
the date and detail of the patient’s conviction, and that there were no prior 
convictions. The second specified the patient’s diagnosis. The third noted a 
history of admissions to hospital under psychiatric care prior to the index 
offence, and also a history of aggressive behaviour. The next section of the 
document listed four ‘early relapse indicators’. These related to loss of insight 
into the patient’s illness, non-compliance, delusional beliefs and religious 
mania. At the end of the document, in bold, was the following caution: ‘Risk 
can be considerable if [patient] starts to relapse. Refer to Grade 7 [manager] 
immediately’.
This document was essentially an efficient summary of the facts of the case. 
In the Home Office’s own words, it was not looking to undertake its own risk 
assessment. Rather, it was assessing the quality of care team’s risk 
assessments against what was known about a patient’s history. As a former 
Unit staff member writing about risk assessment has put it,
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naturally it is not possible literally to 'predict' whether someone is 
going to do harm in a given situation ... In assessing the proposals 
made to us by hospitals for the transfer or discharge of restricted 
patients, we look for evidence both of accurate assessment and of 
effective risk management (Potts 1995:37).
In the example of the documented risk factors discussed above, all reports 
received about the patient were checked against this summary document.
The emphasis on particular information as important implied a clear theory of 
risk and risk factors. To a large extent that theory was based on the 
commonly-held wisdom that past behaviour was predictive of future risk. 
Such wisdoms were important because they provided tangible, identifiable 
factors that could be relied upon during assessment, such as repeated 
patterns of behaviour. Dell and Grounds found a similar process in the 
routine refusal of applications for discharge by patients who required 
medication, even though clinicians felt that two-thirds of their patients would 
comply with medication without a restricted order (1995). The rejections of 
discharge applications were based upon the association of medication with a 
tangible fact about a person, even though that fact did not in itself 
demonstrate a higher likelihood of risk than was present in other patients. 
Equally, the reliance on the nature of the index offence as predictive of risk 
provided a fact against which current behaviour could be measured, even if 
the index offence had occurred many years earlier. Rose has cautioned that, 
‘once it seems that today's decisions can be informed by calculations about 
tomorrow, we can demand that calculations about tomorrow should and must 
inform all decisions made today* (Rose 2002b:214). It was as though the 
presence of a fact, such as a patient continuing to take medication, was itself 
determinative of the process to follow.
This might seem unnecessarily ad hoc or uncoordinated. However it could 
also have reflected the fact that precise methods of risk assessment remain 
hotly contested in clinical practice and in research. There is considerable 
debate around types of risk assessment and the sorts of variables they 
involve, for example whether to use static variables (which remain fairly 
constant) or dynamic variables (which are likely to change over time). Even 
leading experts in the field of risk assessment have acknowledged that there
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are very few effective tools or clear methods to guide risk assessment in 
practice, and such tools should be used alongside other methods of practice 
(Monahan 2004).
While many risk assessment tools have emerged out of empirical research, 
the professionalisation of these tools has added controversy to their use. For 
example, many psychiatrists and psychologists developing them have 
increasingly pinned their own expertise on the use of particular tools from 
which they benefit financially (see for example Hare 1991; Ogloff 2002; Rice 
et al 2002). Within this tricky clinical terrain, the choice by the Home Office 
not to adopt any particular measure of risk assessment reflected the fact that 
its priority was not on the nature of the risk assessment conducted but on its 
quality in terms of the public.
Recall
My analysis so far has sought to distinguish between the monitoring and 
decision-making roles of the Mental Health Unit. Like many other areas in my 
thesis, these categories were not distinct in practice. More often they were an 
interactive process, where monitoring led to actions taken and vice versa. 
The clearest example of this was in the process of recall. This was one of the 
most controversial aspects of the Home Secretary’s powers, and its scope, 
effect and implications warrant detailed analysis.
Conditions for Recall
The Secretary of State may at any time during the continuance in 
force of a restriction order in respect of a patient who has been 
conditionally discharged ... by warrant recall the patient to such 
hospital as may be specified in the warrant (Mental Health Act 
1983:section 42).
Recall was the process by which a restricted patient, discharged on 
conditions to the community, was compulsorily returned to hospital. For 
patients on leave of absence but still formally detained in hospital, both the 
Home Secretary and the responsible medical officer had the power to recall 
them to hospital, and either one could recall a patient without the involvement 
of the other [Mental Health Act 1983:section 41(3)(c)(iii)]. The more common
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use of recall related to patients who had been conditionally discharged and 
were residing in the community. Here the power to recall to hospital was 
vested solely in the Home Secretary. Recall was a particularly sensitive 
provision because it was the only aspect of the Home Secretary’s authority 
over restricted patients that resulted in the deprivation of a person’s liberty. 
For most restricted patients, the fact of their detention had been determined 
by an order of the crown court. However when recalling restricted patients 
from conditional discharge in the community, the deprivation of a person’s 
liberty took place under the Home Secretary’s authority alone.
As with all other powers of the executive, the discretion to recall patients 
hinged on the protection of the public. To that end, the statutory provisions 
for recall did not place any constraint on how the executive could exercise 
them. However certain conditions had been established through case law 
emerging since the 1970s. The so-called Winterwerp criteria, arrived at 
following a case before the European Court of Human Rights, required that 
the nature and degree of mental disorder had to meet the criteria for 
detention under mental health law in order to avoid arbitrary detention 
(Winterwerp v The Netherlands 1979). This criteria applied to recall and to all 
other forms of detention under the 1983 Act. A number of other conditions 
operated alongside the Winterwerp criteria. For instance, decisions to recall a 
patient had to be reviewed and confirmed by the Home Secretary within five 
days of the patient being returned to hospital; and following that, the matter 
had to be referred to the Tribunal to confirm the appropriateness of the 
detention under the 1983 Act. Although a patient could be recalled on the 
grounds of protection of the public, the patient’s current mental state had to 
meet the criteria for detention under mental health law. Importantly, it was not 
necessary for a patient’s mental state to have deteriorated since their 
discharge in order to justify recall (K v UK 1998). Additionally, the 
requirement for up to date medical evidence confirming the nature and 
degree of a patient’s mental disorder did not mean that the patient’s treating 
team had to support the decision for recall (B v MHRT and SSHD 2002). 
Case law had also established that when a conditionally released patient was 
voluntarily readmitted to hospital, the Home Secretary could choose to recall
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them, thereby changing their status of treatment from voluntary to 
compulsory under the 1983 Act (Dlodlo vMHRT 1996).
A number of these cases had confirmed existing Unit policy. Nevertheless 
the exercise of recall provisions had attracted some criticism in the literature. 
For example, Dell and Grounds had expressed concern that some of the 
principles on which recall operated conflicted with key tenets of mental health 
law, such as that of care and treatment in the least restrictive circumstances. 
They found that ‘people were recalled against psychiatric advice, in order to 
prevent the possibility of their committing further offences’ (Dell and Grounds 
1995:xiii). Whilst this amounted to preventive detention, practitioners and 
patients had to accept the executive’s authority. Subsequently, the finding in 
the case of B provided an important judicial affirmation of the Unit’s policy in 
this regard (B v MHRT and SSHD 2002).
Not all practices at the Mental Health Unit had been supported by case law. 
For example, the Unit had not always obtained up to date medical evidence 
of current mental disorder prior to initiating a recall. That position changed 
with the case of K v UK (1998), which found that ‘in the absence of an 
emergency, a patient’s leave of absence should not be revoked without up to 
date medical evidence to demonstrate that he or she remains mentally 
disordered’ (Jones 2004:1-179). From then on, up to date medical evidence 
was required in order to confirm that a patient met the criteria for detention 
under the 1983 Act, in order to justify a recall.22
The case of K was also important because it provided legitimacy for the 
detention of patients via recall on the grounds of dangerousness without 
requiring any causal relationship between the dangerousness and mental
22 After I completed my fieldwork a case in the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) 
provided further clarification on the requirement of medical evidence. In The Queen on the 
application of MM v the Secretary of State for the Home Department, a restricted patient 
challenged the legality of two decisions by the Home Secretary to recall him in 2006 (MM v 
SSHD 2007). On the basis of slightly different accounts of the communication between the 
Home Office and the treating psychiatrist prior to the order for recall, the challenge turned on 
the question of whether the criteria for current medical evidence set out in Winterwerp had 
been met. The appeal against the decisions was lost with the court favouring a less stringent 
test of current medical evidence than that being claimed by the appellant. The finding 
supported the argument made by a psychiatrist I interviewed, that the framework of 
European human rights law provided little protection for restricted patients.
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disorder. As long as there was evidence of current mental disorder of a 
nature or degree to meet the criteria for compulsory treatment, a person 
could be detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 on the grounds of public 
safety.
A number of Home Office officials I spoke with said that there had been a 
growing emphasis on public protection through the exercise of recall 
provisions. They referred to the increased frequency of recalls to 
demonstrate this point. The following table provides a snapshot of recall 
actions by the Unit, based on Home Office data provided to me during my 
research.
Table 4: Patient recalls over a three-year period
Patient status 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04
Detained 3107 3132 3212
Conditionally Discharged (CD) 1152 1156 1169
Recalls 54 86 130
Recalls as a % of CD patients 4.68 7.44 11.12
Whilst three years was a relatively small timeframe from which to establish 
any broad trend, it was certainly true that the rate of recall had increased 
annually in the short term from 2001 to the start of my research.
Unit staff believed that increased recalls reflected a harsher stance being 
taken by the Home Office in relation to behaviour in the community. One 
official told me that the Mental Health Unit had become more willing to 
challenge care teams who were themselves unwilling to recall conditionally 
discharged patients. He gave the example of a recent case he had dealt with, 
where a conditionally discharged patient had become unsettled after 
consuming alcohol. Previously, the Unit would have checked the most recent 
medical reports about the patient and would not have taken any action if 
there was no evidence of current mental disorder. Now, however, the official 
had gone back through the patient’s file to examine the index offence. He 
saw that it had occurred under similar circumstances. The official wrote to the 
patient’s care team reminding them of the circumstances of the index offence 
and advising them to monitor the patient more closely in the community. His
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action stopped short of recall but constituted an intervention in the care 
team’s approach. That response was determined by the increased emphasis 
on public protection and the sentiment expressed frequently by Home Office 
officials that patients in the community presented the greatest risks to public 
safety. The official described his role as ‘acting as a trigger’ for the care 
team, who might not pay as much attention to matters of public risk as the 
Home Office did.
The recall process demonstrated the hierarchy of authority and accountability 
of executive decision-makers in the restricted patient system. From 
observation of recalls that took place during my fieldwork, it was clear that 
these decisions required close liaison between the care team working with 
the patient in the community and the hospital to which the patient was to be 
recalled. However it was equally clear that the actual decision to recall 
someone was made entirely by the Unit, regardless of whether that decision 
accorded with the wishes of clinicians or the submissions of legal advocates. 
This was an indication of the authority of the Home Secretary and the extent 
to which public protection was the dominant measure of accountability for the 
executive. It was also an indication that processes like recall were based 
upon an implied theory of risk. In the next section I shall consider this further.
The utility of recall in protecting the public
In their study of the supervision of restricted patients, Dell and Grounds found 
that the Home Office relied upon the threat of recall to obtain compliance 
from patients coercively, and that clinical practitioners were extremely 
concerned that the way the Home Office exercised its recall powers ‘was to 
impose restraints on [patients’] liberties and obstacles to their discharge 
which were unjustifiable’ (Dell and Grounds 1995:xii). Their finding resonated 
with risk theorists who have argued that risk is immeasurable and that, by 
extension, it is difficult to know what is or is not justified (see for example 
Giddens 1991). Recalling a patient did not mean that he or she presented a 
clear danger to themselves or to others. Indeed, Dell and Grounds found that 
the high proportion of cases where recall was not justified on the basis of 
dangerousness meant that ‘recall cannot ...be equated with failure on
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conditional discharge’ (Dell and Grounds 1995:xii). The use of recall 
indicated an assessment of unreasonable risk to the protection of the public.
For example, one official reported that he would recall a patient ‘where there 
was evidence of risk to the public. Not because of a need for treatment in 
hospital’. Another Unit staff member pointed out that a patient could be 
recalled if the patient stopped attending supervision sessions, because he or 
she could no longer be monitored. These decisions to recall did not 
necessarily require the patient’s mental state to have deteriorated since 
discharge. They were based on a concern about what risk the public might 
be exposed to in the event of a potential deterioration. In that regard, the 
recall provisions were a good example of how preventive detention operated 
through the restricted patient system based on the implied theory that past 
behaviour determined future risk.
However risk could also be associated with more common problems of case 
management. One official told me of a patient with ‘challenging behaviour’ 
attributed to a combination of mental impairment and autistic character traits. 
According to the official, the patient also had a very difficult mother who was 
a ‘destructive influence’ on her son’s progress and rehabilitation. This meant 
that the patient could not be conditionally discharged to his family home and 
that he needed to be escorted at all times while on conditional discharge. The 
patient had lived in supported accommodation for a short time, but the 
arrangement had not lasted. In the absence of existing services to provide 
adequate support, and no appropriate alternatives, the patient was recalled. 
He was not exhibiting an increased risk since his conditional discharge, nor 
had his mental state deteriorated. But the political imperative of public 
protection determined that, if the patient remained in the community 
unsupervised, he might pose an unacceptable level of risk.
Above all, the utility of recall lay in the ability to detain people who posed a 
risk of harm to others. Yet its effectiveness was also based on the deterrent 
effect of the threat of loss of liberty. Breaching conditions of discharge did not 
necessarily constitute grounds for a recall. For example, one official 
explained that a patient who ceased to take their medication would not
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necessarily be recalled; it depended on the patient’s mental state as a result. 
In practice, a breach of conditions often led to increased monitoring of the 
patient, rather than recall in the first instance. During my observations, an 
official was closely monitoring a conditionally discharged patient who had 
returned a positive drug screen for marijuana some weeks earlier. Drug 
screening was part of the ongoing monitoring of patients in the community, 
and was sometimes relied upon as a form of current medical evidence in 
considering a patient recall. In this case drug use was known to trigger a 
deterioration of the patient’s mental condition. The patient was believed to be 
becoming paranoid and his girlfriend had expressed fear to the community 
care team. The official decided to recall the patient because of the risk of his 
mental deterioration due to his use of drugs.
Repeatedly in the examples of recall I came across, the political mandate for 
public protection dominated the executive’s decision frame over the opinions 
of medical or legal practitioners. In the criminal justice system, a person 
charged with using marijuana would be most unlikely to receive an indefinite 
sentence. Similarly, a patient receiving psychiatric care who returned a 
positive result after a drug screen could not be detained compulsorily under 
the Mental Health Act 1983. But as I discussed in Chapter One, restricted 
patients were particularly vulnerable to sanctions for actions like drug-taking 
which could just as easily be considered part of everyday life (Padfield et al 
2003). The potential risk of harm to others produced by such behaviour 
enabled the executive to literally contain those risks through preventive 
detention.
The discretion to enforce preventive detention on the grounds of public 
protection contrasted starkly with the powers that were available to 
alternative legal decision-makers such as courts and tribunals. A significant 
literature on penal modernism has examined the increasing curtailment of 
judicial discretion through guideline and minimum sentencing policies and the 
imposition of statutory tariffs (see for example Simon and Feeley 1995; 
Fennell and Yeates 2002; Hawkins 2003; Thomas 2003; Richardson and 
Freiberg 2004; Rose 2004). For the Home Office as decision-maker, its 
function was to protect the public and it had unfettered discretion in that
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regard. Yet the public were simultaneously the objects of executive discretion 
and the mechanism for its accountability. There was little scope for the 
appeal or review of decisions by the Secretary of State. The accountability of 
the system came in the extent to which ministers were answerable to 
Parliament and subject to public criticism and electoral favour. As such, the 
effectiveness of executive discretion was measured by the absence of 
incidents in which the public was put at risk. Coming full circle, the 
democratic accountability of ministers provided a further impetus for 
preventive detention in the containment of risks to the public.
The issue of democratic accountability raised the spectre of appearance as a 
constitutive element of public confidence in the restricted patient system. In 
the final section of this chapter, I consider to what extent public confidence 
was based upon the apparent effectiveness of executive discretion, in the 
symbolic value of the executive’s mandate for public protection.
The Symbolic Politics of Public Protection
Criminology has long been interested in attempts to reduce fear of crime 
through criminal justice policy, as a distinct objective from reducing crime 
itself. Recently, Simon has remarked how policies that increase police 
presence on the street seek to reduce fear based on the assumption that 
visibility of police will reassure the general public of their safety as much as it 
will effectively counter street crime (Simon 2007). The Home Secretary has 
also acknowledged that reducing people’s fears of crime was equal to 
addressing offending behaviour in the objectives of criminal justice policy 
('Today' program 2007).
One way to understand the underlying rationales of these policies is through 
the notion of symbolic politics. Writing about the symbolic uses of politics in 
the 1960s, Edelman pointed to a shift in American political acts at the time, 
away from a critical probing of the limits of the state’s authority, towards 'a 
predilection for staying so comfortably inside the limits that the main 
impression conveyed is one of craftsmanship in conforming to the prevailing 
political climate’ (1964:105). The potential of politicians to challenge people 
and to develop ideas as leaders was increasingly being marginalised by
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attempts to be seen to be doing things that would maintain political popularity 
amongst the electorate. As Edelman propounded,
not only does systematic research suggest that the most cherished 
forms of popular participation in government are largely symbolic, but 
also that many of the public programs universally taught and believed 
to benefit a mass public in fact benefit relatively small groups 
(Edelman 1964:4).
The symbolism of the act was itself an assurance of political popularity, 
whether or not it resulted in direct or effective action.
Mead’s account of social behaviour, discussed in Chapter One, has also 
provided some foundation to the idea that assurance or predictability are 
important aspects of political action. Mead wrote,
the general pattern of social or group behaviour which is reflected in 
the respective organized attitudes - the respective integrated 
structures of the selves - of the individuals involved, always has a 
wider reference, for those individuals, than that of its direct relation to 
them, namely a reference beyond itself to a wider social environment 
or context of social relationships which includes it, and of which it is 
only a more or less limited part (1934:272).
At the time, Mead was interested in globalisation as a process whereby 
understanding individual actions as part of society would enable social 
understanding at a broader, even international level. But his development of 
the idea of individual identity as contingent upon group or social dynamics 
was a significant precursor to later analyses of the importance of symbolic 
politics. Both his and Edelman’s theses contributed to a developing body of 
sociological inquiry into the interaction between individual, social and political 
behaviour.
Building on these approaches, later work examined how knowledge 
compared with individual associations of morality and values in the opinions 
people formed about their social environment. Gardiner’s empirical research 
found that, ‘whenever symbols of law enforcement and official morality were 
brought into survey questions, most respondents opted for public norms of 
morality’ (Gardiner 1970:55). His study suggested only a tangential 
relationship between policy and operational objectives, for example between
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government anti-corruption strategies and attempts by police to reduce 
corruption.
Writing far more recently, Newburn and Jones have argued that symbolic 
politics 'downplays the complexities and long-term character of effective 
crime control in favour of immediate gratifications of a more expressive 
alternative' (2005:73). As crime policy has become more politicised and 
populist, so such 'acting out' has become a more central feature; the coupling 
between symbolic politics and operational outcomes in criminal justice has 
become ever looser (Newburn and Jones 2005:73).
As I set out in Chapter One, by the time of my research Mead’s notion of a 
‘social environment’ was increasingly viewed through a lens of risk. Through 
that lens, actions and consequences were understood in terms of the chance 
of their occurring and the variable consequences depending on whether that 
chance or risk could be prevented and how it might be responded to. In the 
context of these social perceptions of risk, individuals expected their 
governments to provide a social environment in which they were protected as 
much as possible. Being seen to respond to those expectations had become 
as much a challenge for political viability as effectively responding to them.
Perhaps the best example of the centrality of managing public fear within the 
mandate of the executive in the restricted patient system arose in the 
operation of conditions of leave and discharge. The main purpose of 
conditions was to provide compulsory supervision of patients in the 
community. While this purpose operated primarily in relation to discharged 
patients, it was also a function of conditions on leave. Yet the extent to which 
conditions operated as a mechanism of control was questionable. A number 
of Mental Health Unit staff members told of cases where concerns expressed 
by victims had resulted in an exclusion zone being included in a patient’s 
conditions of discharge. Exclusion zones were supposed to prevent patients 
from attending particular areas such as a town or suburb where their victims 
lived. Restricting a patient’s travel gave the impression that victims were 
being protected from coming in to contact with their offender. However 
exclusion zones were not enforceable. They provided no guarantee of
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avoiding such a confrontation, nor would a breach of an exclusion zone 
necessarily have negative consequences for a patient. One official 
commented that recall conditions were pretty meaningless, as evidenced by 
the ease with which patients could breach them. In that official’s view, 
exclusion zones provided a measure of deterrence for patients, and were an 
important source of reassurance that the Home Office could offer victims. But 
they provided no guarantee that victims and offenders would not come 
across each other in the community.
Another staff member told of a patient whose leave provisions prohibited the 
patient from visiting his home town where he had committed the index 
offence. There was significant ill-feeling from the local community towards 
the patient and the victims still lived there. The exclusion zone was intended 
as much to protect the patient from the ire of the public as to prevent the 
victims and the patient from confronting each other. However the patient’s 
parents were ill and infirm and still lived in the town. As a result, the patient 
kept breaching the exclusion zone to visit them. When it became clear that 
the patient was not going to comply with the exclusion zone, the Unit 
removed it as a condition of his discharge. Instead, a new provision was 
introduced which forbade the patient from contacting the victims. The 
example illustrated the symbolic importance of conditions both as a deterrent 
to certain activity by patients and as a mechanism for reassuring people like 
victims that their concerns were being taken in to account in the decision­
making process. However it also demonstrated the latitude with which 
breaches of conditions could be viewed. While the threat of recall was always 
present, it was clearly not invoked as an automatic response when conditions 
were breached. The primary utility of conditions remained the ability to 
supervise patients in the community.
In these examples, conditions of discharge were explained in terms of public 
protection. Yet the protection they offered was as much through the 
appearance or assurance of public safety as it was a substantive measure to 
prevent harm. The effect of the executive’s mandate was not just on 
individual patients but was also on the perceptions of families of patients, 
victims, and the broader communities with which patients were engaging.
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Media attention was also a factor in decision-making. Any such attention to a 
case was likely to have an impact upon the entire system and consequently 
the level of confidence with which the public viewed it. In that sense, 
controlling risk in the restricted patient system was both a matter of individual 
patient management and of controlling damage to the public’s confidence in 
the system as a whole. As Garland notes,
for political actors, acting in the context of electoral competition, policy 
choices are heavily determined by the need to find popular and 
effective measures that will not be viewed as signs of weakness or an 
abandonment of the state's responsibility to the public (2001:111, 
emphasis in quotation).
Symbolic politics were an important component of the executive’s mandate 
for public protection. In reality, Home Office staff were aware that some of the 
conditions they put in place for public protection had no binding power. Yet 
symbolically, they were an extremely important expression of ‘terminology 
and rhetoric’ (Newburn and Jones 2005:74). Similarly, the exercise of recall 
provisions emerged as both a mechanism for preventive detention and a 
powerfully symbolic tool of deterrence.
Mead argued that the principles of deterrence through the standards of 
retribution and prevention underpinned public perceptions of criminal justice 
(Mead 1918). While there had undoubtedly been a shift in the balance of 
these standards over time, their symbolic importance remained as an 
example of what Edelman described as ’emotional commitment’ to a symbol 
that was ‘associated with contentment and quiescence regarding problems 
that would otherwise arouse concern’ (Edelman 1964:32).
The executive’s authority was operating within a law that enabled preventive 
detention on the basis of public protection. As the examples and statistics 
presented in this chapter indicated, a reasonable number of patients were 
recalled, and this figure had been increasing over time. So the power to recall 
was no empty threat: it constituted a mechanism for control through, 
containment and the Home Office’s willingness to use this mechanism was 
well-established. Yet at the same time the executive was not immune to the 
role of instincts in constructing social interaction. The threat of recall had a
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strongly deterrent effect which was relied upon as much as the use of 
detention itself. Recall was both a coercive legislative provision and an 
important symbol of the powers that lay in the hands of executive discretion 
for the protection of the public.
Edelman suggested that symbolic politics were useful and effective ways to 
meet both individual and collective expectations of social behaviour.
On the whole ... the diverse symbolic responses to political acts and 
events fall into place to build a remarkably viable and functional 
political system. It is a system that provides for both change and 
stability. It involves mass audiences emotionally in politics while 
rendering them acquiescent to policy shifts through that very 
involvement (Edelman 1964:15).
For the decision-makers in the Mental Health Unit, familiarity with patients’ 
index offences and therapeutic progress, and with other people involved such 
as family members or victims, gave officials confidence that they could 
anticipate the concerns from - as well as the risks to - the public, and that 
they could reassure them appropriately. The ability to detect and prevent 
risks of harm to the public was supplemented by the ability to reassure 
members of the public accordingly. While the actual risks posed by patients 
could be managed by provisions like recall, the fears of the public could also 
be managed through the symbolic politics of protection. Controlling fear of 
crime through the symbolic power of social interaction operated alongside the 
very real powers to contain and control people through preventive detention.
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CHAPTER 4
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE RESTRICTED PATIENT SYSTEM
Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the role and work of the Home Office 
regarding restricted patients, specifically the dual functions of monitoring or 
supervising patient progress and making decisions in response to issues that 
arose from supervision or applications. In many ways this work was part of 
the formal mandate of the executive’s function in the system. In the present 
chapter I shall explore further what I have described as the informal mandate 
of the Home Office: the responsibility it took for other people working in the 
system, including practitioners, clinicians and the Tribunal. I will examine how 
this work differed from the supervision of patients and how other actors in the 
system responded to these aspects of the executive’s informal mandate.
As I set out in Chapter Two, I refer to the various participants in my research 
as ‘actors’. This is not intended to dehumanise the people who participated in 
my research nor to suggest that participants were playing a role in the 
system in any pejorative sense of the term. Certainly, people who represent 
institutions often adhere to a policy or practice that they might not necessarily 
subscribe to personally, because of their responsibility to that organisation. 
But these professional responsibilities are common and are not in 
themselves a subject of inquiry for my thesis. Rather, I use the term actors as 
a collective noun to encompass both the range and nature of the participants 
in my research. Some of the people I observed and interviewed were 
engaged in the restricted patient system in their own right, for example as 
advocates or practitioners. However others were involved as representatives 
of their organisations or departments; and both the Home Office and the 
Mental Health Review Tribunal had a strong presence as institutions in my 
research, not just by virtue of the staff that represented them. The term 
‘actors’ is simply an attempt to capture the breadth and range of the 
participants in my research, from individuals to institutions.
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There is an established body of literature criticising executive discretion in 
mental health law. Executive decision-making has been perceived as overly 
cautious (Mohan et al 1998); as arbitrary (Prins 1993); and as unwilling to 
recognise the rights of patients until forced to do so by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and subsequently the Human Rights Act 1998 
(Richardson 2005). The limited ability of the criminal justice system to provide 
effective intervention to offenders with mental disorder and the preoccupation 
with risk that underpins contemporary sentencing policy has also been held 
responsible for creating the potential to leave mentally disordered offenders 
‘being dealt with more harshly’ (Peay 2002:747). Within this critique of 
structural disadvantage, there is a propensity for double jeopardy by 
containing risk through the use of preventive detention rather than managing 
the people who pose those risks in the community (Hawkins 1986; Peay 
1993). Finally, the failure to grant decision-making power to the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal in the transfer and movement of patients through the 
system at points other than discharge has been criticised for undermining the 
right to liberty (Richardson 1999).
Notably, the small body of literature in support of executive discretion over 
restricted patients comes primarily from government sources. One of the 
main expressions for this support was in the form of the government’s 
agenda for reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (see Chapter Six). Another 
example is a study into restriction orders which was conducted under the 
auspices of the Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate. While that 
study pointed to some problems in communication between various actors in 
the system including the Home Office Mental Health Unit, the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal and clinicians, its overall finding was that the imposition and 
supervision of restricted hospital orders was effective in protecting the public 
from risk (Street 1998). There is little other literature in support of executive 
discretion per se, although some writers have been supportive of the 
executive’s mandate for public protection (see for example Maden 2007).
The nature of scholarly debates about executive discretion provided an 
interesting insight into the links between advocacy and scholarship within the
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academic discipline of mental health law. It was an area rich in empirical 
research and analysis, as my literature review in Chapter One revealed. 
There was also a high degree of engagement by academics at the level of 
public policy and debate about law reform. Indeed, the distinction between 
scholarship and advocacy was not always as clear as those terms might 
suggest and a number of the authors of well-respected academic work in the 
field were also keen advocates for particular policies or approaches (see for 
example Thornicroft 2006; Richardson 2007; Peay 2007b).
The critiques of executive discretion informed one of the underlying questions 
of my research, namely how harshness in contemporary penal policy 
influenced executive decisions about offenders whose substantive legal 
status was ‘patients’. There was a gap in the literature on this point and also 
on the views of practitioners about the systemic challenges to treating 
forensic patients. The present chapter seeks to fill this gap by exploring the 
relationship between the Home Office and other actors in the system, 
specifically the Tribunal, clinicians and lawyers. I begin by discussing the 
attitude of Home Office staff to the Tribunal. I then explore the opinions of 
other people about the function and value of the Home Office in the restricted 
patient system. What emerges is a complex picture of different opinions and 
critical insights (although not necessarily criticisms) across a wide range of 
people engaged in the system.
Part of the layering of relationships between various people in the system 
was structured around the formalised interaction of agencies on questions of 
risk. This took place under the policy of Multi Agency Public Protection 
Agreements (or MAPPA): an inter-governmental strategy designed to offer 
greater protection to the public. MAPPA provided an ideal site through which 
to consider the tensions between patient therapy and public protection at a 
systemic level. MAPPA also provided a context in which to consider how the 
public was constructed by policy-makers and practitioners engaged in the 
management of restricted patients.
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Rights vs Control? The Relationship between the Home Office and the 
Tribunal
The relationship between the Mental Health Unit and the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal in the restricted patient system was important in a number of 
ways. At a theoretical level, it demonstrated the central sociological problem 
explored in my research of the tension between rights and control in the 
management of mentally disordered offenders. That tension will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Seven. In the present chapter, I examine the 
practical differences in decision-making between the two bodies and how 
these differences emerged as an important element of the decision frame of 
the Mental Health Unit. Specifically, the perception of the Tribunal as being 
less cautious regarding public protection and consequently as discharging 
patients whom the Unit claimed were too risky, meant that Unit staff kept a 
close eye on the decisions of the Tribunal in restricted cases. Monitoring the 
Tribunal was not formally set out in statute or departmental policy. Yet from 
my observations and interviews with staff it clearly formed an important 
aspect of the Unit’s work. Whilst related to the official mandate of the Home 
Office to provide public protection, this formed an unofficial dimension of the 
Unit’s work.
At the outset, I considered there would be a degree of similarity in the 
decision-making environments of the Mental Health Unit and the Tribunal. 
The propensity for their decisions to receive public attention was high and 
both could be expected to be concerned about the public perception of their 
work (Hawkins 2003; Padfield et at 2003). However from my fieldwork there 
was no sense of mutual sympathy at the extent to which the two 
organisations were exposed to public scrutiny. On the contrary, there was a 
degree of disregard in the attitudes of each towards the other. At best, this 
could be described as ‘institutional inertia’; a general malaise towards the 
efficiency and appropriateness of the actions of the one as perceived by the 
other (Padfield 2002:137, see also Street 1998). Home Office staff spoke of 
how the Tribunal administration was chaotic and expressed frustration at the 
fact that the Tribunal frequently lost Home Secretary statements, or asked for 
comments on a report only days before the hearing.
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However other people in the system attributed that same problem to the 
Home Office. One lawyer who represented restricted patients told me that the 
Home Office tended to send reports late or refused to comment on care team 
reports which led to cancelled or adjourned hearings. Tribunal staff and 
practitioners cited the unavailability of Home Secretary reports at the time of 
Tribunal hearings as a major cause of adjournments and other delays. These 
participants interpreted the Home Office’s actions in such situations as 
obstructionist. There was no acknowledgement or sympathy for the idea that 
the Home Office might have had insufficient time to pay due regard to the 
case in question. Not surprisingly, these tensions led to some bad feeling 
between the Tribunal Secretariat and the Mental Health Unit and cynicism 
about the efficiency of the system on the part of practitioners.
The Home Office was tightly bound by its formal mandate of public 
protection. This mandate informed the basic criteria for executive decision­
making about restricted patients. By contrast, the Tribunal’s decision-making 
hinged on safeguarding patient rights according to the criteria for detention 
under the Mental Health Act 1983. While this division of labour was forged by 
legislation, it meant that there was a difference in the criteria upon which the 
two organisations made decisions about discharge (Peay 1989). The 
perception at the Home Office was that this difference was particularly 
marked. Not only did the Home Office recognise its own mandate specifically 
in terms of public protection; it also regarded the Tribunal’s mandate as 
defined solely in terms of patient rights. These perceptions contributed 
substantially to the reduced legitimacy which Home Office officials accorded 
decisions made by the Tribunal.
For example, some Unit staff expressed distrust of Tribunal decisions. They 
claimed that the Tribunal released patients even when the risk they posed to 
the public was too great. As evidence of this, several people told me that 
when something went wrong in the community it was usually the Tribunal that 
had conditionally discharged the patient against the wishes of the Home 
Office or care team. In many ways this perception reflected the way in which 
the division of labour played itself out ideologically and culturally in the
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workings of the bureaucracy. It created a logic of accountability for decisions, 
but it also created a mechanism for attributing blame for perceived mistakes 
in decision-making.
An illustration of this logic of accountability was in the descriptions by Home 
Office staff of the ‘problem’ of patients discharged by the Tribunal who 
subsequently suffered mental deterioration; or who exhibited dangerous 
behaviour in the community prompting recall or other intervention by the Unit. 
The construction of these episodes as problematic was telling in itself. Staff 
instinctively viewed any patient behaviour that warranted intervention by the 
Unit as problematic, and this construction then reflected poorly on the 
decision-maker, which was often the Tribunal. Yet, as Dell and Grounds’ 
study of Home Office supervision of restricted patients showed, recall was 
not itself evidence of a failed discharge and 40% of cases did not cite 
dangerousness as the reason for recall (1995). Moreover, there was a 
statistical likelihood that the decision-maker in these cases would be the 
Tribunal as it was responsible for 90% of all discharges of restricted patients.
None of the Unit staff I spoke to considered fluctuations in mental disorder or 
difficulty adjusting to life once released as normal or predictable experiences 
for patients in the community. The perception of these issues as problematic 
was based on the assumption that ‘the perceived costs of a wrong decision 
to release are less than the perceived costs of a wrong decision to deny 
parole’ (Thomas 1986:1275). There was an immediate assumption that 
patient incidents in the community resulted from bad decisions to discharge 
the patient. This implied the Tribunal took unnecessary risks, making ‘bad’ 
decisions to grant conditional discharge, whilst the Unit’s more cautious 
decisions were generally ‘good’. At one level this could be seen as a normal 
aspect of how officials in their formal role approached an area of work. They 
might well take a different view if they occupied a different position in the 
system, but they spoke from the position of Home Office decision-makers 
and so were firmly entrenched within the logic of that mandate and 
responsibility. At another level, however, the opposition between the Home 
Office and the Tribunal was striking. In the following section I consider how
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structural factors led to such an oppositional relationship between these 
alternate decision-making bodies.
First Bite of the Cherry
The system itself ensured that the decision-making of the Home Office and 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal operated under different mandates. But 
did this necessarily situate the two as opposing, competitive forces? Did the 
structural relationship between the two agencies make it inevitable that the 
Home Office would perceive Tribunal decisions as ‘bad’? Was this reflective 
of the underlying responsibility of the bureaucracy to maintain public 
confidence in the system, resulting in mistrust of any decision not made 
within the bureaucracy? Or was it simply that any decision by the Tribunal 
was going to be suspect in the eyes of the Home Office, because of its own 
continuous discretion to release patients as and when it thought appropriate?
This last, structural reason emerged as a plausible account for the mistrust 
by the Home Office of Tribunal decisions. The Home Office automatically had 
first bite of the cherry, so to speak, because it could discharge restricted 
patients at any time. As Dell and Grounds found, consultants were ‘likely to 
be highly selective in choosing cases to recommend to the Home Secretary, 
and from these the Home Office can pick the best cases for release’ (Dell 
and Grounds 1995:xiv). Thus the Mental Health Unit’s cases were selectively 
the safe cases (Holloway and Grounds 2003). Yet there was no recognition 
amongst Home Office staff that the system itself determined that the Tribunal 
would be considering the discharge of riskier patients. In other words, if the 
Home Secretary had not already released those patients himself, they were 
likely to pose greater risks than the executive was comfortable with. There 
was also no acknowledgment by the Home Office that Tribunal decision­
making revolved around the criteria for compulsory detention under the 
Mental Health Act 1983, which differed in emphasis from the Home 
Secretary’s mandate of public protection. (This is not to suggest that the 
Tribunal ignored the public protection agenda -  an issue I shall address 
shortly.)
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As such, the conflict between decision-makers was a structural inevitability: it 
stemmed from the primary conceptualisation of restricted patients in terms of 
risk. Because a restriction order was in place solely for the purpose of public 
protection, any patient-related incident in the community automatically raised 
concern at the Home Office about the public’s exposure to risk. 
Consequently, patients were understood primarily in terms of dangerousness 
or deviance (Scheff 1999). The logic of responsibility that underpinned the 
Mental Health Unit’s mandate meant that when a patient’s behaviour in the 
community was considered a problem, officials immediately looked to see 
who had released them. When the decision-maker was the Tribunal, officials 
ascribed the incident as an example of bad decision-making by the 
alternative authority in the system.
Predictably, the mistrust with which the Home Office viewed Tribunal 
decisions resulted in a belief that the Home Office did a better job than the 
Tribunal. Unit staff consistently expressed the view to me that the Home 
Office had a better knowledge of individual cases than the Tribunal, because 
the latter only had a snapshot of patients at the particular time of their 
hearing. Unit officials claimed that they made better decisions as a result of 
having ongoing knowledge about patients. Earlier I suggested that ascribing 
‘bad’ decisions to the Tribunal was a mechanism of blame. This ascription of 
blame was often motivated by a sense of relief that it had not been the Home 
Office which had authorised the ‘mistaken’ discharge. Staff never wanted to 
have missed something that might lead to anybody getting hurt. Additionally, 
their bureaucratic setting made Unit staff aware of the potential for scandal 
that could arise from a public incident and they were wary of such 
eventualities, even as a result of decisions made by others.
So far the discussion has focussed on the relationship between the Mental 
Health Unit and the Tribunal. As I discussed in Chapter Two, I was unsure at 
the start of the project to what extent the Tribunal would be a significant actor 
in my thesis, given my focus on the Home Office, and the ostensible 
separation of the two organisations. Yet the perceptions of Home Office staff 
towards the Tribunal, and their impact upon the workload of the Mental
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Health Unit, illustrated a number of important points about the official and 
unofficial mandates of the Home Office.
What emerged was that part of the protection the Home Office offered the 
public was not just from restricted patients themselves, but from ‘bad’ 
decisions by other actors in the system. The Home Office took seriously its 
legislative responsibility for public protection, and its bureaucratic 
responsibility for maintaining public confidence in, and protecting the political 
sensibilities of, the system. This led to a sense of responsibility for other 
elements of the system, as though the Home Office was a lead agency even 
though the Tribunal was an independent, statutory body in its own right and 
medical practitioners were engaged by local health trusts. Protecting the 
public was not only seen as a matter of controlling ‘risky’ patients. It also 
necessitated monitoring other people in the system and undoing their 
decisions as the executive felt necessary. Monitoring the decisions of others 
in the system was an unofficial but integral part of the mandate of the Home 
Office. I turn now to examine how this played out with other actors in the 
system.
Other Actors
Many staff at the Mental Health Unit believed that other actors in the system 
misunderstood the role of the Home Office. Unit staff were keenly aware of 
mistrust from clinicians towards the executive, particularly regarding its ability 
to make decisions without clinical training or expertise. For example, one 
official told me of a case where the routine reports about a patient’s progress 
had not been received. The Unit investigated the matter and discovered that 
the care team had been ‘allowing the patient to dictate his own conditions, 
and regarded the [Unit’s] concerns as exaggerated’. This demonstrated poor 
confidence on the part of the treating team in the validity of the Home Office’s 
concerns. As Unit staff had anticipated, the patient’s mental state eventually 
deteriorated. The patient’s parents became very concerned and when the 
police were called, the patient was found to have been hoarding weapons in 
circumstances similar to that of the patient’s index offence. The patient was 
ultimately recalled. According to Unit staff, ‘the care team learnt their lesson’;
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namely the effectiveness in preventing harm of the Home Office’s vigilance in 
monitoring restricted patients in the community.
Another official commented that even the Department of Health did not really 
understand the role of the Mental Health Unit and the Home Secretary. To 
counteract a poor understanding of (or confidence in) the Home Office, the 
Unit held an open day every two months for mental health care teams and 
anyone working with mentally disordered offenders, including clinicians, 
social workers and Mental Health Act administrators (who were hospital- 
based staff with responsibility for ensuring the procedural requirements of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 were met). These ‘away days’ were an attempt to 
show clinical practitioners how the Unit made its decisions, to improve 
working relationships between Unit staff and clinicians, and to build 
confidence in the Unit. For the Home Office, the test of its relationship with 
stakeholders was the extent to which clinicians sought release via the Home 
Secretary rather than the Tribunal. Indeed, building this relationship was so 
important that the work of the Mental Health Unit’s management team 
included visiting the regions for which they were responsible to promote the 
Home Office as the preferred avenue for release of restricted patients.
At the beginning of this chapter I noted the view that executive decision­
making was overly cautious. Mohan et al have also suggested that:
the increasing use of [Tribunals] for the discharge of restricted hospital 
order patients reflects a growing conservatism at the Home Office, 
such that it has become preferable for possibly controversial decisions 
to be taken by this independent body without ministerial involvement 
(1998:63).
This analysis implied that the Home Office preferred the Tribunal to be the 
discharging authority, particularly in cases considered to be of high risk. 
However my data did not accord with this view. The Unit encouraged care 
teams to approach the Home Secretary directly rather than the Tribunal, and 
was actively trying to increase the rate of applications for discharge that 
came to the Home Office. This self-promotion was part of a concerted effort 
to shift the emphasis in the Home Office from being reactive to active. Unit 
staff spoke to me about a range of other policy changes, including more time
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spent chasing up reports not received for regular review of discharged 
patients, and corresponding with care teams to encourage applications for 
conditional discharge.
In part, this effort was motivated by the Home Office’s perception that 
clinicians, like the Tribunal, were insufficiently concerned with public 
protection. That view was evident from the following excerpt in the Unit’s 
Casework Manual:
We should remember that ours is the only input to decision making 
which is made exclusively from the perspective of public safety. We 
should never hesitate to press any reservations we have on that score 
even though the care team is reluctant to address them. They have 
different priorities: professional pride, pressure to take forward 
rehabilitation, not to allow precious beds to be clogged up by lack of 
progress. They have a different perspective too. They have to live with 
the patient in their hospital; may have come to empathise with them, 
and will be more readily influenced by the patient’s recent good 
behaviour; may be less keen to provoke their reaction when 
confronted with things the patient would rather forget or keep under 
wraps; may be less likely than us to remember the full details of the 
offending behaviour, and to realise that any recent minor incident 
looks like behaviour in the run-up to the offence. So we should not 
hesitate to ask the uncomfortable questions, which it may not be in the 
immediate interest of the care team, much less that of the patient, to 
answer (Mental Health Unit Casework Guide, March 1998,1A.8ii).
This excerpt indicated the extent to which the Home Office constructed its 
responsibility in the system solely in terms of the public protection agenda. It 
was a consequence of the executive’s official mandate, but there was scope 
for Home Office staff to interpret the framework as they saw fit. However, 
there was a particular perception among Home Office staff that the mandate 
for public protection was an isolated one; and that no other actors in the 
restricted patient system shared that responsibility. Earlier I talked about the 
Home Office perceiving itself to be a lead agency in the system. Despite the 
fact that practitioners were generally health service employees, the Unit 
conducted ongoing monitoring of care teams and practitioners in much the 
same way that it monitored patients and Tribunal decisions. Ostensibly this 
was to ensure that the risks posed by restricted patients were being 
adequately managed, particularly in the community. But in practice it led to 
subjective assessments of applications depending on who they came from.
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Home Office literature explained that its staff made decisions based on the 
applications of clinicians and practitioners; it did not substitute their 
assessments for its own (Potts 1995 and also MHU Casework Guide 1998). 
At the same time, Unit staff were genuinely concerned that clinicians were 
not providing public protection. This provided the impetus for closely 
monitoring the actions of care teams. Only one staff member believed that 
doctors were also responsible for controlling risk and that they did it very well. 
Indeed this person claimed that there was a cultural problem at the Unit 
because of the general perception that the Home Office was the only agency 
concerned with risk.
Informal opinions developed in the Unit about the clinicians and treating 
teams they trusted or in whom they had confidence. These opinions had a 
significant impact upon how Mental Health Unit staff conducted their 
assessments. For example, Unit staff placed confidence in the information 
they received based on the source of the evidence, as well as the type. One 
Unit staff member explained how social workers in the community tended to 
be more reliable than doctors in terms of risk management, because 
psychiatrists who worked in the community often had less experience with 
forensic patients than those who worked in secure hospitals. As a result, 
officials considered these psychiatrists to be less aware of the risks to the 
public and to be more patient-focussed, which contrasted with the Home 
Office’s own preoccupation with public protection. Another Unit worker 
concurred that, when dealing with conditionally discharged patients, social 
worker’s reports were often more reliable because they saw the patient more 
often in the community, and therefore their monitoring was better. 
Consequently, when assessing the progress of a patient in the community, 
some staff placed greater weight on the evidence contained in social worker 
reports than they did on the reports of psychiatrists whose evidence they 
claimed to be less relevant to public protection. In this way experience across 
the Unit had led to a set of wisdoms based upon knowledge of - and 
familiarity with - staff providing patient care. These were pieces of common 
knowledge that were generally held to be true by Unit staff and which, 
although informal, formed part of the Unit’s decision frame.
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One of the emerging issues here was how Home Office assessments of 
applications included a judgement about the source of the information as well 
as the content of the information. In addition to examining the contents of the 
risk and clinical information provided in an application, decision-makers at the 
Mental Health Unit took account of who had provided the information; where 
they were from (regionally and institutionally); and their record in terms of the 
care and management of other restricted patients. This accorded with 
Perkins’ observation that there were different layers of subjectivity involved in 
assessing evidence about detained patients (2003). Earlier in the chapter I 
discussed how detailed knowledge of a patient’s case was seen as integral to 
the ability of Unit staff to make decisions. The faith of officials in this in-depth 
knowledge extended to a reliance on the relationships they had established 
with care teams and legal practitioners. For example, one Unit official talked 
about ‘good care teams’ in whose work he had confidence, as opposed to 
‘bad care teams’ about whose applications he was far more cautious. 
Another official had his own criteria for assessing the quality of clinical risk 
assessments received in support of applications for leave and discharge, 
including whether the application addressed victim issues. At the same time, 
he stated that he was generally supportive of care teams. In his view the 
Home Office should not look at management plans or at the work of 
hospitals, but should instead concentrate its energies on the supervision of 
conditionally discharged patients in the community.
These examples pointed to a slippage between official policy and actual 
practice within the Unit. In theory, the Unit received evidence from care 
teams about risk, and then made a decision about whether that risk was 
acceptable. However, in practice, staff made judgements about the source of 
risk assessments and other clinical evidence, as well as its content. These 
judgements led to different levels of confidence attached by Unit staff to the 
applications they received.
These unofficial assessments of care teams were also evidence of broader 
concerns about systemic problems in the consistency of mental health care 
for restricted patients. As I shall discuss later, the reform of the Mental Health 
Act 1983 brought to light widespread concern about the quality of mental
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health care available at the time (see Chapter Six). It was not surprising that 
these concerns were rarely acknowledged publicly by government officials 
and politicians. Nevertheless, it became clear during my fieldwork that Home 
Office staff were concerned about evidence of poor mental health care in 
some areas. One official stated that, in the ten years prior to 2005, there had 
been seven homicides by released restricted patients, compared with 63 
homicides per year by non-restricted patients receiving compulsory treatment 
under the Mental Health Act 1983. He attributed the homicides by non­
restricted patients to errors of communication between people involved in the 
care and management of civil mental health patients. In the eyes of the 
Home Office, this meant that the homicides could have been prevented. This 
had led to another piece of wisdom told to me by staff at the Unit, that ‘Part 
Three patients were Part Two patients the system had failed’. Restricted 
patients were classified under Part Three of the Mental Health Act 1983. Civil 
patients received compulsory treatment under Part Two of the 1983 Act. The 
statement indicated that some Mental Health Unit officials felt that restricted 
patients who were former civil patients had been failed by the system.
A body of evidence supporting this view had been collected through inquiries 
after homicides by people who had previously been receiving mental health 
care (see for example Peay 1996; South East Coast Strategic Health 
Authority et al 2006). These inquiries had been mandated for any homicide 
by a person receiving compulsory mental health treatment, and investigated 
the care and treatment that patients had received to see whether and how 
future incidents could be prevented systemically. Avoiding systemic failures 
in communication between the various agencies who worked with patients 
was an ever-present aspect of the decision frame that was applied to 
restricted patients, particularly between care teams in hospital and the 
community, and across other agencies (see for example South East Coast 
Strategic Health Authority et al 2006). By virtue of its unique position in 
monitoring restricted patients, the Unit had a bird’s eye view of the systemic 
approach to individual cases and was in a position to take steps when it 
perceived the care and treatment of patients was deficient. The Home 
Office’s monitoring role both reinforced the importance of the executive’s
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discretion and the extent to which that discretion led it to monitor other actors 
in the system, not just patients.
Monitoring was extremely important both to the official and unofficial 
mandates of the Home Office in the system. Officially, the department’s role 
was to monitor restricted patients to protect the public from harm. Unofficially, 
the Mental Health Unit also monitored practitioners, the experts charged with 
patient care and treatment. The Home Office could have justified such 
monitoring as upholding its responsibility for maintaining public confidence in 
the whole system. Yet the role was conspicuously unofficial precisely 
because it was not stated in any of the Home Office’s public material, or even 
in internal policy and procedure manuals of the Mental Health Unit. It was 
represented by Unit staff I spoke with as a natural part of the Home 
Secretary’s mandate. Yet it was noteworthy for a number of reasons, not 
least because the people being monitored were professionals within the 
bureaucratic framework of the health system. As such they did not fall within 
the traditional reach of the Home Office over either civil servants or other 
actors in the criminal justice system.
The exercise of this unofficial mandate could be understood within the 
context of broader shifts to deprofessionalise the criminal justice system. In 
Garland’s view, criminal justice agencies ‘are no longer permitted the 
professional autonomy and discretion with which they were once entrusted’.
Agencies like the police, probation and prisons that were once given 
statutory powers and responsibilities ... and a degree of freedom to get 
on with it, are now increasingly subject to state-imposed standards 
and guidelines, and are closely monitored and inspected to ensure 
that they comply. The long-term trend towards professional autonomy 
and the delegation of penal powers has been abruptly reversed, and 
the state has begun to tighten its grip upon criminal justice agencies 
and employees (Garland 2001:120).
The assessment of care teams, as well as their evidence, was one indication 
of this shift. It was a matter of pride for some Mental Health Unit staff that 
they could assess risk as a ‘normal person’, without requiring professional 
expertise. While their assessments were based upon the evidence of 
professionals, that professional opinion was not enough to determine a
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decision if, for example, it was believed that the public would have expected 
a longer period in detention to ensure public safety.
However, monitoring the system as a whole was also the consequence of 
another process that had been taking place over decades: the shift towards a 
new type of ‘presentation of self in criminal justice policy (Newburn 2002). 
Previously I introduced the idea of symbolic politics as a way of 
understanding certain characteristics of how the public protection agenda 
was met by the executive. Assessing risk as a 'normal person’ the way one 
official described was another important aspect of the Home Office’s decision 
frame. Staff were not assessing these risks on the basis of any statistical 
probabilities of re-offending but in terms of the risks to the Home Office 
(including to its reputation) if something negative happened.
The symbolic importance of the executive’s discretion in the system had 
been established over decades, at least since the Mental Health Act 1959. 
However during that time there had been two significant shifts. One shift was 
in relation to the media, whose ever-increasing attention to criminal justice 
issues could cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the Home 
Secretary and the system as a whole. (Several Home Secretaries lost their 
position because of scandals related to the release of offenders throughout 
the period of my research).
The second shift had been the move away from believing that the problem of 
crime had a solution, and that the criminal justice system could control it. As 
Garland has observed, modern penality was stuck with the perception that 
punishment had lost its purpose, or that its purpose had become 
contradictory and confused (1990). This peculiarly modern phenomenon 
contrasted sharply with the clearly established and articulated purposes of 
punishment of earlier periods of penal policy, as evident by the Durkheimian 
and Foucauldian accounts of punishment discussed in Chapter One. Simon 
and Feeley have observed somewhat harshly,
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the virtual absence of successful new representations of crime. 
Current penology provides neither policies that succeed nor words that 
succeed. It not only does not 'solve' the crime problem, it does not 
even provide reassurances that something significant is being done 
(1995:150).
More moderately, Reiner has argued that the notion that crime can be solved 
has steadily declined over decades to the point where the Home Office no 
longer has confidence in its ability to control crime (2007). For Reiner, this is 
one explanation for the ongoing interest in controlling fear of crime.
Consequently, as Newburn argues, there has been an important shift in the 
focus of Home Office policy towards how it reflects back on the system, 
rather than its outcomes.
Decisions are taken, policies implemented, not simply because of their 
potential impact but, of course, because of how they will be perceived 
and ‘received by a particular electoral community'. They are important 
for what they ‘say’ both about political parties and about individual 
politicians. This has always been so. Arguably, however, it is 
increasingly the case that individual politicians are exploiting the 
capital that can be made out of ‘symbolic action’ (Newburn 2002:175).
The exercise of executive discretion in the restricted patient system took 
place in the context of this declining bureaucratic and political confidence in 
its ability to control crime. As I have argued, this confluence of pressures led 
Home Office decision-makers to resort to the rhetorical processes of 
symbolic politics in an attempt to reassure people’s fears of the risk posed by 
restricted patients. Within this framework, the role of the professional was 
complex and often contradictory. On the one hand, professional expertise 
was secondary to more generalist, non-expert processes of assessment. On 
the other hand, the nature of managing an ‘offender’ population within a 
health system required government officials to defer in some way to the 
professional expertise of clinicians. I suggest that it was the hybrid nature of 
the restricted patient system - sitting at the intersection of the management of 
dangerous offenders and the therapeutic aim of rehabilitating people 
detained for compulsory treatment of their mental disorder - that led to the 
contradiction of a system which required professional expertise but was not 
necessarily dependant upon it. For example, clinical reports were always
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called for in any ‘incident’ such as a failure to return from leave or a family 
member reporting strange behaviour by a patient on discharge. This was an 
example of the established ‘standard operating procedures and legitimated 
rules and structures’ that were necessitated by mental health law’s reliance 
upon psychiatric evidence to provide explanations for the actions of mentally 
disordered offenders (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Yet those reports were 
not assessed on clinical grounds but on the basis of a broader appeal to the 
public interest. The process was one of assessing risk to the public by the 
public, wherein the expertise required for the decision resided not with the 
professional but with the lay persons’ representative who was embodied by 
the staff of the Mental Health Unit.
The discussion so far has focussed on how Home Office decision-makers 
viewed the experts and alternative decision-makers of the restricted patient 
system. I have explored how informal mandates to monitor various actors 
within the system emerged alongside the formal mandate to monitor 
restricted patients in the interests of public protection. I turn now to consider 
how these other actors perceived the role of the Home Office.
From the Other Side: Practitioners Views on the Home Office
From the outset of my research, I found clinical and legal practitioners to be 
generally accepting of the role of the Home Office in terms of protecting the 
public. One lawyer in a practice who represented many restricted patients 
stated that ‘the Home Office has a role in relation to protecting the public. I 
think that we would really accept that’. He described the Home Office’s role 
as one of ‘public guardianship’; and his reference to ‘we’ indicated his 
perception that most legal practitioners shared this view. Indeed recognition 
that the Home Office had an important role in protecting the public was 
widespread amongst non-government representatives I interviewed and 
observed. However, equally widespread was concern about the balance 
between public protection and patient rights; The lawyer said,
I think [the Home Office] are entitled to have a view. I mean, is this 
chap going to go and get unwell and do things to other people? You 
know, are people waiting at a bus stop safe, and this sort of thing? But 
OK, they express their views, and the court in effect made another 
decision.
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This lawyer claimed that the Home Office could not strike the right balance, 
as he saw it, because of its preoccupation with public protection. For him this 
justified the widely-held view that only a Tribunal or similar independent 
structure should be the primary decision-maker over restricted patients; a 
view maintained by practitioners in my research despite evidence that the 
Tribunal was itself an extremely cautious decision-maker (discussed further 
in Chapter Seven).
I asked another lawyer involved in law reform in the system about the Home 
Office making decisions without professional training in the area. His reply 
confirmed the views of Home Office staff themselves that they added value 
through their familiarity with cases and the system as a whole:
they do have a considerable amount of expertise in mental health. And 
having worked with them in the field they do know what they’re talking 
about. But I think while they don’t have a good expertise in terms of 
clinical evidence or judgment, I think nevertheless they have built up a 
lot of casework knowledge which is very useful to have really.
This lawyer went on to say that even though the Unit might seek to promote 
transparency, the nature of the system pitted people such as lawyers against 
the Home Office. This would always produce conflict over particular cases.
My findings were largely consistent with Dell and Grounds, who found that 
Home Office supervision of patients in the community was generally 
considered useful by clinical practitioners, particularly in terms of the Home 
Office’s support of their work and the ability to discuss anxieties clinicians 
had about particular cases with Home Office staff (1995). But in that study, 
clinicians voiced concerns similar to those the Home Office expressed to me, 
about how changes in care teams or other continuity issues led practitioners 
to miss the signs of past behaviour that could be indicative of certain risks. 
Interestingly, Dell and Grounds also found that staff changes and 
discontinuity at the Home Office caused considerable consternation amongst 
care teams (1995). This finding supported the Home Office’s perception that 
it could add value to the system by taking on the role of lead agency; and to 
the recognition by staff at the Mental Health Unit that issues of continuity of
Chapter 4: Relationships in the Restricted Patient System [136]
staff and resourcing were integral to effective care and treatment of restricted 
patients.
However, underneath this surface layer of acceptance, there was much 
frustration about how the Home Office exercised the powers of executive 
discretion. Many practitioners claimed that the Home Office was completely 
unsympathetic to their own role. This applied to both psychiatrists and 
lawyers to differing extents. For example, some psychiatrists claimed that 
there was an increasing expectation on them to shoulder responsibility not 
just for assessing risk, but also for determining the acceptability of risk in 
terms of public protection. This, of course, was the essence of the Home 
Office’s own role, and the one area in which government and non­
government practitioners were generally in unanimous agreement.
Lawyers were also concerned about the Home Office’s attitude towards their 
role in the system. One lawyer interviewed exclaimed, ‘lawyers are seen as 
the second coming of Satan!’ He stated that this was at its worst in the 
difficulties experienced by some lawyers to get hospitals to refer clients to 
them. Only enlightened advocates or hospital staff would recommend 
lawyers who routinely represented patient interests, as opposed to 
recommending those firms who worked on behalf of the government. While 
this may sound conspiratorial, it was indicative of the inherent conflict 
between legal practitioners and government decision-makers in the system.
Lawyers asserted that they had to use the tools of the law against the 
discretionary powers of the Home Office. For example, if a patient was unwell 
and continued to stay in hospital, he or she was unlikely to be discharged. 
But solicitors could challenge hospitals to justify their decision for ongoing 
treatment, thereby opening a dialogue about the mental state of the patient, 
and appropriate care and management. Even as they saw the necessity of 
this process to ensure that patients were detained lawfully, legal practitioners 
expressed frustration at the ‘games’ they were required to play because of 
the nature of executive discretion. In this regard, the area of tension most 
often cited by non-government actors in this research was how the Home 
Office responded to the challenges of managing risk in the community.
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Getting risk right
Psychiatry has long been an administrative as well as a clinical
science (Rose 2002b:216).
Practitioners were rarely critical of the fact that the Home Office assessed the 
expert reports of clinicians about risk. The question of risk has always been 
important to psychiatric practice, and all practitioners interviewed recognised 
risk to be a major element in the care, treatment and progress of patients. 
Instead, practitioners levelled their concerns at the cautiousness and 
consequent slowness of Home Office decision-making, because of its 
approach to risk. In the views of a number of practitioners I spoke to, the 
problem lay in the conflation of probabilities of risk with the desire to predict 
and prevent individual behaviour.
Risk assessment revolves around assessing the probability of a range of 
possibilities. It does not translate into a prediction about how one particular 
patient will behave and it is not intended to be relied upon as the sole basis 
for determinations about a patient’s leave, transfer or release. Yet, in the 
view of one legal practitioner I interviewed, the Home Office’s conservative 
approach to risk automatically produced a presumption against applications 
for less secure conditions of detention or discharge. She said, ‘my 
understanding of the Home Office’s position is that they want to be absolutely 
sure that it’s safe to move somebody on before they move on. And you can’t 
ever be absolutely sure’. For her, the worst effect of this approach was not 
upon applications for discharge, because they could be submitted to the 
Tribunal, but on attempts to move patients from more to less secure settings 
in preparation for release. In her judgement, this demonstrated the Home 
Office’s difficulty in grasping the difference between manageable risk and 
zero risk. While she thought the Home Office would prefer to be told that a 
patient had zero risk of reoffending that was a literal impossibility.
She attributed significant delays in patient progress to the Home Office’s 
‘default position’ of maintaining the status quo and opposing applications for 
patients to be discharged to the community. Consequently the Home Office 
was seen always to be advocating further hurdles to discharge. Another 
lawyer made the following comments about the Mental Health Unit.
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They’re civil servants, they have no medical qualification whatsoever, 
and it is always going to be the case that if you get enough reports 
which express perfectly valid hesitations and reservations and things 
that you need to look out for and so on and so forth, it is the work of 
but a moment to extract these and say ‘well that’s gotta be sorted out 
before the person moves on’.
Ultimately, this approach led to the system slowing down and patient 
numbers burgeoning.
In the internationally renowned MacArthur studies on risk, Monahan et al 
advocated an interactional approach to violence risk assessment, wherein 
‘the same variable could be a positive risk factor for violence in one group, 
unrelated to violence in another group, and a protective factor against 
violence in a third group’ (Monahan et al 2001:90). Practitioners who 
criticised the Home Office suggested that it failed to recognise the inherent 
problems with risk assessment per se, specifically that it was an inexact 
science, and that it was most reliable in relation to whole populations, not 
individuals. Practitioners I spoke to worried that the political imperative for 
risk assessment seemed to ignore these principles, assuming that a risk 
assessment could be easily obtained; would be comprehensive and 
accurate; and that a positive assessment (establishing the presence of risk) 
was grounds for refusing less restrictive conditions of detention or discharge.
At the same time, practitioners were generally accepting and even supportive 
of the Home Office’s mandate to protect the public. Practitioners had not 
considered how executive decision-makers might work other than on the 
basis of probabilities. In fact, the concerns of practitioners about how the 
Home Office approached risk would have been likely to persist even if risk 
were the sole criterion for determining access to the community by any 
authority. As Peay has argued,
if the assessment of risk were to provide the basis for compulsory 
measures it would be incumbent on society to ‘get it right’. If there is 
not a real probability of risk, but rather an attributed perception of it 
which prompts intervention, then the moral arguments favouring it are 
altogether less compelling. Moreover, if there were no real probability 
of danger then we would be infringing the liberty of a few, without any 
concomitant increase in the well-being of the many (except perhaps by 
falsely reducing their fear) (1989:207).
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Yet practitioners in my research claimed that the process of risk assessment 
was used to justify a policy of containment through ongoing preventive 
detention. One psychiatrist told me about a conference at which a Home 
Office official had,
let slip [words to the effect of] ... ‘well, I don’t know what all this 
business is about using mental health law because very soon we 
won’t need to use mental health law’. Now of course what she didn’t 
seem to realise as she was saying it was that the implication was that 
if you did need to use it, you’d use it. Which I thought was quite 
interesting because I thought that was quite clear that she was saying 
‘well of course we’ll use mental health law for public protection even 
when there’s no benefit for the individual’ ....
Here again, the objection was how mental health law was used to advance 
the public protection agenda. It was not problematic that the Home Office 
should work in the interests of public protection, but it should do so 
appropriately. This was the crux of many of the criticisms of the exercise of 
executive discretion: that the assessment of individual risks became the 
basis on which to deny patients progress through the system. Inevitably this 
led to the question of how much the system was one of preventive detention, 
an issue I shall address shortly.
One of the arguments developed by Monahan and Steadman during the 
MacArthur risk studies was that the same finding could be used to support a 
number of different positions (Monahan et al 2001). Likewise, the same 
statistical data were used to support opposing sides of the debate about 
treatment versus control in the restricted patient system. In an interview with 
me, a senior Home Office official argued that the low recidivism rate of 
restricted patients demonstrated how successful the executive was in 
exercising its discretion to protect the public. However a lawyer I interviewed 
argued that the same data on reoffending supported the argument that 
patients should be discharged earlier.
The overall recidivism rate is extraordinarily low, I mean it’s something 
like three percent over five years or something. ... it seems to me that 
what that must mean is that many people are being kept in who don’t 
need to be. ... And you know the Home Office no doubt would say, 
‘well, you know, we’re not making mistakes because very few people 
get out and re-offend’, but they are making mistakes but they’re just 
making an invisible mistake where people aren’t getting out who could
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safely be let out. And if one accepts that people are in hospital for 
treatment rather than punishment then that’s an error’.
Another clinician interviewed for this research had managed forensic patient 
units in the UK and overseas. He commented,
our patients generally get out after four to six years. We have a zero 
re-offending rate, which I think is dreadful. It means we are being too 
conservative. I would like to have a five to ten percent re-offending 
rate, which would be one-fifth of the general re-offending rate.
For these practitioners, reoffending rates that were significantly lower than 
those of comparative populations reflected over-cautiousness in the system. 
Moreover, some psychiatrists perceived re-offending as a natural event, not 
something that should be viewed as a failure. It would have been difficult for 
the Mental Health Unit to sustain such a position, especially in the face of 
anxieties about safety from the victims and families of patients, or in media 
and popular discourse. Nevertheless these different perspectives showed 
that the same data couid be interpreted in directly contradictory ways, 
depending upon the standpoint being adopted.
For executive decision-makers, reoffending data provided a source of 
institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As Mason and Mercer 
argue, ‘the hue and cry over those patients incarcerated for many years who, 
in effect, would not have re-offended pales into insignificance in relation to 
public and political outrage regarding a released patient who does re-offend’ 
(Mason and Mercer 1999:103; see also Padfield et al 2003; Wood 1993). 
Practitioners were also aware of the political imperative for the executive to 
meet the public’s expectations, as well as to provide public protection. One 
lawyer I interviewed stated:
I think you do have to take on board that this is a serious public 
concern and no matter what we say about the best way to deal with 
people who are a danger to others, the public are always going to take 
this ‘lock ’em up’ attitude and the Government have got to respond to 
that to some extent.
Another lawyer claimed that conservative decision-making by the Home 
Office derived from its responsibility to juggle political pressures, including 
popular punitiveness, with the individual needs of restricted patients.
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Consequently, in her view, the reality was that the system did not provide 
people with the least restrictive care necessary to treat their illnesses.
The fine line between risk prevention and preventive detention
I have argued that the perceived excess of caution shown by the Home 
Office raised the spectre of how much the system was one of preventive 
detention. I did not find this to be the case in the official mandate of the 
executive. There was nothing in the express letter of the laws and policies set 
down, or in the formally ascribed roles of each government actor, that 
required the system to detain people preventively. It was in the effects of how 
the Home Office operated that this emerged as a possibility.
Part of the perceived conservatism of the Home Office related to its 
requirement for system-wide support for changes in a patient’s status or 
location, which practitioners stated was a significant hindrance to progress 
through a restriction order. As one lawyer argued to me,
the Home Office say ‘that everyone’s got to agree before we’re going 
to agree. We’re not going to agree to it unless everyone else agrees.’ 
And there’s always somebody not agreeing. And it can take years. ... 
Broadmoor are saying, you know, in 2000, this person’s ready to 
move, and in 2005 there they still are. ... whatever the HO may say 
about the public interest ... the law relating to detention and transfer 
and so on and so forth is perfectly clear: people should be treated in 
the least restrictive alternative possible; people should only be 
detained in the interests of their own health and safety or the 
protection of others ....
Another lawyer perceived the Home Office’s slowness in making decisions to 
be an attempt to avoid making decisions for release at all. He stated, ‘they’re 
unwilling to discharge on their own. My view certainly is that they prefer to 
cover themselves with the Tribunal doing it’. A legal policy officer supported 
this claim stating that most practitioners and clinicians saw the need to 
reform the system away from executive decision-making in order to deal with 
its slowness and inefficiencies. People repeatedly mentioned that the Home 
Office would be unwilling to discharge if a Tribunal had been convened. This 
contrasted directly with the Mental Health Unit’s presentation of itself as 
actively encouraging applications for discharge. Yet it did suggest that the 
Home Office’s unwillingness to discharge certain patients might result in their
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remaining detained well beyond the period when such detention ceased to be 
warranted under the Mental Health Act 1983.
Many lawyers described frustration at the Home Office’s cautious approach 
to risk. The following scenario told to me in an interview with a lawyer 
illustrated a problem lawyers encountered routinely.
I mean I had a case last week where, there’d been some 
administrative problems with the client who’s been on overnight leave 
for some time, and the Tribunal was going to convene and I phoned 
the Home Office and said ‘well, why don’t you just discharge him?’ ‘Oh 
well, there’s a Tribunal coming up isn’t there.’ I said ‘well look, you 
know, you could read this recommendation for leave, you haven’t 
objected, you haven’t put statements in in relation to these extra 
reports at all. Why don’t you just discharge him?’ ‘Well, you know, 
we’ve had problems finding the file.’ You know, you get the feeling that 
the HO doesn’t like to discharge if it doesn’t have to.
Other people also spoke of cases where a clinical team and independent 
experts all supported an application, but the Home Office would not make a 
determination if there was a Tribunal coming up. Despite staff at the Unit 
saying they encouraged applications to the Home Secretary rather than to 
the Tribunal, practitioners claimed that the Home Office preferred the 
Tribunal to discharge a patient because it avoided the executive taking 
responsibility for any ensuing problems.
Delays in patients moving through and out of the system also led to a pattern 
of institutionalisation for restricted patients who had been detained for 
chronically long periods of time. One participant talked about the problems 
facing aged restricted patients, for whom the world outside the hospital had 
changed significantly since they were first detained. In the time taken to 
move some patients through the system to the point where they could be 
released, they had become institutionalised and alienated from the nature of 
the world outside the hospital, such that there was now a significant risk 
presented to them by the possibility of being released.
It became clear that where the Home Office was not satisfied about the 
proposed management of identified risks, it would oppose applications for 
leave or release on that basis. The consequent prolonged detention was
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punitive for the patient, who had no power over the availability of resources in 
their own care and treatment, yet whose liberty was dependent upon them. 
From the point of view of the Home Office there was a clear logic to this: if a 
patient’s risks could not be satisfactorily managed in the community, he or 
she should not be discharged. The effect was to turn preventing risk into 
preventive detention. In this way at least, the Home Office’s approach 
appeared to be diametrically opposed to that of treatment in the least 
restrictive conditions, a principle that was advocated as fundamental even in 
the context of executive discretion, and by those concerned with systemic 
reform (see for example Dell and Grounds 1995; Richardson 1999).
Decision-making bypass: understanding the role of psychiatrists
The dangerousness debate in the criminal justice sphere suggests 
that we are not sufficiently expert to justify indefinite detention on 
protective grounds (Peay 1989:207).
A psychiatrist who had trained in England and worked overseas commented 
to me that the English system was ‘better in theory but worse in practice’ in 
terms of how executive discretion operated. Part of the problem, in his view, 
was that English psychiatrists were complacent about the role of the 
executive. As my data have shown, clinical practitioners were generally 
accepting of the role of the Home Office in the system. This was in contrast 
with literature that criticised the executive’s discretion; and even with my own 
experience of an Australian forensic mental health jurisdiction where, 
practitioners had despised the role of the executive. Indeed one psychiatrist I 
interviewed stated, ‘in the sort of democracies we live in it’s probably difficult 
to envisage a system which didn’t involve political involvement’. But for many 
participants in my research, the question of how the executive performed its 
role was more than a matter of striking the right balance between care and 
control. Another area where clinical practitioners were particularly concerned 
about the Home Office was the perceived over-reliance on clinicians to take 
the responsibility for decisions about appropriate levels of risk. Psychiatrists 
were particularly concerned that the criminal justice system, including the 
Home Office, expected clinicians to be the ones not only required to assess 
risk but to determine whether it was ‘reasonable’ in terms of risk exposure to 
the public. Psychiatrists were responsible for their patients: they could and
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should identify risks and propose howto manage them. But, they argued, the 
ultimate decision about whether levels of risk were acceptable should be 
made by elected representatives or those appointed to act on behalf of the 
public such as judges (Mullen 2002; Maden 2007).
Another psychiatrist I interviewed believed that doctors should never be 
charged with making the decision to release their patients if there was a risk 
to the public. In his view, doctors could not take responsibility for judging 
whether a certain level of risk was acceptable, particularly because it was not 
the role of clinicians to protect the public. He claimed that this was the role of 
the Home Office or the Tribunal. The same clinician asserted that part of the 
de-professionalisation of decision-making in the system was consequent 
upon a decline in public trust in the ability of psychiatrists to manage the risks 
of their patients. He argued that doctors needed to win back that public 
confidence in the system, but the way to do so was by meeting the concerns 
of the community in adequately managing patients in the community; not 
through over-exaggerating the utility of psychiatric expertise in decisions 
about release.
Clinicians I spoke with frequently suggested that the role of psychiatry was 
exaggerated in legal environments. In one interview a psychiatrist told the 
following anecdote which illustrated the point.
Lord Woolf gave the opening address in 2001 to the [Royal College of 
Psychiatrists] annual conference ... And he gave a wonderful ... 
demolition of the White Paper for the Mental Health Bill, on a civil 
rights basis, and the audience could have hugged him, and at the end, 
he said, ‘of course when it comes to risk, we very much rely on you’. 
And there was stunned silence. Now Lord Woolf was, I think, a very 
liberal Lord Chief Justice, rather sensible, balanced, often outspoken, 
and yet even he felt unskilled when it came to mental disorder, and 
assumed that we were more skilled than we actually are.
This example indicated the extent to which the law expected psychiatrists to 
determine the appropriateness of the levels of risk to which the community 
was exposed. Many of the psychiatrists I spoke with expressed the view that 
the balance in courts had shifted too far in favour of clinical evidence, which 
was privileged over other forms of knowledge. While psychiatrists in my 
research clearly believed they had useful information for the courts, they felt
Chapter 4: Relationships in the Restricted Patient System [145]
that the extent to which that information was relied upon was too great. As 
one stated, ‘I think there’s quite a strong risk of courts if you like paying too 
much attention to what psychiatrists and psychologists who are prepared to 
go into court say.’
In Chapter One I explored the critiques of ‘mentally disordered offender’ as a 
category, particularly on the basis of the randomness with which offenders 
were allocated to it and its various applications (see for example Prins 1995; 
James et al 2002; Peay 2007). The privileging of psychiatric evidence in 
court further reinforced this categorisation by assuming that the offenders in 
question were of a different order to those who usually came before the 
court, thereby justifying the court’s reliance (or over-reliance, in the views of 
my research participants) upon psychiatric perspectives. According to the 
clinicians that I spoke to, the arbitrary application of the category of ‘mentally 
disordered offender’ was compounded by the fact that it left experts trained in 
law (judges, for example) feeling ill-equipped to deal with an issue that they 
thought was a medical problem. Yet for those clinicians providing evidence 
and information to the court, the decision about risk - upon which a restriction 
order was based - was an inherently legal one.
I had anticipated that practitioners would be opposed to executive discretion 
because of the systemic over-crowding attributed to executive caution. Not 
surprisingly, the picture that emerged from my data was much more nuanced 
and complex. Certainly, practitioners were concerned that mental health law 
was being used to further the public protection agenda at the expense of 
individual patients’ progress and rights to liberty. At the same time clinicians 
were concerned that the executive should accept their expert opinion, but 
also its limitations. Psychiatrists claimed that there was too much 
responsibility being foisted upon them in terms of determining the 
acceptability of levels of risk. Whilst they were capable of assessing risk and 
proposing how to manage it, the actual decision was a matter of public 
interest. This was a political and representative decision that psychiatrists did 
not feel competent to make.
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Sympathy for the Home Office’s role
Despite the many frustrations experienced by practitioners in the system, a 
lot of the people I spoke to said that, overall, the Home Office had good 
intentions. People noted that relationships between the Home Office and 
practitioners had been improving as the Mental Health Unit became more 
flexible and willing to review its decisions. A number of participants 
commented that, despite their lack of clinical knowledge, Unit staff were often 
very familiar with patient cases. For some practitioners, this familiarity 
facilitated speedy responses, particularly when challenging initial decisions to 
reject an application. Two lawyers in separate interviews cited recent 
examples where they had challenged the Home Office’s rejection of a leave 
application for their clients. The Home Office had heard their submissions 
and reversed the decisions, reflecting what these lawyers perceived to be a 
newfound openness and flexibility in the decision-making process.
Practitioners did not believe that the Home Office was intractable, asserting 
that personal contact was extremely important between Unit staff, patients 
and care teams. As one lawyer explained to me, ‘the [Responsible Medical 
Officer], sometimes in conjunction with ourselves, has made sure the Home 
Office come to case conferences and they’re clearly reassured. They meet 
the patient, which is often a very good thing, humanises the whole situation, 
and softens their response’. Here then was an alternative viewpoint on the 
informal relationships that informed the way Unit staff assessed applications 
for discharge. Personal interaction was valued by everyone as beneficial to 
the flow of communication and the ultimate objective of moving patients 
through the system.
Favourable regard for the Home Office persisted even in the face of the 
Unit’s initial caution towards applications for discharge. This was summed up 
by the following statement made in an interview.
And they always will let you know where the applications are within the 
system ... I mean they could argue, well, ‘we want something further in 
writing’, or ‘there’s confidentiality issues with the RMO’ and so on. So 
they are genuinely fairly helpful in that way, within the confines of their 
role which as I say I accept, protection of the public.
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Those engaged in lobbying government, advocacy and law reform were also 
largely sympathetic to the Home Office’s role. One representative of a mental 
health charity I interviewed acknowledged the validity of the public protection 
agenda but also claimed that it was influenced by people outside the Home 
Office’s control. In her view, this external influence was driven by factors like 
the intense competition between news agencies, whereby major daily 
newspapers needed to maintain and increase sales through sensational 
stories of dangerous mentally disordered offenders. She did not mind the 
Home Office having a role protecting the public, but claimed that it had 
become too politicised in the interests of systemic reputation rather than 
patient rights.
My analysis of relationships between people across the restricted patient 
system indicated the complexity of the issues at stake and the wide range of 
opinions about them, both between organisations and within them. Home 
Office decision-makers accepted the expertise of clinicians and lawyers, but 
claimed that the executive’s concern lay in an alternative direction to those of 
other actors. The Home Office asserted this agenda irrespective of 
opposition it encountered throughout the system. Other actors accepted the 
agenda in theory but claimed that the practice did not always strike the right 
balance. Moreover, some participants in my research had reservations that 
the right balance could be struck at all when decision-making lay in the hands 
of the government. There was one issue that surfaced consistently from each 
different organisation or group of practitioners I spoke with: the perception 
that other people did not understand their role or responsibilities. In the next 
section I explore how this perceptual problem foreshadowed the problems 
experienced when the Home Office implemented a policy for inter-agency co­
operation.
MAPPP-ing Interagency Cooperation in the Management of Restricted 
Patients
Over the past two chapters it has become clear that not only did the Home 
Office prioritise public protection over other objectives (like rehabilitation of 
patients), but it perceived its own concern with public protection to be unique 
across the system. Yet, as my data show, both clinical and legal practitioners
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were acutely aware of the effect of the public protection agenda on Home 
Office decisions. If they were not themselves preoccupied with public 
protection, its impact upon decision-making meant that practitioners could not 
afford to ignore it if they were to see their clients and patients make progress 
through the system. However there was another aspect to this broad 
acceptance of the public protection agenda. My research took place at a time 
when the Home Office was ‘rolling out’ its policy of ‘multi-agency public 
protection’. I turn now to examine what effect this had on the restricted 
patient system.
Discussing the new crime prevention approach developed in the USA and 
especially in the UK in the finaf two decades of the 20th century, Garland 
noted a range of buzz words created around new strategies of crime control, 
including ‘partnership’, ‘public/private alliance’, ‘inter-agency cooperation’, 
‘the multi-agency approach’, ‘activating communities’, creating ‘active 
citizens’, ‘help for self-help’ and the ‘co-production of security’ (2001:124). He 
argued that the primary objective of these new strategies was ‘to spread 
responsibility for crime control onto agencies, organizations and individuals 
that operate outside the criminal justice state and to persuade them to act 
appropriately’ (Garland 2001:124). The development of Multi-Agency Public 
Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) was a good example of this new 
approach to crime control.23 Many of Garland’s buzz words peppered the 
language of MAPPA policy. More directly, the establishment of MAPPA 
illustrated the dualism of redefining the state’s role in criminal justice away 
from delivering law, order and crime control and towards managing risk, while 
simultaneously dissolving that responsibility for risk across an ever- 
increasing list of agencies engaged in the care and control of the populations 
in question.
In multi-agency public protection collaborations, shared decision-making 
between agencies was regarded as essential to assessing and managing the 
risk posed by sexual and violent offenders (Home Office 2004). The MAPPA
23 The acronyms MAPPA (Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement) and MAPPP (Multi- 
Agency Public Protection Panel) were used interchangeably by participants. In practice, 
MAPPPs are the meetings that bring different agencies together under the policy of MAPPA.
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policy was enacted by the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. It 
required police and probation services to work together in managing the risks 
these individuals posed to the public. Restricted patients whose index 
offence involved sexual or violent offending were always covered by this 
policy, and in 2003 it was extended to agencies who might not formally be in 
the criminal justice system but who worked with offenders (Home Office 
2004). This included hospital and community care teams working with 
restricted patients. Turner and Colombo note how relationships between 
criminal justice and mental health professionals ‘flourished’ particularly in 
relation to the management of the ‘critical few’ of high-risk, violent and sexual 
offenders, through multi-agency collaborations which sought to ‘encourage 
an open exchange of information, skills, and ideas amongst professionals 
with different disciplinary backgrounds’ (2005:34). The question this raised 
for my research was as follows: if the terms of reference for MAPPA were 
dealing with dangerous and violent offenders, how did the policy respond to 
restricted patients who were substantively patients not offenders?
One of the first challenges raised by the incorporation of restricted patients 
into MAPPA policy had been how and what information practitioners could 
share with other agencies. During my research, Home Office staff talked 
about the law on information-sharing as ‘impenetrable’. There was already a 
responsibility to alert the police to restricted patients who fell within a 
prescribed set of conditions (for example patients with a certain history of sex 
offending who had been conditionally released). There was also a specific 
responsibility on clinicians to share information with other risk management 
agencies (such as police) where they considered there might be an issue of 
public safety. But the onus was on clinicians to select what information they 
should share and when. Thus the practical implications of balancing patient 
confidentiality with public protection were a matter for clinical discretion.
Turner and Colombo note that:
confidentiality is a central principle of Western health care, with the 
relationship between health professionals and members of the public 
founded on reciprocal trust. This is of particular relevance to the work 
of [Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels] for two principal reasons. 
Firstly, because breaching client confidentiality can have a significant 
impact on the longevity and quality of the relationship between
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practitioners and mentally disordered offenders - more significant in 
light of the fact that the MAPPPs client group generally comprise of 
those who, in the past, have found it difficult to. engage with mental 
health and social services. And secondly, because of the significant 
ethical dilemma the issue of confidentiality presents to clinicians 
involved in MAPPPs who must constantly balance interests of public 
protection against responsibilities towards their clients. For the police: 
'the risk posed is far greater than the confidentiality issue.' This is true 
up to a point. However, the reality is usually far more complex, for if 
breaches in confidentiality result in a break down in therapeutic trust 
then ultimately both the public and mentally disordered offender will 
suffer (2005:35).
In Turner and Colombo’s study, the police occasionally acknowledged the 
importance of patient confidentiality, but police also suggested that mental 
health practitioners hid behind the notion of patient confidentiality when they 
did not want to reveal certain information (2005). In other words, police 
believed that practitioners who did not want to provide information to the 
police, or did not want to make a decision that might affect their patient 
detrimentally, would cite patient confidentiality as an excuse. Timmermans 
and Gabe have described as ‘agency misalignment’ the inability of 
practitioners and organisations to understand the terms and objectives of 
other agencies with whom they are supposed to be collaborating 
(Timmermans and Gabe 2003). As Turner and Colombo put it, the ‘inherent 
friction’ between mental health and criminal justice professionals meant that 
there was an ‘entrenched difference between agency groups in terms of 
beliefs, values and actions resulting from contrasting professional 
backgrounds, training and experiences’ (Turner and Colombo 2005:34). Their 
research found that ‘the spectrum of agencies involved in MAPPA “speak 
different languages, use different jargon and different tools of assessment’” 
(ibid).
The MAPPA policy was in its infancy at the time of my research, and very few 
people had direct experience of the Panels. Yet the inability of different 
people to understand each other’s perspective was immediately evident from 
the comments practitioners made to me. One psychiatrist I interviewed 
relayed a clinical colleague’s first experience of a MAPPP.
She said ‘it was like a tennis match really’ and she described how the 
ball just got batted between two sides and each didn’t understand the
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strokes of the other. Urn, you know, the police couldn’t understand 
why the hospital wasn’t detaining the person and the hospital couldn’t 
understand why the police couldn’t understand why they weren’t 
detaining the person and why they weren’t doing something else. Now 
as they get to know each other better maybe they’ll all end up huddling 
around the net having forgotten that they’re actually on two sides of 
the net.
There was also concern that the ‘MAPPA culture’ would influence the 
therapeutic decisions clinicians made. Almost a decade ago, mental health 
charity Nacro had warned about the risks of adopting ‘defensive practice’ 
from the USA into the UK, whereby practitioners made decisions in order to 
avoid future blame, rather than in the best interests of the patient (Jewesbury 
1998). It appears that Nacro’s warning went unheeded in the area of mentally 
disordered offenders. I have discussed the analysis of defensive practices at 
the parole board, where decision-making turned on the ‘worst case scenario’, 
rather than the most likely outcome (Padfield et al 2003:199). Similarly, in 
their research into MAPPA Turner and Colombo found that,
the dispersal of risk and responsibility is, however, likely to remain 
problematic whilst mental health practitioners feel pushed into 
defensive practice by a media that highlights rare tragedies and 
creates a culture of blame. A Forensic Social Worker respondent 
highlighted this and candidly disclosed: 'If I'm honest part of 
information sharing is a back covering exercise ... when things go 
terribly wrong and the inquiry sits, if you weren't around the table, then 
your agency is vulnerable. And as a professional you're vulnerable' 
(2005:35).
The MAPPA approach raised important questions about the underlying status 
of restricted patients and the responses the system was capable of making. 
How could the therapeutic interests of restricted patients remain paramount 
in a climate where the professionals responsible for patient care and 
treatment were forced to consider their patients only in terms of risk to the 
public? The very status of ‘patient’ could be called into question in this 
context.
At the same time some people were positive about the MAPPA policy. One 
psychiatrist believed that MAPPA facilitated the representation of public 
interest in decision-making. In his view, doctors’ concerns for their patients 
were not mirrored by equal concern for the protection of the public. He
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believed there was a need for representation of the public interest in 
decisions about risk and that the MAPPA policy made this a more measured 
aspect of decision-making by people other than the Home Office. He also 
claimed that MAPPA provided the impetus to share responsibility for 
decision-making across agencies, and that shared responsibility for risk 
management was best practice in psychiatry. This was supported by Street’s 
finding that restriction orders enabled a unique sharing of responsibility 
across different agencies and decision-makers in the system (1998). For the 
practitioner quoted above, MAPPA involved an element of protection for 
doctors, for example being able to consult non-clinical practitioners about a 
particular patient plan.
Clinicians were clearly engaged in coordinating risk management in the 
interests of public protection. Indeed, while the Home Office believed that 
some clinicians were not at all concerned about protecting the public, some 
people I encountered in my research were concerned that practitioners were 
becoming too preoccupied with public protection. One clinician I spoke to 
worried that the public protection imperative would become so widely- 
accepted that clinicians would forget their responsibilities to patient 
confidentiality.
I think the whole notion of multi-agency management is sort of 
interesting and variously problematic. My gut feeling about it originally 
was that I was opposed to it. I think that I am being brought round to it 
in relation to some particularly difficult cases where there are factors 
that are not just mental health factors that relate to offending, and 
where it does make sense for agencies to cooperate with each other. 
But then what still worries me is that the health service won’t keep its 
boundaries properly in terms of what information it passes over. That it 
won’t do it on the basis of ... ‘significant risk of serious harm to the 
public therefore I must or can disclose’, but it will do it on some sort of 
fudged ‘need to know’ basis as if we were all looking after the patient, 
whereas actually police officers don’t look after the patient. ... My 
suspicion is that generally as time goes on there will be ... loosening 
... and people will forget what the real rules are. They’ll be busy so 
they’ll hand over discharge summaries.
This anxiety was echoed by Turner and Colombo, who asked: ‘.... will mental 
health practitioners’ important contributions to MAPPPs inevitably see them 
slipping further into the sphere of public protection at the expense of 
therapeutic care?’ (2005:34). As long as patient health and public protection
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remain dichotomous objectives, it was difficult to see how the outcome would 
be otherwise.
Earlier I discussed the tension expressed by psychiatrists in gaining 
acceptance for their professional expertise in the assessment of risk by the 
Home Office, while simultaneously seeking to distance themselves from 
expectations that psychiatry would take responsibility for determining what 
level of risk was acceptable to the public. The involvement of psychiatrists in 
MAPPA was another example of the blurring of the roles, responsibilities and 
utility of psychiatry in the management of mentally disordered offenders. As 
Peay notes, ‘the tensions are evident, and not only in respect of information 
sharing, but also in respect of the very relevance of psychiatric knowledge to 
the broad ambit of general offending’ (2007:499). In the symbolic politics of 
criminal justice, people who might once have been considered elements of 
crime control are now considered risk managers. Several senior Home Office 
officials described the police and other criminal justice agencies as risk 
managers who supported the objectives of the Mental Health Unit. These 
officials compared such risk management agencies favourably against the 
Department of Health and other actors whose objectives did not prioritise 
public protection. Yet the initial inclusion and subsequent compulsion of 
psychiatrists to participate in MAPPA policy placed a legal responsibility on 
psychiatrists to adopt that preoccupation with public protection. The 
implementation of MAPPA indicated how firmly psychiatrists had become 
situated within the spectrum of ‘risk management authorities’ and lent further 
support to my thesis of the symbolic politics of protection in the restricted 
patient system.
Patients and the public: an intractable opposition?
In this chapter I have explored one of the consequences of how the Home 
Office constructed the public protection agenda. I have shown that, by 
perceiving itself to be the sole protector of the public in relation to risk, the 
Home Office relegated the expertise of care teams and alternative decision­
makers outside of its own decision frame. This led Home Office staff to 
downplay the reliability of assessments about risk from the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal and care teams pursuing applications for leave or discharge
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of restricted patients. At the same time, the Mental Health Unit was engaged 
in actively promoting the Home Secretary as the preferred authority to 
receive applications for leave or discharge. All this could be explained by the 
Unit’s exhaustive commitment to the public protection agenda. However the 
perception that it was only the executive that was concerned with public 
protection was not supported by my data. Moreover, that perception created 
some significant challenges for the exercise of executive discretion in the 
system.
I have documented a perception at the Home Office that other actors in the 
system did not take account of public protection, and therefore made riskier 
decisions. Two particular challenges emerged from this perception. The first 
was in relation to the Tribunal. Legislatively, the Tribunal was required to take 
account of risk to the public by the Mental Health Act 1983 [section 73 (1)(a)]. 
It was one thing to suggest that the Tribunal did not place sufficient weight on 
the question of public protection, quite another to argue that the Tribunal did 
not consider public protection at all. Additionally, the perception of the 
Tribunal making risky decisions had led to the Home Office monitoring, and 
sometimes seeking review of, Tribunal decisions. As I shall discuss further in 
Chapter Seven, this informal monitoring brought into question the 
independence of the Tribunal, which was charged with safeguarding patient’s 
rights in the mental health system.
Secondly, concern by Home Office officials about the capability of particular 
care teams translated into an informal mandate to supervise clinical 
practitioners in the system. Again, these concerns were informed by the 
perception that clinicians paid insufficient attention to public protection. Yet, 
from my data, clinicians routinely paid attention to the question of public 
protection when considering the preparedness of their patients to spend time 
in the community.
Thus the perception that the Home Office was the only agency considering 
the protection of the public was an important point of contention across the 
system. Both the Tribunal and clinical practitioners considered the matter of 
public protection in all decisions about the care, management and discharge
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of restricted patients. Ironically, the mere fact that this point of contention 
existed disproved the Home Office’s perception that it was the only actor with 
regard for public protection. Within the importance of protecting the public 
which was acknowledged by all, the disparity lay in how different actors felt 
that public protection should be assessed. Both legal and clinical 
practitioners I spoke to believed that the way the Home Office undertook its 
deliberations undermined the responsibility of the mental health system to 
ensure that patients were detained in the least restrictive circumstances, and 
with appropriate treatment including the opportunity for rehabilitation in the 
community.
Despite the contention around public protection, and for all the theoretical 
arguments against executive discretion, non-government actors were not 
uniformly opposed to the fact of the Home Secretary’s authority. Opinions 
were far more dynamic and complicated than mere opposition. On the one 
hand, there was a degree of confidence in how the Home Office carried out 
its work. This was evident in the opinions of non-government actors, 
including practitioners and advocacy organisations, many of whom had 
confidence in the individuals and processes employed by the Home Office; 
who found the Mental Health Unit to be approachable and reasonable; and 
who acknowledged and appreciated the Home Office’s role in supervision 
generally.
These same actors, however, were concerned by the extreme cautiousness 
they perceived in Home Office decision-making, which resulted in an 
inordinate length of time taken in processing decisions; and the fact that 
applications for patients considered appropriate for less secure conditions of 
detention were generally rejected at first instance by the Home Office. As one 
psychiatrist put it during an interview, the Home Office was simply failing to 
exercise its discretion to release restricted patients.
That statement struck at the essence of the tension between the executive 
function - as embodied by the work of the Mental Health Unit - and the 
therapeutic objective of other actors in the restricted patient system. As long 
as public protection was seen as oppositional to individual patient needs, 
there could be no midpoint for compromise on both agendas. As long as
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restricted patients were understood primarily in terms of their risk to the 
public, their individual needs would always be secondary. And as long as the 
executive authority was implemented by the Home Office, the interpretation 
of public protection would prioritise the control of dangerousness over 
therapeutic care.
Clinicians and practitioners repeatedly claimed that the prioritisation of 
controlling dangerousness ran counter to the intentions of the Mental Health 
Act 1983 and the mental health system itself. Yet the approach of the Home 
Office was firmly rooted in the executive discretion granted it by that same 
legislation. It was in recognition of the high degree of public interest in this 
area and because the tenor, scope and scale of that interest might shift over 
time that the Home Secretary was given decision-making authority in the first 
instance. This produced an intractable impasse which simultaneously 
legitimised each side’s positioning with reference to the Mental Health Act 
1983 and institutional mandates.
The last two chapters have set out the role and work of executive decision­
making in the restricted patient system; and the relationships between the 
various actors in the system. Much of this discussion has turned on the 
question of the public protection agenda. This brings me to the central 
questions of my thesis: what was the public protection agenda, and whose 
interests did it serve? In the next chapter I consider ‘the public’ being served 
by executive discretion, and how.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSTRUCTING ‘THE PUBLIC’
Introduction
My analysis so far has explored the role and function of the Home Office 
Mental Health Unit, and relationships between the Home Office and other 
groups in the restricted patient system. I have established that the formal 
mandates of the executive were to provide public protection and to maintain 
public confidence in the system. These formal mandates operated alongside 
the informal mandates of monitoring other actors in the system and avoiding 
scandals and negative attention on the system. Each of these aspects of my 
analysis has revolved around the emerging distinction between individual 
patients and members of the public. It is a distinction that brings me to my 
focal question: what was meant by ‘the public’? How was it constructed, and 
how did these constructions vary across different actors in the system? The 
present chapter addresses these questions in turn.
There is a considerable body of work examining who constitutes the public 
which provides the theoretical framework for my discussion. However 
empirical analysis of how the public is constructed in the daily decision­
making processes of government is rare; even more so when applied to 
decisions about the release of offenders assessed as high risk. Moreover, 
the political climate which shapes approaches to law and order and penal 
policy is in a constant state of flux. Policy shifts had been attributed to the 
changing nature of public opinion, perceptions of that opinion, and the 
relationship of both those issues to criminal justice policy (Simon and Feeley 
1995; Garland 2001; Reiner 2007). In the present chapter these theories 
about the social construction of public opinion provide the analytical 
framework for my examination of how the Home Office took account of the 
public in its decision-making about the discharge of restricted patients.
The construction of the public was a very important issue for my research. 
Only by answering it could the interaction between public protection and the
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exercise of discretion over restricted patients be wholly understood. The 
amorphous ‘anyone and everyone’ of people in communities where restricted 
patients had been discharged, and of society more broadly, was one element 
that was particularly important to investigate, because it legitimated the lay 
status of Unit staff themselves. This over-arching notion of the public as 
everyone outside the system gave Home Office staff a representative 
function in terms of making decisions for and on behalf of the public. 
Decisions were made with regard to the best interests of the public, and 
simultaneously as though Home Office staff were representatives of the 
public themselves.
An additional layer of the public was represented by the media. As Ardron 
has described, the notion of public interest is frequently drawn on by the 
media to legitimate their requests for information and to put pressure on 
those unwilling to provide it (Ardron 2007). The media were important 
elements of the ‘surrounds’ within which the Unit made decisions about 
restricted patients (Hawkins 2003). In particular, media interest in the 
restricted patient system played directly into yet another unstated but central 
aspect of the Unit’s role in protecting the political interests of the system, and 
ultimately of the Minister. However the effect of this attention could only be 
understood through an examination of what actually constituted the public 
interest. Who defined it, and how were the perceived interests of the public 
met?
To some extent, in the eyes of Home Office decision makers the public was 
constructed around people personally engaged in restricted patient cases, 
and specifically around victims. Seen within the broader policy framework of 
New Labour, this meant that victims played a particularly important role in the 
construction of the public. In many ways they were the central embodiment of 
the public. This was evident in the routine referencing of victims in anecdotes 
and examples drawn on by Mental Health Unit staff to describe the system 
and the challenges to it from the public protection agenda.
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Constructing the Public Interest
Those features of the world outside which have to do with the 
behaviour of other human beings, in so far as that behaviour crosses 
ours, is dependent upon us, or is interesting to us, we call roughly 
public affairs. The pictures inside the heads of these human beings, 
the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and 
relationships, are their public opinions. Those pictures which are acted 
upon by groups of people, or by individuals acting in the name of 
groups, are Public Opinion with capital letters (Lippmann 1922:18).
As Lippmann’s classic work on public opinion demonstrated, ‘the formal 
political structure exists in a social environment, where there are innumerable 
large and small corporations, and institutions, voluntary and semi-voluntary 
associations, national, provincial, urban and neighbourhood groupings, which 
often as not make the decision that the political body registers’ (Lippmann 
1922:14). Central to Lippmann’s thesis was the notion that decisions were 
based on ‘pictures’ of the world, of experience and of opinion. The notion of 
legal, bureaucratic decision-making suggests a framework of rational policies 
and systems, underpinned by the rule of law, in which decisions are made. 
But this is only part of the picture. Missing is the important element of public 
interest in the decisions being made. By definition the civil service is obliged 
to act in the interests of the public, but the extent to which those interests 
determine how the civil service acts or reacts is often determined by the 
political and public dynamics of the day (Rock 1986 and 2004; Stenson and 
Edwards 2004). Even when sociological inquiry has engaged with policy 
shifts and trends in contemporary criminal justice, the influence of the public, 
or the construction and effects of the public interest upon those shifts, has 
received little more than casual reference. The failure to interrogate such 
notions more fully has left a gap in our understanding of the ‘broad 
environment, particular context, and interpretive practices’ of decision­
makers (Hawkins 2003:189).
The need for legitimacy in the eyes of the public is an essential characteristic 
of bureaucratic decision-making. As Thomas argues:
the problem of justice follows logically from the symbolism of formal 
rationality in decision-making, when it is expected that decisions in 
individual cases will be grounded in general rules faithfully applied to 
specific cases. From this perspective, it can be argued that a basic
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difference in the decision frames of legal institutions is the extent to 
which the decision-making process is governed by the need to avoid 
threats to legitimacy (Thomas 1986:1284).
The question of how the public were constructed was crucial to the 
legitimisation of the government’s approach in the restricted patient system, 
and was an element which distinguished the Home Office from other legal 
decision-makers in the restricted patient system, such as the Tribunal.
Judicial authority operates within principles like the rule of law. These 
principles involve policies and procedures which enable judicial decision­
making based upon legal facts, without being subjected to influence from a 
more general notion of public opinion. Of course, the judiciary is not immune 
to external factors (Thomas 2003), and scrutiny of it ranges from academia to 
the media, politics and the public. Moreover judges must often make 
decisions in the interests of public protection. But the very independence of 
judges comes from their operating at one level removed from the public and 
political processes of criminal justice; from at least the perception of immunity 
to such processes. By contrast, ministers are held to account through the 
democratic process. The point here is that in the structures of decision­
making, the role of the public can be an important distinction between 
political and judicial decision-making even in the same contexts of law or 
criminal justice.
For the Home Office, the public were the objects of executive authority: both 
in the policy imperative to provide public protection, and to maintain public 
confidence in the system. The public underpinned the more detailed, subtler 
aspects of the Home Office’s mandate such as maintaining public confidence 
in the system and protecting the Secretary of State from any political fallout. 
In this context, the consideration of the public interest was not just an 
incidental factor. Rather, it was the direct object of the decision-making 
processes of Home Office staff. Shortly I shall discuss the form that public 
interaction with the restricted patient system took. Firstly, however, I want to 
consider how the executive’s approach to the public manifested itself 
throughout the system.
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One of the interesting distinctions between how criminal justice and mental 
health actors operated in the restricted patient system was their approach to 
the public. Executive discretion was firmly based within the political context of 
public policy, legislative process and electoral popularity. Locating the 
authority for that discretion within the brief of the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department also brought into the picture principles like the rule of law 
and natural justice, which were part of the decision-frame of criminal justice 
decision-making. These principles contrasted strongly with the health system, 
which operated on the basis of individual patient needs and professional 
rather than political judgement. In the health system, the personal doctor- 
patient relationship was primary, and was sustained through fundamental 
health care principles such as the confidentiality of patient information. 
Patient progress was perceived in terms of the individual, without reference 
to other interested parties such as the patient’s family, victims or local 
community. These core systemic differences informed how each actor 
responded to the notion of public interest, as well as to the application of that 
interest in particular patient cases. As such, the role of the public was a 
variable of decision-making that operated differently between bureaucratic 
and judicial staff within the restricted system as well as between legal and 
health approaches to restricted patients.
There have been many studies of how the public are constructed in the eyes 
of people whose work is dependent upon or responsive to public concern. 
One notable study examined journalists and the news media in the late 
1950s. De Sola Pool and Shulman examined how media subjects thought 
about their audiences in terms of what they wrote (de Sola Pool and Shulman 
1959). They found that journalists constructed their audiences in three ways: 
in terms of the specific characters of a story; by taking a sympathetic view 
towards general people who might be affected by this or similar experiences; 
and in terms of a desire to punish perpetrators of bad acts, whom they 
termed ‘fakers’ or ‘crooks’ (de Sola Pool and Shulman 1959:147). Moreover, 
they found that journalists’ thoughts about their audiences were much more a 
matter of personality than of mood, remaining fairly constant over a period of
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time and any variance in the issues they were reporting. In their view, the 
process of constructing an audience,
involved adopting dissonance reduction strategies to sustain an 
established mental picture of the world. Each respondent had a basic 
fantasy which related him to the world, either as a recipient of rewards 
from it or as a battler against it. His actions as a communicator sought 
to sustain this image (de Sola Pool and Shulman 1959:156).
In many ways, the process they described resonated with how Home Office 
decision-makers constructed the public in relation to restricted patients. As 
will become evident, there were individual differences in terms of how staff 
conceptualised the needs of patients and their families, and of the public as a 
broader subject of the system. These differences appeared more closely 
related to the personality of the official than to an issue of mood at the time of 
the decision. Differences in approach were clearly acknowledged by staff 
who recognised the extent of their own discretion in how they arrived at a 
particular decision. Even so, the way in which they constructed the public 
was very much a product of individual engagement with people outside of the 
formal actors of the system like practitioners and patients. Those outside the 
system included families of patients, victims and members of the 
communities in which patients lived or spent time. De Sola Pool and Shulman 
found that newsmen might report news badly if it did not serve their imagined 
purpose (de Sola Pool and Shulman 1959). Their findings reflected the desire 
by decision-makers to reassure concerned citizens that they were being 
protected, even if that reassurance was primarily symbolic.
The difference in approach to how the public was constructed was no more 
evident than in the issue of providing patient information to victims. Up until 
the late 1990s, the Probation Service was responsible for liaising with victims 
where the offender was convicted. No-one had responsibility for victims 
where the person who committed the offence was not formally categorised as 
an offender, including restricted patients. Although restricted patients had 
been convicted of an offence, their formal status was as patients. This meant 
that the sort of information victims expected about offenders was covered by 
the principle of medical confidence (Peay 1996; Rock 1996). One clinician 
explained this premise during an interview with me.
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I start from the position that these are patients. And I think that’s 
something that other agencies don’t understand. ... That police 
officers can’t understand why a doctor would want to resist giving 
information about a patient, forgetting that if they went to their GP and 
the GP told lots of other people that they have a sexually transmitted 
disease, they might be a bit upset about it. But they can’t somehow 
see that mental health care is as intimate as that, and almost more 
intimate on occasion. So I start from the position that, well, if you’re in 
the mental health system you’re part of the medical system and 
therefore you have a right to medical confidentiality.
However as victims were increasingly able to gain access to information 
about offenders, so pressure grew from those who perceived the restricted 
patient system as an anomaly in that regard (Rock 2004).
The response to victims who sought information about restricted patients had 
changed over time. Mental Health Unit officials had increasingly been 
contacted by victims directly, or via their elected representatives, seeking 
information about where a restricted patient was detained and whether they 
were to be released. The practice had slowly emerged whereby officials 
would release what they called 'basic information’, such as the fact of 
somebody’s detention or rough geographical location so that victims could 
know whether their offender was in their area or not, and whether there was 
anything in place to protect the victim.
After some years the Unit sought legal advice on victim access to information 
about restricted patients. I was denied access to this advice, but was 
informed that it had supported the existing practices of the Unit and had 
legitimated the expectations of victims to have information ‘for peace of 
mind’, as long as that information did not infringe medical confidentiality. This 
was subsequently put into legislation through the Domestic Violence Crime 
and Victims Act (DVCVA) 2004, which enabled victims to make submissions 
to any relevant determinative authorities in all offender cases, including 
restricted patients (DVCVA 2004:section 37). That legislation also required 
victims to be notified about conditions of discharge; details of any conditions 
relating to contact with the victim or family; notification of the date a 
restriction order was to cease; and ‘to provide that person with such other 
information as the [probation] board considers appropriate in all the 
circumstances of the case’ (DVCVA 2004:section 38,). Whilst the law
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stipulated that the Probation Service was the agency responsible for liaising 
with victims in these matters, the onus was on decision-makers including the 
Secretary of State to notify the Probation Service of any relevant information 
for victims.
One Mental Health Unit official observed that it was extremely important to 
explain to victims how the system worked, because if they did not understand 
this, they would believe the person discharged was still the perceived 
monster who had, for example, murdered their relative. Of course, the 
restricted patient population included some people who had committed 
horrific offences. There were also patients for whom a history of mental 
health treatment and supervision had neither prevented nor anticipated the 
severity of the crimes they came to commit (see for example the report of the 
Independent Panel of Inquiry into the triple homicide by Jason Mitchell in 
Blom-Cooper et al 1996). But there was also a widespread view that the 
opposition of some victims to the discharge of their offender could be 
alleviated through the provision of information about the patient.
An example given by a practitioner I interviewed illustrated this point. A 
patient had attacked officers in a police station during a period of severe 
mental illness many years earlier. The patient was now much better and had 
repeatedly sought leave to test his readiness for discharge into the 
community. These leave applications had been repeatedly rejected by the 
Home Secretary in the face of strong objections by officers at the police 
station where the index offence took place. As the practitioner explained to 
me,
we ended up having a sort of conciliation meeting between the police 
officers and the patient, with the social worker from our service ... And 
it, as far as I could see, completely defused the situation because they 
saw this ‘monster’ who’d gone down in the annals of their police 
station as being the most, violent man for twenty years, as a sweet 
young kid actually, who’s very well now and has a rather nice 
demeanour. So it can be, in a sense that was pragmatic, the legal 
response would be to say to the Home Office ‘you have absolutely no 
right to do this’ and so on. The pragmatic response which I said to the 
patient was ‘look, you’re going to have to live in this area. You’re 
probably better off pragmatically meeting them.’ And that was the right 
thing to do, I think.
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In this case, the impression the police had of the patient had not changed 
since the index offence, except perhaps to worsen through the exaggeration 
of folklore and anecdote. In the end, meeting the patient enabled the officers 
to understand how different the man being discharged would be from the 
man who had committed the offence, and that allayed their fears about (and 
ultimately their objections to) his release. Interestingly, in the clinician’s 
narrative there was no sense that the police, the public and the victims might 
all have occupied the same standpoint. There certainly wasn’t any indication 
that the clinical team viewed the police as ‘insiders’ of the restricted patient 
system, for example because of police responsibilities for public protection.
General information about restricted patients was one thing. But as I 
discussed earlier, the question of patient-specific information posed some 
significant problems for practitioners and the Home Office. I was interested in 
how Unit staff actually navigated the complex territory of determining what 
was confidential patient information and what information could reasonably 
be provided to victims. What emerged was that Mental Health Unit staff saw 
themselves as something of a proxy for the public. In previous chapters I 
have discussed how for Unit staff, the fact of being lay rather than 
professional actors in the system was integral to their sense of function. The 
importance of this self-perception was that it suggested a representation of 
the public; what Lippmann would have described as a process of adapting 
the various permutations and combinations of public opinion to a smaller, 
manageable model (Lippmann 1922).
One of the ways Home Office decision-makers attempted to do this was 
through empathy by putting themselves in the position of victims, as they saw 
it. One official told me,
the difficulty is that you’re getting into areas of patient confidentiality. 
Leave, for example, is regarded as part of a patient’s rehabilitation. 
And there are arguments that if you started getting victims involved in 
leave decisions, where do you draw the line between the doctor 
saying ‘this is for rehabilitation’ and the victim saying ‘well we want to 
know anyway’. And so we get around that at the moment by taking it 
upon ourselves to look at the victim issues and have exclusion zones 
or whatever.
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In examples like this one, staff tried to put themselves in the position of the 
victim to imagine what information the Unit had access to that could alleviate 
the victim’s concerns. In practice, the staff of the Unit assumed a 
representative role not only of the executive, but of the public as well, 
determining which issues victims would want information about, and then 
providing certain information accordingly. Up until the point of my research, 
there was no institutionalised method of communication between victim 
representatives and Home Office decision-makers in the restricted system. 
This meant that staff of the Mental Health Unit relied upon one-to-one contact 
with victims to inform their understanding of what victims generally wanted.24 
The correlation between assessments of what victims wanted and what 
victims actually wanted was beyond the limits of this study, but the question 
of extending victim-focused initiatives in criminal justice to the area of 
mentally disordered offenders is something to which I shall return.
As Lippmann argued, decision-makers face a series of structural limitations 
regarding how to incorporate public interest in bureaucratic decision-making. 
These included,
artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the 
comparatively meagre time available in each day for paying attention 
to public affairs, the distortion arising because events have to be 
compressed into very short messages, the difficulty of making a small 
vocabulary express a complicated world, and finally the fear of facing 
those facts which would seem to threaten the established routine of 
men's lives (Lippmann 1922:18).
In the restricted patient system, the public interest had always been a 
paramount concern. As Peay has argued,
since a proportion of patients on restriction orders ... have committed 
very serious crimes and may indeed have avoided a life prison 
sentence because of their mental disorder, determining whether to 
discharge will be of significant interest to applicants, the public, and 
sentencers (1989:10).
24 The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 extended the role of Probation 
Service Victim Liaison Officers to the restricted patient system. This formalised the 
processes and contact between agencies and victims. At the time of my research it was still 
too early to tell if and how the new arrangements were going to affect the Mental Health 
Unit’s contact with victims.
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Indeed the public interest justified the executive’s authority in the system. 
Examining these issues through a criminological lens, I was interested in how 
the rise of law and order politics had shifted, or perhaps simply clarified, the 
processes through which the public’s interest was perceived, and public 
protection provided (Reiner 2007).25 Clinicians sometimes criticised the 
Home Office for assessing clinical evidence without professional expertise. 
But for staff at the Mental Health Unit, it was their public expertise that 
enabled them to make decisions in the public interest. In their view, they did 
not need clinical expertise; that was what care teams provided.
Of course, as Mead argued, institutions are ‘organized forms of group or 
social activity - forms so organized that the individual members of society can 
act adequately and socially by taking the attitudes of others toward these 
activities’ (Mead 1934:261). Thus in some ways this perception of being 
representatives of the public was simply instructive of social processes more 
generally. Yet civil servants do not serve a representative function directly, 
but on behalf of elected members of parliament. In the realpolitik of the 
bureaucracy, ‘civil service responsibilities are not simply to the government of 
the day; they should include responsibility to Parliament, and to the 
constitution’ (Public Administration Select Committee 2007:3). In this sense 
civil servants have to mediate between the demands of the political executive 
and the expectations of the public in the development of policy; the provision 
of services; and, as is the focus of this study, in decision-making. At the 
same time, staff of the Mental Health Unit had regular contact with members 
of the public which must in some way have contributed to their 
generalisations about the public. I turn now to examine some of these 
interactions, and how they shaped Home Office decision-making.
25 While some have argued that public opinion has taken on an even greater role as a 
‘privileged source’ in criminal justice (Garland 2001:13), the appropriateness of this thesis to 
understanding policy developments in the UK is still debatable (see for example Gottschalk 
2006).
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How was 'The Public’ Conceptualised?
The general public
In Chapter Two I set out my working definition of ‘the public’. That definition 
did not include decision-makers such as the Home Office and the Tribunal; 
health and legal practitioners; or patients. It did include families and carers; 
victims and their families; mental health and other non-government 
organisations that were involved in issues relevant to, but not focussed on, 
the restricted patient system; and anyone else that might have had 
involvement with a restricted patient at some point (for example neighbours 
or local businesses where a patient lived). I was interested in Lippmann’s 
notion that public opinion is a pragmatic construction made up of multiple 
sources and Mead’s observations about the generalised other (Lippmann 
1922; Mead 1934). From these perspectives I wanted to analyse how Home 
Office decision-makers conceptualised the public whom they were mandated 
to protect.
Initially, the self-perception of representativeness among Unit staff introduced 
another layer to my own conception of the public, through an anonymous 
body of people who might never be individually identified, but who could be 
exposed to risk simply by being in the vicinity of restricted patients. This 
included members of the communities that restricted patients lived in or 
visited. It also pointed to anyone and everyone who did not have a formal, 
acknowledged involvement in the system. In this way it expanded the 
working definition I had applied at the outset to include the broadest possible 
conception of the public.
On the one hand, this definition operated as a catch-all for anyone and 
everyone who might constitute membership of the public. But it also took 
practice further away from structured, categorical actors into a nebulous, all- 
encompassing population. This was another indicator of the shift away from 
expertise towards a greater emphasis on common knowledge, a sign of the 
way in which ‘the bureaucracies of the criminal justice system have had to 
become more responsive, more attuned to the interests of individual
Chapter 5: Constructing ‘the Public’ [169]
consumers and stakeholders, and less assured in their definition of what 
constitutes the public interest’ (Garland 2001:117).
How did the policies and practices of the Unit make provision for such a 
broad range of possible interests being brought to bear by the public? One 
way was to allow for flexibility or deviation from standard practice when cases 
fell outside the ordinary or the expected. The recall policy discussed in the 
previous chapter provided a good example of this. The formal procedure, 
established in case law, required medical evidence at the time of recall (K v 
The UK 1998). But the Mental Health Unit’s interpretation of the case law 
maintained the overriding priority of ensuring public protection above any 
strict interpretation of the principles of compulsory treatment.
Unless recall is necessary as an emergency measure (for example, 
where the patient presents a clear, immediate, serious risk of harm to 
others), there must be an up to date report on a patient’s mental 
condition prior to recall. This report must confirm that the patient is 
mentally disordered (but not necessarily that his mental state has 
deteriorated). This report may in the first instance be given over the 
telephone if the case is urgent (Mental Health Unit 2003:13).
I came across numerous cases where patients were not in regular contact 
with care teams, suggesting that current clinical information might be difficult 
to obtain in the event of a proposal to recall the patient. The Unit’s policy took 
cognisance of this by reminding staff that the supremacy of the public 
protection agenda remained, and that recall action was permitted in the 
absence of clinical evidence where that mandate was threatened. In this way, 
the documented policy reflected the letter of the law, while the practice relied 
upon a more fluid process of legal interpretation, enabling the Unit to meet its 
responsibilities to the public.
Beyond the amorphous ‘anyone and everyone’ of the public, I was interested 
to know what other types of individuals or members of the public the Unit 
came into contact with. One routine form of contact was correspondence 
from the public. This could be to Ministers, to the Unit directly, or in the form 
of parliamentary questions raised on behalf of constituents. Each of these 
types of correspondence constituted a performance indicator at the Unit, and
Chapter 5: Constructing 'the Public’ [170]
each had a target for completion. Sometimes the Unit received vitriolic 
letters, whose authors laid claim to public representativeness even when they 
were directly involved in restricted cases. For example, a Home Office official 
showed me one letter by the father of a homicide victim, complaining about 
therapies offered to prisoners when, in his view, there was an absence of 
support for victims. Despite the demonstrated shifts towards greater support 
for victims in the criminal justice system, the letter represented the popularly 
held view that offenders received better treatment than victims. For decision­
makers, these letters often required an individual response to the victim, and 
sometimes to the patient or their care team. Communication from victims was 
not simply interpreted as the expressions of an individual. Its content also 
had to be monitored for any potential scandal that might damage the 
reputation of the system.
The public was also constituted through other forms of expression. For 
example public polling on the criminal justice system and projected voting 
behaviour; and newspaper and other media reports about restricted patients 
all fed into the picture of what the public wanted. If there was significant 
media interest in the release of a restricted patient, the political implications 
would depend upon whether the release had been ordered by the Home 
Office or the Tribunal. As I discussed previously, risks perceived by the Unit 
included how decisions might be publicly received. One Unit staff member 
told me how, politically, there was a difference between discretionary leave 
authorised by the Resident Medical Officer and a decision taken under the 
authority of the Home Secretary. Unit staff had a role in minimising the 
political effect of decisions as well as safeguarding public confidence in the 
system. This role contributed to how the public was conceptualised, as those 
perceptions could be reflected in media reports and public commentary.
Beyond these generalised conceptions of the public, there emerged a very 
clear pattern of interaction with two key categories of people with whom Unit 
staff had contact. These were the families of patients and victims.
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Specific manifestations of the public
There is an important body of work examining the experiences of prisoners’ 
families which draws parallels between their experiences and those of victims 
and witnesses in the criminal justice system (for a detailed review and 
analysis of this literature see Condry 2007). There is also a long-established 
movement of mental health service users and their families who describe 
themselves as ‘survivors’ either of the mental health system or the stigma 
associated with it, and in some cases as victims (see for example Tait and 
Lester 2005; Thornicroft 2006; Nacro 2007). As this literature demonstrates, 
ostensibly clear terms like ‘patient’, ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ often belie the 
complexities of relationships, interaction and histories that constitute lived 
experience.
The interaction between the categories of ‘victim’ and ‘family member’ was 
another example of the hybridity of the principles of criminal justice and 
health in the restricted patient system. In Chapter One I discussed how the 
restricted patient population encompassed a high proportion of homicides 
amongst its offence statistics. Mentally disordered offenders were also more 
likely to have killed family members or acquaintances than other offenders 
(Department of Health 2001). The impact of mental disorder on many of 
these offenders’ lives (and on their offences) meant that a large proportion of 
victims were also family members and/or carers of the patient. As such, 
boundaries between victims and family were significantly blurred. Victims’ 
interests were often directed at concern about the patient’s therapeutic 
progress as well as preventing further harm to themselves or others. To 
illustrate, I observed one official considering a compassionate leave 
application where a patient had sought to return home to visit a sick relative. 
The index offence had been committed against another family member, so 
the Unit asked the Victim Liaison Officer to check whether the victims 
objected to the proposed leave. The official was sympathetic to the 
sensitivities for the victim, but also to the desire of other family members who 
wanted the patient to be able to attend the family at this time. The Unit’s 
responsibility was to provide information about the proposed leave to the 
victim and to obtain input about the victim’s wishes. The official was awaiting 
the victim’s submission before determining the leave application. However
Chapter 5: Constructing ‘the Public’ [172]
the official was planning to suggest to the victim that she absent herself from 
the home during the patient’s visits, if that was necessary to enable the 
patient to go home.
Another official from the Unit explained to me that staff were always 
considering how much it was reasonable for victims to ‘dictate the process.’ 
For example, I observed one staff member responding to a leave application 
by a patient convicted of rape. The patient had been married at the time of 
the offence and had two children, one of whom he was permitted to see 
under supervision by the Family Court. However the children’s mother had a 
new partner who was concerned about the risks posed to his step-children by 
their father, and he had contacted both the Home Office and the detaining 
hospital about the matter. The Mental Health Unit took a dim view of his 
intervention for a number of reasons. Firstly, officials perceived the step­
father to be ‘obsessed’ with the patient and noted that the children’s mother 
had not raised similar concerns with them. Moreover, the father did not live in 
the area of his family, and visits to his daughter were only permitted under 
supervision. The Unit proposed to approve the leave, but to include 
conditions re-enforcing the orders of the Family Court. In the words of an 
official, the purpose of these conditions would be to ‘safeguard us to an 
extent from any future enquiries from family members’. Thus, for the Unit, the 
risks involved in this case were as much about negative publicity that an 
anxious victim could bring upon the system as they were about specific risks 
posed by the patient. The conditions served a utilitarian purpose for any 
future contact with the public that might be necessary.
Victim involvement
Victims have been prevalent in the specific examples discussed so far in this 
thesis. The frequent reference to them by Home Office staff could have been 
in response to the interest that I expressed at the outset of my fieldwork. 
However the extent to which case anecdotes routinely referred to victims 
individually or as a population within the system suggested something more 
than that. It was clear that this group carried particular weight within staff 
perceptions of the public, and of the Home Office’s role within the system. 
For instance, one Unit member commented that doctors could be resistant to
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the Home Office’s concerns about victims, seeing them as irrelevant and 
unimportant to restricted patient cases, but, for the Home Office, victim 
issues went to the heart of the questions of risk and protection of the public.
Indeed it began to seem as though ‘the public’ was most clearly and directly 
conceptualised by Home Office staff through contact made in 
correspondence or phone calls from victims. Yet, as I have argued, the terms 
‘victim’ and ‘offender’ suggest simple, discrete categories that were far more 
complicated in reality. In the restricted patient system, victims might have 
been unknown to the patient. Equally, they might have been family members 
or carers who continued to be concerned about the patient’s therapeutic 
progress, even as they entertained concerns about their own safety. Victim 
status was even further complicated in cases where a successful insanity 
defence meant that the person who committed the act was acquitted of 
criminal responsibility for an offence.26
There has been considerable criminological interest in the typology of victim- 
offender relationships, and the notion of victims and offenders as 
dichotomous categories has been widely criticised (see for example Von 
Hentig 1940; Davies et al 1996; Zedner 2002; Stubbs and Tolmie 2005; 
Walklate 2007). Moreover, as Rock has pointed out, ‘“victim” itself is not 
necessarily considered an appealing term. It is contradictory, connoting ... 
images of pariah and saint’ (Rock 2002:14). Yet general conceptions of 
victims and offenders as ideal types still abound (Christie 1986), and there is 
very little empirical evidence of how victims feel about the people who 
victimised them, or the systems (criminal justice and otherwise) with which 
they come into contact as a result. As Rock posits:
what is the significance of being a victim (as opposed to being the 
occupant of some other or no well-defined role at all); how are 
identities distinguished, selected and enacted as, say, angry, 
campaigning, chastened, fearful, self-reproachful, cynical, nonchalant 
or resigned victims; how do those selves interplay with the wider 
biography of the victim and with retrospective and prospective 
readings of his or her identity; how much are they stereotyped and 
how much the result of reflective consideration and remodelling by the
26 As discussed in Chapter One, successful insanity defences were relatively rare in 
England and Wales at the time of this research.
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victim himself or herself; how are they shaped by readings of the 
offender and his or her motives and, reciprocally, of the offender's 
readings of the victim's behaviour; how do they sit with beliefs about 
fate and agency in human affairs; what practical, existential and moral 
consequences flow from the acquisition of victim selves; what parts do 
others play in formulating those interpretations; when and how would a 
victim seek their support, take action or call upon outsiders, amongst 
them the police; and when, most importantly, is victimisation an 
enduring signifier? In short, when and with what consequences does a 
person understand himself or herself to have become some existential 
entity called a victim (Rock 2002:18)?
My research did not seek to answer these questions directly. However, what 
was emerging from my data was the strong effect that those who identified as 
victims had upon Hawkins’ notion of the ‘surround’ of Home Office decision­
makers (Hawkins 2003). I was curious about what decision-makers 
understood by the notion of victim, and to what extent this conceptualisation 
influenced their broader notion of ‘the public’, within the restricted patient 
system.
The Home Office at large presented a very clear perception of victims that 
was evidenced by the language of its policies and publications at the time. 
Statements such as ‘reforming the justice system so that the needs and 
rights of victims and witnesses are placed at the heart of what we do’ and 
‘your rights as a victim’ littered Home Office press releases, publications and 
policies released during the period of my fieldwork. Perhaps the most 
significant statement in this regard was New Labour’s policy of
rebalancing the criminal justice system in a way that gives the law- 
abiding public much greater involvement in the criminal justice 
services they receive. That starts with ensuring the needs of victims 
must be at the heart of what the criminal justice system does (Home 
Office 2006, emphasis in quotation).
No longer could it be said that victims were ‘forgotten’ by the criminal justice 
system (Shapland et al 1985). Indeed, as Walklate notes, ‘a concern with and 
for the victim of crime has become not just a symbolic reference point in 
government policy but the dominant one’ (Walklate 2007:7). From policy and 
public statements by the Home Office, attention to victim-related concerns
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and a focus on victims in policy were being reflected at the highest levels of 
Home Office visibility. However it was unclear to what extent these slogans 
reflected novel approaches in the work of the Home Office rather than 
rebranding the same practices under new slogans. At the same time, these 
slogans had some very clear implications. As civil liberties lobby group 
Liberty has argued, the notion of ‘rebalancing’ implied the idea of positioning 
the criminal against the presumption of innocence, in favour of victims and 
against the interests or rights of offenders (Chakrabarty 2007).
Chapter One reported the strong criticism levelled at the Home Office that 
criminal justice policy was being politicised in line with a perceived rise in 
public punitiveness and against the collected evidence of a vast body of 
criminological research. Indeed, the ‘politicisation of the civil service’ was a 
concern that underpinned broader debates about the relationship between 
the bureaucracy and the executive at the time, informed by the widespread 
perception that ‘the old version of the “public service bargain” in which there 
was an implicit division of responsibility between ministers and civil servants 
has become confused’ (Public Administration Select Committee 2007).
Yet these messages from the Home Office were not evidence of some new 
process in the presentation of public policy. The interaction between public 
opinion and policy has always been fluid. In fact, it is ‘the ability of the person 
to put himself in other people’s places that gives him his cues as to what he 
is to do under a specific situation. It is this that gives to the man what we term 
his character as a member of the community; his citizenship, from a political 
standpoint’ (Mead 1934:270). This ‘community’ is not itself neutral or 
objective-free. There are social ‘rules’ that determine which issues capture 
the public imagination and which do not, as Lippmann explained.
There is a description of some aspect of the world which is convincing 
because it agrees with familiar ideas. But as the ideology deals with 
an unseen future, as well as with a tangible present, it soon crosses 
imperceptibly the frontier of verification. In describing the present you 
are more or less tied down to common experience. In describing what 
nobody has experienced you are bound to let go. ... The formula 
works when the public fiction enmeshes itself with a private urgency. 
But once enmeshed, in the heat of battle, the original self and the
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original stereotype which affected the junction may be wholly lost to 
sight (Lippmann 1922:109).
In the symbolic politics of law and order, the ‘public fiction’ was both 
produced and re-enforced by the representation of victims and offenders as 
distinct, disparate categories. In turn, this informed the ability of executive 
decision-makers to put themselves ‘in other people’s places’ and offer the 
reassurance to victims that I discussed in the last chapter. However, as my 
data have suggested, the binary opposition between victims and offenders 
that was reflected in Home Office policy statements contrasted strikingly with 
the close level of interaction between victims and offenders in the restricted 
patient system. It seemed that the oppositional notion of victims and 
offenders was more a manifestation of the idea of a disembodied public than 
recognition of the interests of victims themselves.
The gap between perceptions of victims and what victims themselves wanted 
was no more evident than in the gap between the rhetoric of the Home Office 
and advocacy for victims by The Zito Trust. It was the only charity that 
specifically represented the interests of victims of mentally disordered 
offenders. The Zito Trust described its work in the following terms.
We respond to primary and secondary victims of mentally disordered 
offenders, to carers of mentally disordered offenders, to those who 
feel they may be at risk of becoming a victim, and to people who have 
concerns about service provision in the community or at work. In some 
cases of homicide we have actively helped the families of both the 
victim and the offender. Families on both sides are victims, in bur view 
(The Zito Trust 2006).
In this description, The Zito Trust attempted to provide a nuanced account of 
the lived experiences of victims, as people equally supportive of ‘the 
offender’. In many ways the work of the Trust reflected the symbolic politics 
of the restricted patient system, and it was referred to variously as a victim 
organisation and a mental health charity in political and media discourse (see 
for example BBC 2006).
Yet their attempt to complicate the categories of victim and offender failed to 
influence the dominant representation of victims in New Labour policy, which
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persisted with its imagery of a binary opposition between the two. The 
objectives of victims themselves seemed to take second place next to the 
political agenda of the day, such that ‘victims and witnesses came ineluctably 
to take some part of their character from their relation to the twin imperatives 
of crime reduction and public confidence’ (Rock 2004:38).
Earlier in this chapter I discussed how the release of patient information 
emerged informally in Mental Health Unit practice, in response to the 
perceived imbalance between victims who could obtain information about 
offenders but not restricted patients. As Rock has described it,
the matter was particularly harrowing for an anomalous and distressed 
group of secondary victims, represented by such organizations as 
Justice for Victims and The Zito Trust. And there was the question of 
consistency: it was, thought Home Office Ministers, indefensible, 
intellectually as well as politically, to treat patients differently from 
other sentenced prisoners and, they protested, ‘our commitment to the 
rights of victims and protection of public is a matter of public record’ 
(Rock 2004:163-5).
The idea that not releasing information about restricted patients was 
‘indefensible’ indicated the realpolitik of the policy environment in which 
executive discretion over restricted patients was exercised. Withholding such 
information was defensible precisely on the basis that it had always been, in 
the interests of patient confidentiality. Yet the external pressures from 
members of the public who claimed to speak on behalf of victims made it 
much harder to continue to exempt restricted patients from policies that 
applied to offenders. In turn, this reality clearly indicated the extent to which 
the Home Office identified restricted patients primarily as offenders.
By the time I was conducting my fieldwork, the position in practice had been 
formalised as a policy to provide victims with information about restricted 
patients. This policy extended to the Department of Health, who had 
recognised victims of crime as an interest group within their own policy 
domain. In particular, a Mental Health Unit official explained that confidence 
in the process had been being undermined because victims were so 
dissatisfied with the system. The extent to which this assertion had produced 
significant policy change also reflected the political effectiveness of The Zito
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Trust. Members of lobby group the Mental Health Alliance spoke with some 
chagrin about a meeting convened by the Department of Health following the 
report of the Joint Scrutiny Committee on the draft Mental Health Bill 2004 
(discussed in detail in Chapter Six). While the Alliance was not invited, the 
meeting was attended by The Zito Trust along with some other non­
government organisations. Likewise, a Home Office official spoke of a 
separate meeting on the needs of victims that had been organised by The 
Zito Trust and a member of the Metropolitan Police. It was attended by all 
ministers from the Home Office and by Health Minister Rosie Winterton 
(responsible for the review of the Mental Health Act 1983). In the official’s 
view the meeting had been ‘quite a coup’ and demonstrated the significant 
political influence of The Zito Trust.
Vengeful sentiments are often attributed to victims and their advocates 
(Stanko 2000; Zedner 2002), and quotations from victims such as 'nobody 
worries about the victims at all these days’ have been used to embellish 
reports of ‘scandalous’ decisions to release restricted patients (Johnston 
2005). Similarly, the dominant media representations of victims of restricted 
patients were generally vengeful. Indeed many have remarked on the return 
of vengeance to popular and policy acceptability within the new penology 
(see for example Garland 2001; Downes and Morgan 2002). Yet the extent to 
which these sentiments accurately reflect the nature of victims’ interests or 
concerns has been questioned (Rock 2004), and evidence from the British 
Crime Survey has suggested that victims are no more punitive than anyone 
else (Hough and Roberts 1998; Reiner 2007).
As the victim organisation most focused on the area of mentally disordered 
offenders, The Zito Trust did not actively propound vengeful sentiments.26 Its 
policy platform focused upon systemic reform to improve health care for 
patients as the best prevention of harm. The victim lobby within the mental 
health law reform process was generally believed to be on the ‘side’ of the
26 While The Zito Trust had a relatively high profile and attracted a share of media attention, 
there were other groups available to make more dramatic, headline-grabbing comments. For 
example, the home page of the web site for the Victims of Crime Trust featured the following 
quotation from the News of the World: There are 100 support groups to help criminals. But 
just ONE for these murder victim’s families (The Victims of Crime Trust)... ‘ 
(http://www.voc.webeden.co.uk/, emphasis in quotation).
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government, in supporting greater control over patients in the community. Yet 
the control agenda supported by victims was never ascribed to vengeful or 
punitive sentiments, either by those representing the interests of victims, or of 
government or non-government organisations. On the contrary, one clinician 
felt that the vengeance portrayed in relation to victims was actually 
propagated by government as it sought a mandate to impose greater 
restrictions on patients. He stated that victim sentiments were ‘used by 
government’ for political mileage, when in fact victims almost always wanted 
treatment to make the patient better. Rock has argued that whilst victims 
sought to assert their agenda in addition to those already in New Labour’s 
policy framework, the government response was simply to subsume victim 
interests within ‘frames that actually served other policies and politics’ (Rock 
2004:39). Once again, that approach perpetuates the notion of ‘ideal’ types of 
victims and offenders and obscures the character of victims and their 
objectives within the system. Its legacy could be seen in the ongoing attempt 
to ‘rebalance’ criminal justice, as though the system were comprised of 
individual, categorical interests evenly spaced along a continuum, rather than 
the deeply complex lives of victims, offenders and their families.
The upshot of victim involvement in the restricted patient system was that 
victim rights to information about discharge and the ability to make 
representations to decision-makers were extended to restricted patient cases 
under the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. In addition to 
formalising victim status for the purpose of obtaining information on restricted 
patients, this also required the Tribunal to engage directly with victims for the 
first time. But, as I shall explore in the next section, that policy did not 
necessarily make a practical difference to the operation of the system.
How did Other Actors View Victim involvement in the System?
Despite The Zito Trust’s careful articulation of their objectives as systemic 
reform rather than seeking vengeance on patients, there was a general 
concern amongst non-government actors that victim involvement could 
produce punitiveness towards patients. In part, this was an 
acknowledgement of the high public profile and media attention that 
particular cases attracted, and the disrepute they brought upon the system as
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a whole. For example, Taylor and Gunn had expressed the following concern 
about the work of The Zito Trust.
In spite of its best endeavours to be as sensitive to the needs of 
people with a mental illness as to those who have died at the hands of 
a very few of them, in practice it may have served most prominently to 
highlight the killings and a drive to more restrictive care (Taylor and 
Gunn 1999:9).
Taylor and Gunns’ comment here illustrated fears that increased attention to 
victims would increase the stigmatisation of mental health patients. Thus, 
while The Zito Trust did not necessarily advance a punitive agenda, its work 
was seen by some to feed the symbolic politics which fuelled the prioritisation 
of control over care. The Trust’s agenda was constructed as much as 
anything else out of the fears and projections that were commonly held about 
mental health patients, however ill-founded the public expression of those 
fears might have been. Yet, other actors in the system showed little initial 
interest in the development of victim-focused policies. In Chapter Six I will 
show that the Mental Health Alliance did not address this agenda in its 
advocacy for the draft Mental Health Bill 2004. Moreover, legal and clinical 
practitioners seemed to have given very little consideration to the question of 
whether and how formal victim interaction might affect the system and the 
progress of patients through it.
In a number of interviews, my questions about victim involvement seemed to 
prompt the first serious consideration of the matter. In 2005 the Mental 
Health Review Tribunal announced that it was implementing procedures to 
bring it in line with the provisions extending victim involvement to restricted 
patient cases (MHRT 2005). This policy involved notifying victims of hearings 
for restricted patients and permitting victim submissions on leave or 
discharge applications. This was the first time that the Tribunal was 
undertaking to engage routinely with victims in its hearings. Yet when I 
conducted my fieldwork, most research participants across government and 
beyond were unaware of these procedures, and practitioners who were 
aware of their existence were unfamiliar with their detail. As I probed this 
issue during interviews, practitioners began to give greater consideration to 
the effect that this policy might have on the system. Generally, they felt both
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that victims should not influence Tribunal decisions and that the new policy 
would have no substantial effect in that regard. As one lawyer put it in an 
interview with me,
if I was faced with a situation where suddenly I saw a victim statement 
before the Tribunal, I would immediately ... seek to have it put aside. 
And certainly if I thought in any way it was involved in swaying the 
Tribunal in its decision, then I think it would be a matter for judicial 
challenge.
Interestingly, the new policy did not stipulate what weight the Tribunal was to 
place upon victims’ submissions. Lawyers consistently stated that victim 
statements should have no bearing on decision-making about restricted 
patients. This indicated how accustomed legal practitioners working in the 
mental health system were to operating without formalised victim 
participation. By contrast, criminal justice processes had established Victim 
Personal Statements, where a record from victims was included in the official 
papers of a case file, which might come before police, prosecution and 
defence lawyers and courts (Home Office 2001 ).28 My research was 
completed before there was any evidence of how the Tribunal’s victim policy 
was actually implemented, what affect it had upon Tribunal decisions, and 
whether it would be challenged or resisted in other ways by legal 
practitioners.
Many practitioners conveyed both a professional and a personal view about 
victim involvement in the restricted patient system. I have discussed how 
professionally they were concerned about the relevance and legal validity of 
considering victim statements when making decisions about restricted 
patients. Personally, practitioners expressed the belief that formal 
engagement by victims at the point of decisions about leave or discharge 
was counter-productive for the victim’s own recovery. Many lawyers I 
interviewed argued that the most important time for formal intervention by a 
victim or their family was after the court had made a restriction order. Such 
intervention, in their views, should include an explanation about the restricted 
patient system and what would happen to the patient going through it. The
28 Although the effect of Victim Personal Statements has been the subject of some 
questioning (see for example Morgan and Sanders 1999).
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following excerpt from one interview with a lawyer was typical of responses 
on this issue.
If the last time that the patient was seen by the victim or the victim’s 
family, they were sort of highly dangerous and extremely mad and 
very frightening ... that’s the image that remains with them. ... to do 
work at the very very beginning to explain what’s happened to that 
person, where they’ve gone, what they’re going to have to go through, 
not in any way that breaches confidentiality but just in a way that 
explains the process, might be useful.
To some extent this reflected a sanguine view of the effects of therapeutic 
intervention. Equally however, it was supported by the examples given 
earlier, where psychiatrists and Home Office officials who took time to explain 
the restricted patient system to victims found that victim concerns were 
significantly alleviated, even to the point where they no longer objected to a 
patient having leave in the community.
One of the reasons The Zito Trust advocated victim involvement in Tribunal 
hearings was that victims often had important information about the patient 
that would benefit clinical interventions. Lawyers concurred with this 
sentiment, but felt that such information should be obtained initially, when the 
patient first entered the system, when the experience was fresh in everyone’s 
mind, and when it would have the greatest impact on the patient’s treatment 
plan. One practitioner suggested that it might be useful for care teams to 
hear from victims when a patient was first admitted because,
for treatment purposes it would obviously be extremely helpful for the 
treating team to really understand the dynamics of what was going on. 
Because it may well be that the only side they get is the patient’s side 
and he might not have a very good recollection of it or be able to 
express it very well.
Legal practitioners also said it was important for leave and discharge 
planning to know the status and interests of victims at the very outset. One 
stated that a number of cases had been held up unduly because all the 
discharge preparation had taken place, at a great cost of time, referrals and 
assessments, only to be rejected by the Home Office because of the 
presence of victims in the vicinity of the proposed area. In such a case, it was
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vital for both the lawyer and the treating team to be aware of any victim 
involvement from the outset of the restriction order.
Clinicians expressed sympathy for the position of victims, but saw continuing 
victim interest as a conundrum for victims as well as for patients. In the words 
of one psychiatrist I interviewed,
I suppose that I would accept that a victim probably has a right to 
know that somebody has been released, because of the argument 
they might meet somebody. Whether it’s good for them to know that 
the person’s been released is another matter. It might actually make 
them fearful when they need absolutely not to be fearful.
This clinician shared the concerns of lawyers discussed above, and 
illustrated a clinical perspective on the benefit or otherwise of victim 
involvement in restricted patient cases. It demonstrated an approach to victim 
involvement determined by what was in a victim’s best interests, rather than 
a victim’s right to information. The paternalism inherent in such an approach 
has been widely criticised as a form of secondary victimisation by denying 
victims access to the information they seek (see for example Newburn and 
Merry 1990). Consequently the position increasingly adopted by criminal 
justice practitioners including police and victim organisations had been that it 
was best to afford victims a choice rather than presume to know what 
information was in their best interests (Maguire and Kynch 2000).
It became clear that there was a notable difference between how the Home 
Office and practitioners viewed the involvement of patients in the restricted 
patient system. For Home Office staff, victims constituted a sector of the 
public with whom they had a lot of contact in the form of phone calls, 
correspondence and organised representation from groups like The Zito 
Trust and others. As a result victims had significant influence on the 
executive’s conceptions of the public, in whose interests their mandate 
operated.
By contrast, victim interests were taken by practitioners essentially to be a 
political issue. This allowed practitioners to relegate any engagement with 
victims to the Home Office, despite the fact that victims were increasingly
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involved in formal processes like the Tribunal and case conferences. The 
emerging focus on victims bore little relation to how practitioners conceived 
of the Home Office’s focus on the public protection agenda. This proved 
something of a paradox. On the one hand, non-government actors relegated 
engagement with victims to the Home Office. Non-government organisations 
clearly recognised the extent to which public protection consumed the Home 
Office. Yet practitioners had not reconciled the interaction of these two 
aspects of the executive’s mandate. Specifically, there was little 
consideration of how victim involvement might shape Home Office 
perceptions of the broader public, amongst the non-government participants 
in my research. As a result, those outside of government were unable to 
counter effectively the concerns about risk that they constantly confronted 
when seeking leave or discharge, and which consistently formed the basis of 
their criticisms of the Home Office.
Did Patients Constitute Members of the Public?
So far family members have featured as a complex but nevertheless 
acknowledged constituency within the various constructions of ‘the public’. 
This left the question of where patients themselves sat on the spectrum of 
public interests. Patients could have been considered in terms of their own 
vulnerability, as there is considerable evidence that mental health service 
users have higher rates of victimisation than others. Colombo investigated 
the victimisation of mental health service users in terms of non-criminal acts 
such as harassment or exploitation by family members, and in terms of 
criminal offences including repeat victimisation (Colombo 2007). Despite the 
dominant view that mental health service users were themselves risky 
individuals, he found that they were subject to the same risks of crime and 
victimisation as the general population; that their mental illness might render 
them even more vulnerable to certain forms of victimisation; and that they 
were particularly susceptible to systemic failures to take their victimisation 
seriously because of their underlying status as mentally disordered. 
Nevertheless, Colombo argues, because society is less able to acknowledge 
and absorb the risks to patients than it is the risks from patients, the public 
protection agenda is aimed at protecting ‘innocent us’ against dehumanised, 
risky others (Colombo 2007).
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Indeed, some research has indicated that patients have specific fears of 
crime and victimisation related to the very fact of their being restricted 
patients. Ardron’s research into the effects of media representations on 
restricted patients in a medium security unit showed that fear of violence 
when on leave in the community was a common preoccupation of patients, a 
number of whom had experienced hospitals cancelling their leave to 
minimise problems such as the risk of adverse publicity while the patient was 
out on leave (Ardron 2007). Participants at the Home Office told me similar 
stories of protecting patients from the victims who were actively protesting 
against them outside hospitals and in the community. One official explained 
that the decision to permit leave was made with regard to the risk of the 
patient being exposed to harm as much as it was to the damage in public 
confidence that could be caused by any adverse attention in the case. 
Another staff member spoke of a case where a hospital had sought escorted 
leave for a patient convicted of murder. The proposed leave was to be spent 
in a place far from the geographical region in which the victim’s family lived. 
The Minister had been unwilling to approve the leave because the victims 
were so opposed to any leave that they had threatened media attention in the 
case. Unit staff met with the patient’s care team to see for themselves how 
the patient was progressing, and re-resubmitted the recommendation to the 
Minister detailing the distances involved between the location of the 
proposed leave and the residence of the victim’s family. The leave was 
eventually approved. In this way staff had sought to placate concerned 
victims and the possibility of the negative attention they might bring to bear 
on the case, yet had still supported a recommendation for leave from the 
patient’s care team. They had also used their own, detailed knowledge of the 
case to convince the Minister that there wdre no unreasonable risks to the 
public by the proposal.
However, on the whole, the exclusivity with which Home Office staff 
interpreted their mandate consistently asserted the consideration of public 
protection over patients’ interests. Only one official described patient welfare 
as integral, rather than incidental, to the process of decision-making about 
leave or release. For the majority of Unit staff, the interests of the public were
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diametrically opposed to those of patients. Given such a binary opposition, 
there simply was no capacity within the Home Office’s decision frame to 
consider patients as members of the public. For example, answering how the 
public profile of a case fed into the Unit’s risk assessment, one official told 
me how the Unit was at the interface between politics and patients. Cases 
were assessed on the basis of objective criteria, but additional factors 
needed to be taken into account, such as the likelihood of the public 
attending a site where a patient would be, or of media attention when a 
patient was on leave. As a result, events had to be managed with respect to 
the public’s confidence in the system. Thus, in practice, the Unit was 
perpetually analysing the perceived risks of decisions so as not to undermine 
confidence in the system, as well as assessing any physical risks posed to 
the public.
Undoubtedly this approach was informed by popular perceptions of the 
supposed dangers posed by mentally disordered offenders. As I have 
already discussed, the Home Office was acutely aware of the political liability 
that was manifest in negative media attention. Suggestions that the Home 
Office was ‘soft on crime’ could be levelled just as easily for its approach to 
mentally disordered offenders as for other offender populations. Yet there 
was reputable evidence to counter such perceptions. The report of the Joint 
Scrutiny Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill noted that ‘it should not 
be overlooked that prison staff and fellow prisoners are members of the 
public’ (2004:vol 1, para 272). While the comment was specifically in relation 
to prisoners transferred to hospital for compulsory treatment of their mental 
disorder, the implications applied to offender populations across the board.
The Home Office’s construction of the interests of patients in opposition to 
the public was also strongly contested by practitioners in the system. One 
lawyer stated during an interview, ‘I understand their position, which is 
protecting the public, but actually the concept of the public that they ought to 
be addressing includes the patient, who’s a member of the public’. She 
referred to the Home Office’s mandate ‘to build a safe, just and tolerant 
society for everyone in the UK’ as evidence of this (Home Office 2007). She 
argued that this meant ‘justice for all, not just justice for some’, and that the
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Home Office had a role to treat all people fairly, not to divide them into 
categories and treat them accordingly.
Essentially, her view reflected those of many practitioners I spoke to, who 
argued that patients should not be seen in terms of risk alone, but should 
also be acknowledged as requiring protection. Yet again, this standpoint 
failed to recognise how, at the level of government, the interests of victims 
had become influential in notions of ‘the public’, and by extension in the risks 
faced by the public. There simply was little scope for the Home Office to 
construct the public as inclusive of patients, when it continued to conceive of 
victims and offenders as mutually exclusive categories.
The Politics of Protection
Politics is interesting when there is a fight, or as we say, an issue. And 
in order to make politics popular, issues have to be found, even when 
in truth and justice, there are none - none in the sense that the 
differences of judgment, or principle, or fact, do not call for the 
enlistment of pugnacity (Lippmann 1922:106).
Within the already tricky terrain of public protection, there were certain areas 
that were considered the most difficult or sensitive and required the highest 
authority over them, in the form of a ministerial decision. These were 
generally described by Home Office participants as the cases that involved a 
high degree of risk, difficult victim issues, or ‘really nasty stuff. Such 
characterisation implied that there were some decisions that presented even 
greater levels of risk than usual. But to whom was this exposure directed? 
What set these determinations apart from the plethora of decisions that were 
constantly being made to protect the public from risk?
Some matters were sent for ministerial approval as standard practice. One 
official explained that a matter would go back to a minister if it had had 
previous ministerial involvement. Sometimes ministers had requested for 
applications in particular cases to come directly to the minister for 
determination. These included cases where either the patient or the victim 
was particularly high profile, or where the incident had been an issue of 
interest to constituents in the Minister’s electorate. Ministers were also sent
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cases where greater than usual activity by solicitors suggested to Mental 
Health Unit officials that judicial review was being considered.
Beyond the cases of particular victims or patients, another area that was 
considered to have a high profile was matters involving diplomatic relations. 
One brief being prepared for the Minister during my fieldwork concerned a 
woman who had killed her husband because she thought he was going to 
take her baby daughter back to his home country of Pakistan. Initially 
perceived as delusional, Mental Health Unit staff had come to believe that the 
woman’s fear might have been well-founded because her husband had been 
so troubled by her mental illness. Here was another example of how a 
decision-maker’s familiarity with a case gave him or her a sense of particular 
insight into the issues at stake. The case was notable because of the 
widespread support the patient had received from her local community. Her 
parents were supporting her, looking after their daughter’s child during her 
detention. The patient’s social worker had made contact with the family and 
with networks in the community including the family’s mosque. All were 
supportive of the patient and the Unit were now considering favourably her 
application for leave for a home visit. However, the case was perceived as 
being particularly sensitive because of the involvement of the Pakistani 
community. The decision was referred to the Minister so that he was 
forewarned of any public attention that might arise from the case.
As these examples indicate, the formal mandate to protect the public was 
frequently mirrored by the informal mandate to protect the system from 
reputational damage and, most particularly, to protect the Minister. Edelman 
once suggested that,
administrative agencies are to be understood as economic and 
political instruments of the parties they regulate and benefit, not of a 
reified 'society', 'general will', or 'public interest'. At the same time they 
perform this instrumental function, they perform an equally important 
expressive function for the polity as a whole: to create and sustain an 
impression that induces acquiescence of the public in the face of 
private tactics that might otherwise be expected to produce 
resentment, protest and resistance (Edelman 1964:56).
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The political sensitivities of the restricted patient system were inextricably 
linked to the vulnerabilities of individual ministers and the government itself. 
While officials in the civil service have always been responsible for protecting 
their ministers from embarrassment, the criminal justice system comes under 
particularly intense media scrutiny on a daily basis for decisions that might 
lead to a public outcry or calls for ministerial action. Earlier in this chapter I 
discussed the concerns voiced by some that these processes were leading to 
an increasingly politicised civil service. Yet, in the restricted patient system, 
this shift was unavoidable. The high profile of serious and violent offenders 
was consequential on the role of Mental Health Unit staff in protecting the 
Home Secretary. Unit staff were keenly aware of the damage to the 
reputation of the system, and implicitly to the Home Office, that could arise 
from negative media attention. Thus officials were sensitive to any case that 
might attract public attention even outside the realm of concern for safety, 
and would routinely refer these to Ministers for a final determination.
The official view from the Unit was that the potential for adverse media 
publicity could irritate staff and the system, but would not directly influence 
the decisions that were made. However, on further probing, it became clear 
that the consideration of how a decision might affect public confidence in the 
system necessarily had to take account of any possible media attention. Staff 
identified some matters that warranted ministerial determination because of 
their political sensitivity, not necessarily because of particular risks to the 
public. In some cases it was a risk from the public, for example in the public 
attention that certain patients attracted. Consequently, these were decisions 
that exposed the system, and ultimately the Minister, to reputational damage.
A good example here was a matter that arose in relation to Peter Sutcliffe, a 
restricted patient who had been convicted of the murder of 13 women from 
1975-1980. Dubbed the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’ in media and public accounts (see 
for example BBC 2001), he was one of the highest profile restricted patients 
at the time of my research and was subjected to persistent media attention 
throughout the history of his criminal trial and ultimate status as a restricted
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patient.29 During my fieldwork, media attention was focussed on a decision 
by the Home Secretary to grant leave for Sutcliffe to visit the site where his 
father’s ashes had recently been scattered. The decision was publicly 
attacked for being insensitive to his victims. The Home Office defended the 
decision on the grounds that this would give him ‘closure’ having been denied 
compassionate leave to attend his father’s funeral (Jay and agencies 2005; 
Johnston 2005). Media reports indicated that the decision had been made by 
one Home Secretary and reaffirmed by the next after a new Minister was 
appointed to the portfolio. Unit staff were not surprised that the matter had 
attracted such attention. They confirmed to me that the decision had been 
made and subsequently reaffirmed by two successive Home Secretaries, 
which was itself an indication that the Home Office had anticipated 
widespread public interest ahead of the decision. Nevertheless they had 
decided to approve the leave anyway because, in the words of the then 
Home Secretary David Blunkett, “it was the right and proper thing to do” (Jay 
and agencies 2005). The Unit regularly had to judge applications for patients 
to enter the community in the face of a risk of harm to the public or a risk of 
symbolic harm to the reputation of the system. But the added sensitivity of 
this case, where the index offence had been of great public interest and the 
patient and his victims remained extremely prominent, necessitated direct 
ministerial authority for the ultimate decision.
In another case referred to the minister, the patient had been convicted of the 
murder of one woman and had seriously injured another woman who had 
come to the aid of the first victim. The offender was a foreign national and a 
repatriation request had been successfully negotiated with the diplomatic 
mission of the patient’s country of origin. The patient was Muslim and was 
reported to have been holding a copy of the Quran during the attack. The 
offence had received considerable media attention at the time, added to
29 Although a sentenced prisoner, Sutcliffe was moved to Broadmoor Hospital in 1984 under 
a transfer direction (Mental Health Act 1983:section 47). As is usually the case with transfer 
directions, a restriction order was imposed vesting decisions on his discharge with the Home 
Secretary (section 49). Consequently Sutcliffe formally became a restricted patient. I have 
not focused on transferred prisoners specifically because their discharge from hospital 
usually results in a return to prison, unless they remain detained in hospital after the expiry of 
their prison sentence. Because of the particularly long period of Sutcliffe’s detention in 
hospital, decisions about his release into the community have continued to be made by the 
Mental Health Unit (to date only in relation to leave).
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which the BBC had been making a documentary in the police station where 
the accused was charged. Interestingly in this case, victim interests were not 
perceived to be a cause for caution in considering the patient’s discharge. 
The murder victim’s family lived in Eastern Europe and it was believed, 
although not known for sure, that there was no family in the UK. The victim’s 
family were known to have opposed the mental health disposal of the case 
and believed the offender should have received the death penalty, despite 
the fact of there being no such punishment in the UK. The police and Crown 
Prosecution Service had had contact with the family, but the Mental Health 
Unit had not. The ability of the victim’s family to attract public attention to their 
opposition was limited because of their geographic isolation from the media 
as a result of being outside the UK. Meanwhile the second victim (who had 
survived the attack) took a sympathetic approach to the offender, having 
stated in court and to local media that she believed the offender should 
receive appropriate treatment. The case was referred to the Minister because 
of the history of media interest at the time of the offence. The referral 
included a proposed media strategy outlining ‘lines to take’ should there be 
further media interest in the case. These included not commenting on the 
individual case but outlining the provision for repatriation under the Mental 
Health Act 1983; and only releasing ‘if pressed’ the details of the hospital at 
which the patient was currently detained, the country of proposed 
repatriation, and that the Home Office were satisfied with all the 
arrangements that were in place. Significantly here, victim involvement 
presented a low risk of scandal or public outcry at the decision to discharge 
the patient for repatriation.
These two examples indicated a range of cases where the Home Office 
anticipated public and media interest but approved an application anyway. 
The first case had resulted in considerable criticism of the Home Secretary; 
ultimately there was no media attention in the second case. Contrary to the 
criticisms of some practitioners, the Home Office did not oppose leave or 
discharge at the slightest hint of negative public attention. At the same time, 
both cases indicated that potential media attention had a direct effect upon 
the decisions made. In the Sutcliffe case, the patient had been denied the 
opportunity to attend his father’s funeral on the grounds that the public outcry
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would have been too great. A balance was constantly being sought by 
officials between how much public pressure the system could withstand in 
the face of decisions to approve applications from restricted patients. Where 
a decision was likely to attract media attention, plans would involve a strategy 
for dealing with media attention, should it arise. These precautions reassured 
the Minister that any unwanted attention had been anticipated and planned 
for; thereby safeguarding the reputation of the system.
Behind the scenes of individual case decisions, a broader part of the Unit’s 
‘risk management’ strategy utilised the established relationship between the 
Home Office and the media. As was common practice throughout the civil 
service, the Home Office had developed networks with the police and media, 
and had a Press Office dedicated to working with the media. While these 
strategies might not necessarily make the media biddable, demonstrated by 
the many scandals focused on the Home Office, such relationships were 
noteworthy as an indication of the extent to which the bureaucracy was able 
to engage with the media. While mental health organisations utilised media 
strategically where they could, there was an absence of such well-developed 
relationships between media and the mental health sector, as evidenced by 
the stigma still attached to people with mental disorder (Colombo 2007).
Tangential to the Unit’s responsiveness to media attention was a concern 
about sources of ‘inside’ information. One staff member told of non-qualified 
nursing staff who were believed to have been leaking patient details to the 
press in particular cases. The evidence for the allegation included a notable 
upsurge of such stories at Christmas time, suggesting that people were 
making money to spend at Christmas. In one case the leaks had been to a 
particular paper from a private medium secure unit, so it was believed by 
officials that a journalist had secured a contact at the hospital. Other research 
had also pointed to information leaked by hospital staff about restricted 
patients (Ardron 2007). In summing up the Home Office’s relationship with 
the media (and indeed the public more generally), an official told me that the 
Unit could not control the publication of such information or ‘leaks’, but it 
could work strategically with care teams to manage the situation and possible 
outcomes.
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Conclusion
By focusing on the construction and effect of public interest in the restricted 
patient system, this discussion has considered not just how discretion is 
exercised, but what constrains it (Gelsthorpe and Padfield 2003; Hawkins 
2003). Even as Home Office decision-makers talked about ‘the public’, a 
clear picture emerged of to whom they were referring. There was the broad, 
amorphous ‘anyone and everyone’. These were unidentified members of the 
general public whose very anonymity indicated successful leave or 
discharge. They would often only be identified in the event of a problem 
arising, for example a member of the community making a complaint to 
police about the behaviour of a patient when on leave from hospital. It was 
this construction which served to legitimate the status of Unit staff as lay 
workers in the system, because it allowed staff to claim to be representative 
of a general public in the interests of whose safety the Home Office acted. 
This broad construction of the public also encompassed the ‘voting public’, to 
whom the executive were democratically and ultimately accountable.
The second type was readily identified in the many examples from patient 
cases that arose during interviews and observations. This was the public as 
represented by victims and their families and by the families of patients. They 
were members of the public by virtue of the fact that they were not 
professionals or practitioners working in the system. Yet they had a direct 
interest in that system, usually motivated by the one particular case with 
which they were personally involved. These were interested parties who were 
routinely cited by Unit staff when I questioned them about how the public 
affected Unit decision-making.
Thirdly, the formal acknowledgement of the public protection agenda by the 
Home Office overlay another, equally important function of civil servants: to 
protect the political sensibilities of the system, and ultimately the Minister, 
from negative attention. This led to a consideration of media interests as an 
inseparable component of the public interest in particular cases. The 
likelihood of media attention did not necessarily mean that a leave application 
would be rejected. But the media, like victims, emerged as integral to the
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constructions of the public which informed the decision frame of Home Office 
decision-makers.
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CHAPTER 6 
PATIENT RIGHTS VS PUBLIC PROTECTION:
REFORMING THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 1983
Introduction
The reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 was a long and hotly contested 
process. It began years before my doctoral project and continued throughout 
my fieldwork, resulting in amendments to the Mental Health Act 1983 and a 
new Mental Health Act 2007. In fact, there were still aspects of the reform 
underway at the time of writing, including the finalisation of a Code of 
Practice to accompany the new legislation.30 The process of reform was 
lengthy, complicated and fascinating enough to warrant its own thesis. In this 
chapter I focus on one aspect of the reform process: the role of the Joint 
Scrutiny Committee that reviewed the draft Mental Health Bill 2004. The 
Scrutiny Committee was appointed by the House of Lords and House of 
Commons in July 2004 to examine the draft Mental Health Bill 2004 and to 
report to both Houses by March 2005. Because of their interest in proposed 
reforms to the mental health system, the Scrutiny Committee had attracted 
the attention of many of the people and organisations I was seeking to 
contact. As such, it provided an ideally contained site to meet potential 
participants in my fieldwork.
The Scrutiny Committee ended up serving a number of very important 
purposes in my research. Methodologically, the Scrutiny Committee became 
the key recruiting ground for participants. Empirically, the draft Bill was the 
clearest indication of the government’s agenda on dangerousness, and the 
Scrutiny Committee provided an avenue to hear the government argue and 
defend its case. Analytically, it demonstrated precisely how the dynamics and 
politics of the restricted patient system operated. Sociologically, the process
30 Amendments to the Mental Heath Act 1983 were introduced in 2007 and a new Act was 
introduced into parliament. At the time of writing the Mental Health Act 2007 was scheduled 
for implementation in Autumn 2008.
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surrounding it was remarkable for the way that issues relating to mentally 
disordered offenders were integral to many of the debates that took place.
It was therefore ironic that forensic patients received very little direct attention 
throughout the entire law reform process and there was almost none paid to 
restricted patients specifically.31 Protection of others was already an 
established principle in the care of forensic patients who were receiving 
compulsory treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983. However, there was 
considerable government anxiety about those believed to be dangerous but 
who did not meet the criteria for detention under the 1983 Act. In particular, 
as I shall show, the question of how to control people believed to have a 
dangerous and severe personality disorder was absolutely central to the 
government’s policy objective. It was these people who drew the 
government’s attention in its agenda for the reform of the Mental Health Act 
1983.
In this chapter I shall examine the proceedings of the Scrutiny Committee to 
consider firstly, how the government’s agenda to control dangerousness 
emerged through mental health law reform; and secondly, how non­
government actors responded to that agenda. It is not my intention to analyse 
the history, process or outcomes of the mental health law reform process. 
Rather, I shall examine the Scrutiny Committee as a specific aspect of that 
reform, in order to explore the interaction between the dynamics of the 
mental health and criminal justice systems and the executive’s mandate for 
public protection. Throughout the chapter I shall draw on data from 
documentary analysis and observation of the written and oral submissions to 
the Committee; the Committee’s Reports; and my interviews with people from 
government, practitioners and non-government organisations involved in the 
restricted patient system.
31 As I set out in Chapter One, 'forensic patient’ is a collective term that refers not only to 
mentally disordered offenders receiving treatment in hospital, but also to mental health 
patients for whom there is a high risk or evidence of dangerousness. These patients are 
often treated in secure hospitals. It is a broader term than 'mentally disordered offender’ and 
includes - but is not limited to - restricted patients. I use it in the present chapter because 
much of the discussion revolves around people considered to be dangerous but who do not 
necessarily have a record of criminal conviction.
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During my research, some of those I spoke with felt that the process of 
reform had been mishandled, as evidenced by the eventual withdrawal of the 
draft Mental Health Bill 2004. However, I contend that the government’s 
agenda and the responses it invoked were wholly illustrative of the 
complexity of the terrain, and were both a product of and a contributing factor 
to the ongoing tensions between government and non-government 
perspectives on the balance between public protection and the interests of 
patients. The reform of the law was a fascinating process because it 
simultaneously reflected those tensions and became subject to them; an 
inevitable consequence of the various - and some would say competing - 
priorities of government, practitioners and non-government organisations in 
the mental health system.
The Process of Reform
The reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 was a complex tale that was dotted 
with inquiries, committees, reports and submissions, many of which reached 
contradictory conclusions (see Appendix 3 for a timeline of the reform). The 
contrasting agendas that emerged throughout the process demonstrated the 
tension between the use of compulsory powers for medical treatment and the 
rights of individuals subjected to that treatment. It was a tension that sat at 
the heart of mental health law and attempts to reform it, but was starkest in 
relation to mentally disordered offenders. I do not seek to argue about the 
merits or otherwise of compulsory powers in the mental health system. My 
interest lies in how these issues interacted with the policies and politics of 
managing dangerousness. In that regard, the issue that was most relevant to 
my thesis was how forensic patients featured in the law reform process.
The Role of Forensic Patients in the Reform Process
The process of reform had its roots in a growing call for review of the 
legislation, including a 1997 forum on mental health law and enforcement 
funded by the Department of Health and convened by Dr Nigel Eastman and 
Dr Jill Peay.32 In 1998 an Expert Committee was established by the
32 The proceedings of the forum were published in Law without enforcement: integrating 
mental health and justice (Eastman and Peay 1999).
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Department of Health and chaired by Professor Genevra Richardson in order 
to ‘advise on how mental health legislation should be shaped to reflect 
contemporary patterns of care within a framework which balances the need 
to protect the rights of individual patients and the need to ensure public 
safety’ (Richardson 1999:1). Commonly referred to as the Richardson 
Report, the Expert Committee’s report was influential in setting an agenda for 
reform. In the end, many of its key recommendations were sidelined in the 
government’s own proposals for law reform. However, and of particular 
relevance to my purpose, the Richardson Report shaped the non­
government agenda for reform. This was partly a result of the wide 
consultation undertaken by the Expert Committee and was evident in the 
issues that were pursued and the arguments that were marshalled by the 
non-government lobby.
Given their brief to produce a scoping study, the Expert Committee had 
limited capacity to examine any aspects of the law in detail. Regarding the 
offender provisions, the Expert Committee’s recommendations included that 
the powers of the executive be extended to the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal; and that the Home Secretary should maintain his or her monitoring 
and take on a more important role in the provision of evidence to the 
Tribunal. The Expert Committee also made some general recommendations 
in relation to principle and the shape of future legislation. Beyond that, it 
urged a separate review of the forensic provisions so that more detailed 
recommendations might be made. In steering away from further review of the 
forensic provisions Richardson cited the complexity of the terrain, including a 
number of different pieces of legislation that were neither wholly coherent in 
themselves nor compatible with other laws that effected the system; and the 
fact that the Expert Committee had been convened by the Department of 
Health, whilst the offender provisions came under the auspices of the Home 
Office. A review of the offender provisions was never undertaken. 
Nevertheless, offender provisions were included in proposals for reform of 
the Mental Health Act 1983 in the ensuing years. In this way, the path was 
laid for reform of the legislative provisions covering mentally disordered 
offenders without specific consideration of how they should change.
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The Richardson Report was published by the Department of Health 
simultaneously with the Green Paper, which was the Department’s own and 
strikingly different agenda for law reform (these differences are discussed 
further below). Subsequently there was also a White Paper and then the first 
draft Mental Health Bill in 2002. Following consultation and a review by the 
Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, the 2002 Bill was revised 
and a second draft Mental Health Bill 2004 was released. It was the second 
draft Bill which went before the Scrutiny Committee and which forms the 
central focus of the present chapter. By that time, the reform process had 
already involved extensive discussion and debate between government and 
stakeholders, including patient groups, practitioners and non-government 
organisations. None of these processes related specifically to the care or 
management of restricted patients, yet all of them included offender 
provisions within the broader debates about the shape reformed mental 
health law was to take.
Importantly, a split had emerged between the Richardson Report and the 
government’s agenda for law reform. The following (abridged) excerpt from 
Professor Richardson’s evidence to the Scrutiny Committee provides some 
indication of the nature of that split:
We started with a very strong commitment to the principle of non­
discrimination on grounds of mental disorder. ... It followed from this 
emphasis on non-discrimination that we attached considerable 
importance to the principle of respect for patient autonomy. ... By 
contrast, the Government, and I am not quite sure whether I should be 
talking about the Department of Health or the Home Office here, has 
focused on the prevention of harm or the reduction of risk without ever 
really engaging with the issues of non-discrimination or patient 
autonomy. And, as a result, the guiding principles described in our 
report and those considered in the Bill are very different and, perhaps 
most significantly, the conditions for the use of compulsory powers in 
the two documents differ really quite significantly (Joint Scrutiny 
Committee 2005b at evidence 1).
Essentially, the split between patient autonomy on the one hand, and risk 
and public protection on the other set the terms for the central opposition in 
the debate on reform of the Mental Health Act 1983. One psychiatrist I
33 Further details of the recommendations of the Richardson Report are included in 
Appendix 3.
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interviewed suggested that it had been bad politics to appoint the Expert 
Committee under Richardson, whose views on mental health law were well 
known, if the government was not interested in following that model. 
Ultimately, these opposing agendas informed the positions that were adopted 
respectively by the non-government opponents of the proposed legislation 
(including mental health organisations and legal and clinical practitioners) 
and by the government. That tension continued throughout the various 
stages of reform and still had not been resolved by the time my research was 
completed.
The Role of the Joint Scrutiny Committee [draft Mental Health Bill 
(2004)] in my Research
The Joint Scrutiny Committee was under way at the time I commenced my 
fieldwork. This proved to be highly serendipitous as it provided a contained 
site in which to make contacts across the forensic mental health system. 
Initially, I approached the Scrutiny Committee merely as a recruiting ground 
for participants. Unexpectedly, the Scrutiny Committee also yielded important 
data in its own right. This was unexpected because at first glance the 
Scrutiny Committee had minimal relevance to the central concerns of my 
thesis. The vast majority of its deliberations were on the civil provisions 
contained in the draft Bill 2004, and even where mentally disordered 
offenders were considered, there was little attention paid specifically to 
restricted patients. However, as I read the submissions made by non­
government organisations about the draft Bill, it became clear that there was 
strong criticism levelled against the government for being preoccupied with 
controlling dangerousness over and above the interests of patient treatment 
and care. Here, then, was an indication of the conflict between mental health 
and criminal justice in the process of law reform.
Throughout my fieldwork I examined the government’s agenda for reform, 
particularly as it was seen by non-government actors. What emerged from 
these interviews was a strong sense that the government was influencing the 
shape of mental health law in the direction of harsher measures of detention, 
against the traditional mental health principle of a patient’s right to undergo
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care and treatment in the least restrictive conditions. As one psychiatrist I 
interviewed put it,
the government is trying wherever it can to retain and even gain more 
and more control over the risk agenda. ... So clearly that’s the political 
flavour of the decade. And you’d expect that to be played out, be it 
with mentally disordered people or not mentally disordered people.
That perception of the Home Office’s influence was evident in Professor 
Richardson’s testimony (above), when she qualified her reference to the 
government by saying that she was not sure whether to direct her comments 
to the Department of Health or the Home Office. The psychiatrist quoted 
above later went on to qualify his assessment in the following way.
I mean the Home Office is very fond of talking about working in 
partnership with the Department of Health. Well, I actually think that’s 
rubbish. I think that the Home Office is the main partner and I think 
there are a lot of tensions between those two departments. And why 
wouldn’t there be because one is avowedly interested in public 
protection and doesn’t give that much bother about mental health and 
the other is avowedly interested in mental health. And maybe that 
tension is unavoidable with the legislation that we have and the power 
that the Home Office therefore has over restricted patients.
As my data will illustrate, Home Office officials participating in my research 
were unanimous that they did not require significant legislative change to 
meet their mandate for public protection in the restricted patient system. The 
extent to which the policy dictates of the mental health system were being 
driven by a risk agenda spoke to my central interest in the interaction of 
criminal justice and mental health policy. Observing the submissions made 
by a wide range of people involved in the mental health system, and the 
responses of the Scrutiny Committee to them, enabled a closer study of 
these perceptions and how they shaped policy directions. It also provided a 
clear example of how and why the government sought to hold on to its 
executive discretion in relation to restricted patients. Accordingly, the extent 
to which the Scrutiny Committee engaged with the law and management of 
forensic patients became an important component of my research, both 
methodologically and empirically.
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The Key Players Before the Scrutiny Committee
The complexities of the issues and the variety of actors engaged in debate 
about the law made it impossible to represent the reform as a single, unified 
process on either the government or non-government sides. The government 
was actually represented by a number of different actors with a range of 
views throughout the process. The most obvious representatives of 
government were ministers and state departments, and here there were at 
least two in the form of the Department of Health and the Home Office. There 
were also a number of statutory authorities, like the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal, giving evidence on the draft Bill. These groups did not necessarily 
represent a formal government viewpoint, but equally they could not be 
termed ‘non-government’. Finally, not one but two parliamentary committees 
had considered the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983. In addition to the 
Scrutiny Committee discussed in this chapter, the parliamentary Committee 
on Human Rights had also examined the draft Mental Health Bill (2002) (the 
predecessor to the legislation that came before the Scrutiny Committee). Not 
surprisingly, and as I shall discuss further, the range of different 
representatives for the government sometimes produced contrasting views 
within the position ascribed to the government as a whole.
Similarly, caution should be exercised in perceiving the lobby of non­
government stakeholders as singular and uniform. The Mental Health 
Alliance was the dominant force within the non-government lobby. It was 
formed by non-government organisations specifically in relation to the reform 
of the Mental Health Act 1983. The Alliance included practitioner and patient 
representative organisations as well as mental health charities and advocacy 
groups. It comprised some organisations which were also represented 
individually in the proceedings, plus many more whose membership of the 
Alliance was their sole engagement with the reform process. The Alliance 
presented itself as the major non-government actor in the reform process and 
its agenda was based broadly on the recommendations of the Richardson 
Report. However, because it was a strategic alliance brought together around 
a specific piece of law reform, there were some compromises for pragmatic 
reasons made on particular issues by those within the Alliance. A number of
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these compromises related to forensic patients and, I argue, reflected the 
lack of political power that mentally disordered offenders had within the much 
larger civil mental health population.
There were also non-government organisations engaged in the reform 
process that did not join the Alliance. The key organisation for my purpose 
was The Zito Trust. As discussed in the previous chapter, The Zito Trust 
represented the interests of victims in the law reform process and did not 
support the agenda for reform advocated by the Richardson Report (and by 
extension the Alliance). As shall become evident, the politics of victim 
involvement were revealing about the position of victims within criminal 
justice policy more widely.
Without dwelling on the entire range of interests and agendas reflected in the 
reform process, it is important to note that the organisation of agendas 
around the Scrutiny Committee further complicated a law reform process that 
was already remarkable for the plethora of practitioner and policy ideologies 
that were in contention. Each ideology determined how those actors 
perceived the politics within the system. My particular interests were in how 
the government established an agenda to control dangerousness; and how 
the non-government lobby responded to that agenda, specifically with 
reference to the position of mentally disordered offenders. The rest of the 
chapter considers these issues in turn.
The Government’s Agenda for Reform
The tension between rights and risk was absolutely fundamental to the 
various agendas for reform advanced by government and non-government 
actors. The priority the government placed upon managing risk of harm 
through the control of dangerous people was an integral aspect of its agenda. 
As one Home Office official told me in an interview,
the reason we, the Home Office, want there to be powers to manage 
people in the community is to enable them to get treatment under 
compulsion before they get to the stage of relapsing. ... The Home 
Office’s major concern with the new legislation is to have a measure of 
compulsion that enables people to be required for example to take
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their medication before they get to the stage of going and burning 
down their neighbours or more likely killing themselves.
These comments referred specifically to the attempt to introduce compulsory 
treatment in the community, a complicated issue which I shall not discuss 
here. But it was a helpful elucidation of the priority the government placed 
upon control of dangerousness in the community. I was interested in how this 
priority took shape in the law reform process.
In the following section I shall explore two examples of how the government’s 
agenda for reform demonstrated its priority with controlling dangerousness 
through mental health law. The first example was the desire for flexibility in 
the application of the draft Bill, in order to maximise the possibility of using 
preventive detention to control dangerousness. The second example was the 
objective of maintaining executive discretion in the restricted patient system. 
For each case I shall set out how the issue was represented by the 
government and the responses of others involved in the reform process.
/. Flexibility within mental health legislation
The objective of flexibility within the new legislation was neither stated in 
government submissions nor in the legislation itself. Nonetheless, from the 
examination of government witnesses during the proceedings of the Joint 
Scrutiny Committee it quickly emerged as a government priority. The key way 
this priority manifested itself was in the debate about principles. In the draft 
Mental Health Bill 2004 the government signalled that it intended to set out 
the following principles to guide decision-making under the legislation:
a) patients are involved in the making of decisions,
b) decisions are made fairly and openly, and
c) the interference to patients in providing medical treatment to them 
and the restrictions imposed in respect of them during that treatment 
are kept to the minimum necessary to protect their health or safety or 
other persons (draft Mental Health Bill 2004: Clause 1).
However, the government did not include the detail of how these principles 
would appear, leaving that to be determined once the Bill itself had been 
finalised. The absence of legislatively codified principles had exercised the 
standing parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, which had reviewed the
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earlier draft Mental Health Bill 2002. At that time, the government had 
suggested a Code of Practice as a compromise, but the Committee on 
Human Rights was concerned at the capacity of a Code to ‘give sufficient 
protection to the human rights of patients in the decision-making processes 
envisaged’ (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2002:para 22).
The problem with the proposed Code of Practice was that it did not contain 
any measures to make it enforceable. In their submission to the Scrutiny 
Committee on the 2004 draft Bill, practitioner and non-government 
organisations repeatedly condemned the absence of clear principles and 
advocated for them to be codified in law. But the government clung to its 
position, as was evident in the following exchange when the Scrutiny 
Committee questioned Health Minister Rosie Winterton about why general 
principles were not included in the draft Bill.
Ms Winterton: We might want to look at whether it was necessary to 
alter the emphasis of some of the principles and it is easier to do that 
with the Code of Practice....
Tim Loughton (Committee member): Minister, we are talking about 
principles here; we are not talking about latest trends and fashion. A 
principle is a principle. It is not there to reflect something; a principle is 
there to underpin the rights of whoever, as you say....
Ms Winterton: In a sense, the issue here is about the Code of Practice 
being able to reflect the way that the Bill itself is applied in practice. ... 
We would want to see within the Code of Practice, if there were 
instances, where some principles about how people are treated have 
changed. You could look, for example, at the issue of people being 
treated in the community, where in a sense there is a slightly different 
principle now, about, so far as possible, looking at how people can be 
treated in a way that is nearest to their home, nearest to their family, et 
cetera. There are some principles there that may change (Joint 
Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Questions 818 and 819 respectively, oral 
evidence, 19 January).
Non-government representatives making submissions to the Scrutiny 
Committee argued that the government was avoiding enshrining principles in 
the law so that they would not be binding. When the Committee pressed the 
Health Minister further, she asserted a desire for flexibility within the Bill in 
order to ensure that it could maintain currency in the event of changing 
priorities, such as the appropriate exercise of the powers of compulsory
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treatment. While the Committee doubted that these principles would change 
over time, the Minister maintained the possibility that they could shift, thereby 
justifying the government’s preference for keeping guiding principles as an 
accompanying - rather than a component - aspect of the legislation. The 
debate about principles demonstrated a clear desire on the part of the 
government for flexibility in the application of the legislation.
However from my research at the Home Office, it appeared that the 
government had not always been strongly opposed to principles being 
enshrined in the legislation. One official told me that an earlier draft of the Bill 
had in fact included principles, but that these had been removed from the Bill 
because of concern about whether they could be applied universally. As he 
put it, the Home Secretary would be guided by principles but was 
nevertheless a law unto himself. As such, the Home Secretary might opt out 
of particular principles if it was felt that they conflicted with the executive’s 
mandate to protect the public. This example seemed to strike at the heart of 
the difference in perceptions of government and non-government 
practitioners about the executive’s mandate. While the executive’s authority 
derived from the Mental Health Act 1983, the official’s comments implied that 
not even the criteria for compulsory treatment under the Act would prevent 
the Home Secretary from continuing the detention of a patient if it was felt to 
be in the interests of public protection. As my data have shown repeatedly, 
that was how the executive’s mandate was understood by officials in the 
Home Office. By contrast, practitioners I interviewed continually returned to 
the criteria for compulsory detention as the primary principle from which all 
other considerations should flow, including public protection..
The desire for flexibility in the law was one example of how the government 
sought to use the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 to enhance its 
capacity to control dangerous behaviour. The government had been facing 
mounting pressure about people who posed a danger to others but were not 
subject to the mechanisms of control (including preventive detention and 
compulsory treatment) available under the Act A number of particularly high 
profile cases had propelled the issue of controlling dangerousness into the 
public consciousness. One such case was the murder conviction of Michael
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Stone in 2001. Stone was convicted for the 1996 murder of a woman and her 
daughter and the attempted murder of her second daughter (BBC 2001b). 
Popular press tended to characterise Stone as a ‘psycho’ and a ‘mental 
patient’, but in fact his condition had been highly complex and difficult for 
services to respond to. In the words of an Independent Inquiry into his care 
and treatment, Stone ‘presented with a combination of problems, a severe 
antisocial personality disorder, multiple drug and alcohol abuse, and 
occasionally, psychotic symptoms consistent with the adverse effects of drug 
misuse and/or aspects of his personality disorder’ (Francis et al 2000:4). 
Despite these complexities, Stone was frequently cited in media and other 
public statements as an example of someone with a dangerous and severe 
personality disorder (DSPD).
Public perceptions of DSPD were important for two reasons. Firstly, DSPD 
was not a diagnosable psychiatric illness, meaning that psychiatrists were not 
able to treat it and - by extension - that it did not meet the criteria for 
detention under the Mental Health Act 7983.34 The notion that psychiatrists 
were refusing to treat people with DSPD simply because they did not come 
within the formal system of classification for psychiatric disorders led to the 
so-called ‘treatability’ debate. Psychiatrists pointed out that, while there might 
be services and interventions that could control the risks posed by people 
who were dangerously and severely personality disordered, they were not 
necessarily psychiatric interventions that people could be compelled to 
accept under mental health law. However those who believed that 
psychiatrists were shirking their responsibilities because they did not want to 
work with dangerous people argued that the law should be changed so that 
psychiatrists had no choice but to detain them.
The treatability debate was a contentious issue that imbued the 
preoccupation with dangerousness throughout the law reform process and 
was a major source of tension between government, practitioner and non­
government stakeholders. Indeed Richardson cited the clinical uncertainty
34 Conditions treatable under psychiatry are set out in a number of key texts, most notably 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 
2000).
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around DSPD as one of the reasons for avoiding the provisions covering 
mentally disordered offenders in her review (1999:para 15.4). Yet the high 
profile of the Stone case was the catalyst for a lot of public interest in the 
issue of controlling dangerousness. It went to the heart of the political 
sensitivity of public protection and underpinned the government’s agenda for 
controlling dangerousness through mental health law. Significantly, the Stone 
case proved not to be an example of a person denied care and treatment 
within the existing terms of the law. In fact, the Stone Inquiry found that, ‘if he 
did commit these crimes, [there is] no evidence that they would have been 
prevented if failings in provision of treatment, care, supervision or other 
services to Mr Stone had not occurred’ (Francis et al 2000:4). Even more 
pointedly, the Inquiry stated, ‘this is emphatically not a case of a man with a 
dangerous personality disorder being generally ignored by agencies or left at 
large without supervision’ (Francis et al 2000:5). Nevertheless, even if Stone 
was the wrong case to flag difficulties about dangerousness and service 
provision under the criteria of treatability, his case was instrumental in 
building the pressure on the government to find mechanisms for controlling 
dangerous people.
This brief discussion of the Stone case does not do justice to the complicated 
arguments that underlined the treatability debate. My intention has been 
simply to set out some of the impetus for the high level of media attention 
and the sustained public interest that were attracted by the question of how 
to control dangerousness. The profile of Stone’s case and the surrounding 
issues of controlling dangerousness flowed directly into the government’s 
agenda for mental health law reform. In response to the psychiatric 
arguments that DSPD could not be treated under the Mental Health Act 
1983, those seeking tighter controls for dangerous people argued that the 
law should be changed. That standpoint was motivated by the assumption 
that detention of dangerous people was necessary for the protection of 
others and further that such preventive detention was permitted under mental 
health law. It was a position that failed to appreciate the purpose and 
application of mental health law, whose powers of detention served the 
specific purpose of containment to facilitate treatment of a mental disorder.
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Mental health law was not intended to provide a containment mechanism in 
its own right.
The conditions for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 were very 
clear.
(2) An application for admission for treatment may be made in respect 
of a patient on the grounds that -
(a) he is suffering from mental illness, severe mental impairment, 
psychopathic disorder or mental impairment and his mental disorder is 
of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to receive 
medical treatment in a hospital; and
(b) in the case of psychopathic disorder or mental impairment, such 
treatment is likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his 
condition; and
(c) it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the 
protection of other persons that he should receive such treatment and 
it cannot be provided unless he is detained under this section (Mental 
Health Act 1983:section 2).
However the purpose of mental health law (to provide clear conditions within 
which people with mental disorder could be treated compulsorily) and the 
ability of psychiatrists to treat particular conditions classified as a mental 
disorder were poorly understood by the general public. In the public sphere 
the debate was represented as psychiatrists and hospitals refusing to ‘treat’ 
dangerous people simply because they did not meet the criteria for 
compulsory treatment under the 1983 Act.
It was in this context that the government attempted to establish a 
mechanism for controlling dangerousness in mental health law. In outlining 
its agenda, the government noted: ‘[t]he challenge to public safety presented 
by the minority of people with severe personality disorder, who because of 
their disorder pose a risk of serious offending’ (Home Office and Department 
of Health 1999:4). As Minister Winterton explained in oral evidence to the 
Scrutiny Committee: ‘very often people with personality disorder can be 
helped to manage, for example, aggression, or can be assisted in terms of 
depression that might be going alongside it’ (Joint Scrutiny Committee 
2005b:Question 834, oral evidence, 19 January). That point had been
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conceded by the Committee on Human Rights in relation to the earlier draft 
Bill (2002). With respect to the government’s obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the Committee had noted that, ‘the availability 
of effective therapeutic treatment is not necessary’ for detaining a person 
with mental disorder in order to protect the person or the public from an 
objectively identified risk (Joint Committee on Human Rights 2002: para 35). 
In other words, detaining people with DSPD in order to guard against risk of 
dangerousness did not contravene European human rights law. However the 
government still had a problem: at home, detaining people with DSPD in 
order to guard against risk did contravene the 1983 Act because compulsory 
treatment was permitted only if it was ‘likely to alleviate or prevent a 
deterioration’ of the patient’s condition (Mental Health Act 1983:part 2, 
section 2b). Consequently, the government sought to change the principle of 
treatability from referring to who and what was treatable, to a concept of 
availability of treatment. In this shift the meaning of ‘treatment’ was itself 
transformed from one of therapeutic intervention and benefit to one of care or 
control.35
In my interviews with Home Office staff, I asked about the attempt to change 
the existing framework of treatability. The government’s agenda to control 
dangerousness was neatly summed up by one official who commented that 
there had been dangerous patients suffering from psychopathic disorder who 
couldn’t be detained under the 1983 Act, which created big problems for how 
the government should respond to those cases. As another Home Office 
official observed, the definition of treatment in case law had now become so 
wide that the minimum requirement was that a patient was not getting worse. 
This meant that detention itself amounted to treatment. Consequently, the 
political imperative for controlling dangerousness could be met if such a 
person was diagnosed with a mental disorder. These had been the issues 
that provided the impetus for the government’s agenda to control 
dangerousness through reform of the Mental Health Act 1983.
35 The government supported its argument for changing the principle of treatability with 
evidence emerging simultaneously from a number of pilot programs assessing whether the 
risk posed by people with dangerous and severe personality disorder could be reduced when 
they were detained and cared for within therapeutic settings.
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One psychiatrist I interviewed was scathing in his assessment of the 
implications of the change to the treatability criteria. He commented,
I would have thought that the Home Office was laughing all the way to 
the bank. Because every time a civil rights lawyer goes to the Court of 
Appeal or the House of Lords to argue the interpretation of the Act in 
favour of a liberal result, the court goes in the opposite direction. To 
such an extent that I sometimes wonder why it is that the Home Office 
is so determined to have a new Mental Health Bill when the courts 
have done most of the work for them. They’ve recently decided, 
haven’t they, that the Act, when it says treatment in hospital, actually 
means treatment at hospital. Well that’s an extraordinary notion. I 
thought that the Mental Health Act was all about taking people’s liberty 
away and locking them up in hospital or not. Now I gather that it’s not, 
it’s about treatment at hospital. Urn, it seems to me it’s probably only a 
small step before it becomes treatment ‘by’ hospital (emphasis in 
quotation).
Evident in this criticism was the strong belief amongst practitioners that the 
central principles of mental health law were being abandoned in the 
government’s quest to control dangerousness. Some clinicians advanced 
vehement opposition to expanding the treatability criteria in the law reform 
process. Professor Nigel Eastman, a forensic psychiatrist and professor of 
law and ethics, argued before the Scrutiny Committee that ‘you should never 
use civil powers for preventive detention where there is no therapeutic 
benefit’ (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Question 493, oral evidence, 8 
December). He defended therapeutic benefit as the definitive principle of 
treatability because it clarified the role of mental health intervention and 
established important boundaries around who could be subjected to 
compulsory treatment (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005:para 139). The 
Scrutiny Committee agreed, recommending that the legislation include a ‘test 
of therapeutic benefit’ in relation to the criteria of treatability (2005:para 141). 
However the government rejected that recommendation, noting: ‘[i]t is not, 
and has never been, the Government’s intention that the Bill should be used 
to detain people solely for the purpose of taking them out of circulation 
without offering them appropriate treatment’ (Department of Health 2005:14). 
Thus the government were caught between the challenge of controlling 
people who posed a risk of dangerousness to themselves or others and the 
purpose of mental health law which was to set out clear conditions within 
which people could be detained for clinical intervention in their mental health.
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One psychiatrist I interviewed expressed a particularly interesting 
assessment of the context in which DSPD had become such a priority for the 
government. In his view, bringing DSPD within the framework of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 was an attempt by the government to punish psychiatrists 
for not taking seriously the dangerousness and violence of a minimal number 
of mentally disordered patients. He believed that changing the treatability 
criteria in order to include DSPD was a response to the perception that 
psychiatrists had not accepted and responded adequately to community 
concerns about dangerousness. His assessment also provided an interesting 
perspective on the question considered throughout this thesis as to whether 
or not the executive held an exclusive mandate for public protection. In his 
view, psychiatry always had to give regard to the protection of others, but the 
decision about what level of risk was acceptable was best made by the 
courts. Yet the political imperative had seen the government push for 
psychiatrists to have greater involvement in decisions about the 
reasonableness of levels of risk to which the public was exposed.
The present discussion began with the point that the government was 
seeking a more flexible piece of legislation in order to assist with its objective 
of controlling dangerousness. In its review of the draft Mental Health Bill 
2004, the Scrutiny Committee disagreed with the government’s objective of 
flexible principles. The Committee found that ‘it is essential that fundamental 
principles be set out on the face of the Bill. It is not appropriate to leave 
fundamental guiding principles to the codes of practice’ (Joint Scrutiny 
Committee 2005:para 64). The Committee went on to list the principles it 
believed ought to be codified (ibid 2005:paras 65-71), and the weight that 
ought to be placed on them (ibid 2005:para 72). The government eventually 
accepted that principles should be codified in the legislation. However it did 
not agree with the detail of the principles recommended by the Committee, 
arguing that they should resist ‘over-codification’ (Department of Health 
2005:9). Ultimately, principles appeared in a Code of Practice in the Mental 
Health Act 2007.
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My discussion of the treatability debate has been a summation of a very long 
and complicated saga. I have attempted to explore the interaction between a 
political imperative to control dangerousness; a belief within government that 
mental health law could provide a mechanism for that control; and very 
strong resistance, particularly from psychiatric practitioners, to such reform. It 
was the interaction of all of these factors that informed the government’s 
desire for ‘flexibility’ in the principles that set out the application of the 
proposed new law. In other words, the attempt to maintain flexible principles 
guiding the application of mental health law was motivated by the over-riding 
objective of detaining people who presented a risk of serious harm to others, 
including those with dangerous and severe personality disorder, under the 
powers of a Mental Health Act.
//. Maintaining current decision-making over restricted patients
The exercise of discretion by the executive in decisions about restricted 
patients was one of the few areas of the law reform process that focussed 
specifically on the forensic provisions of the 1983 Act I have discussed the 
various criticisms of executive discretion previously (see Chapter One). As 
those discussions demonstrated, momentum to remove executive discretion 
from the system had been building since the enactment of the 1983 Act 
There was widespread concern that over-cautious executive decision-making 
was preventing the flow of patients who, it was thought by clinicians, were 
ready to progress to less secure settings, particularly those in high security 
hospitals. According to practitioners I spoke with, this meant that some 
patients remained detained for too long in high security settings, which also 
blocked others from being admitted to those locations which would best 
support their care and treatment.36 At the same time jurisprudence from 
European human rights law was increasingly finding fault with the operation 
of the executive’s powers in relation to its obligations under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Given this mounting opposition to executive 
discretion, and the fact that the executive maintained its exclusive decision­
making powers in the draft Bill 2004,1 anticipated the role of the executive in
36 At the time of writing, there had been a rapid increase in medium-secure hospital beds. 
Home Office officials explained that this increase reflected the need for greater capacity to 
accommodate patients requiring long-term medium-secure environments.
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the restricted patient system to be a significant point of discussion for the 
Scrutiny Committee. To my surprise, there was minimal discussion of the fact 
of executive discretion per se. Instead, debate addressed the extent of that 
discretion, and the possibility of sharing it with the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal.
Submissions to the Scrutiny Committee had focussed on the nature and 
scope of executive authority and its appropriateness within the new 
legislative framework that was being proposed as well as within broader 
contexts such as safeguarding patient’s human rights. Forensic psychiatrist 
Professor Eastman commented that there was ‘absolutely no logic to the 
Home Office retaining its power over the transfer of patients between 
different hospitals and different hospital units, when the core of the care plan 
which the tribunal operates is the location of the care plan’ (Joint Scrutiny 
Committee 2005b: Question 457, oral evidence, 8 December). In other 
words, he found it illogical that the Tribunal should be responsible for 
reviewing the lawful detention of patients, but be unable to take action to 
ensure the appropriateness of that treatment such as by ordering their 
transfer to an alternative hospital. Similarly, the Mental Health Alliance also 
argued for ‘the power to order transfers and leave of absence extended to 
the Mental Health Tribunal’ (Spencer-Lane and Bell 2005). Notably, these 
submissions did not pursue an end to executive discretion. Instead they 
sought to extend to the Tribunal powers that were concentrated in the Home 
Office’s unique authority over the progress of restricted patients through the 
system.
The interests of people who were both mental health service users and 
involved with the criminal justice system were represented largely by two 
charities: the UK-wide Revolving Doors Agency, which was dedicated to 
improving the lives of people caught up in a cycle of crisis, crime and mental 
illness; and Nacro, a charity working in England and Wales whose objective 
was preventing crime by addressing social exclusion and respecting human 
rights. Both organisations were asked by the Scrutiny Committee if they had 
a view on the role of executive discretion over restricted patients (Joint 
Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Question 457, oral evidence, 8 December).
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Surprisingly, neither of these organisations had an opinion to express. Nacro 
replied that they did 'not feel strongly that the executive power should be 
taken away from the Home Office’ but did advocate the sharing of decision­
making power with the Tribunal (ibid at Question 523). Revolving Doors 
Agency stated that they had no position on the issue as they did not deal with 
restricted patients (despite the fact that they worked with mentally-disordered 
offenders) (ibid). Both groups were fairly non-committal about the fact of the 
executive’s discretionary powers, concentrating instead on the possibility of 
sharing those powers with the Tribunal, rather than removing them from the 
executive.
Even though the cessation of executive discretion was a formal policy of the 
Alliance, the lack of will to pursue it was an interesting reflection of the 
political marginality of forensic patients. Many Alliance members chose not to 
pursue the end of executive discretion in the strategic interests of other 
objectives that they felt were more important or were more likely to succeed. 
In an interview with me, one representative of the Alliance explained that 
their policy was for the Tribunal to become the sole decision-making body in 
relation to restricted patients, but that the Home Secretary should be required 
to make representations to the Tribunal. He accepted that the government 
was not going to relinquish its role in public protection, as implied by its 
ongoing discretion. He stated:
I can completely understand, from a Government point of view, that 
they’re not going to want to let go of restricted patients. ... And I think 
we do understand that when it comes to the Bill we’re going to have to 
compromise significantly because we’re just not going to get what we 
see as being a perfect Bill.
Therefore, it was tactically more realistic to argue for expanded Tribunal 
decision-making than an end to the power vested in the Home Secretary. In 
another interview, a psychiatrist also involved in the scrutiny proceedings 
affirmed that ‘in the sort of democracies we live in it’s probably difficult to 
envisage a system which didn’t involve political involvement’. Consequently, 
he said, it was important to focus on working effectively within that framework 
rather than challenging its very existence. He commented:
Chapter 6: Reforming the Mental Health Act 1983 [216]
I’ve never worked in a system where there wasn’t executive discretion 
... I suppose that what I would be in favour of would be ... 
strengthened powers to tribunals, so that the Home Office if you like 
was a party to these issues, but was not definitive.
Essentially it was this pragmatic view that marked the Alliance’s approach to 
mentally disordered offenders, and particularly restricted patients, throughout 
the Scrutiny Committee’s hearings. As I have already discussed in previous 
chapters, this pragmatism was a product of the intersection between 
professional practice and political decision-making that resulted in such 
competing objectives throughout the restricted patient system.
It was also a consequence of the intractability of the dilemmas facing the 
various actors involved in the care, treatment and supervision of restricted 
patients. My earlier discussion of the public interest in controlling people with 
dangerous and severe personality disorder illustrated the challenge for the 
government between the appropriate application of mental health law and the 
public protection agenda. As the data discussed in previous chapters have 
suggested, non-government actors within the system were well aware of - 
and sympathetic to - the political realities of the executive’s position.
Those political realities carried over into how non-government actors pursued 
their agenda for law reform. Lobbying from the non-government sector did 
not seek an end to executive discretion. Rather, it was limited to extending to 
the Tribunal the decision-making authority about leave, transfer between 
hospitals and reductions in the level of security under which restricted 
patients were detained. Once again the Scrutiny Committee supported the 
non-government agenda here, recommending that ‘the Mental Health 
Tribunal be given the power to order the transfer and leave of absence of 
restricted patients’ (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005:para T il)? 1 But as the 
following statement shows, the government rejected this recommendation on 
the grounds that it offered inadequate protection to the public.
The Tribunal must always base its decision on evidence about the 
state of the applicant’s mental health. It cannot take decisions purely 
on the basis of the risk of harm. This is not a system that would attract
37 Notably, the Scrutiny Committee did not recommend an end to executive discretion.
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the confidence of courts or of the public (Department of Health 
2005:27).38
Only one Scrutiny Committee recommendation attempted to restrict 
executive discretion and it was raised in relation to the management of 
transferred prisoners. These were sentenced or remanded prisoners who 
needed to undergo compulsory treatment in hospital. I do not deal with this 
patient group much in my thesis. Suffice to say that people remanded in 
custody were a high proportion of the forensic patients monitored by the 
Home Office Mental Health Unit and constituted the second-biggest 
population under their supervision after restricted patients. In the existing 
legislation, the Home Office had the discretionary power to transfer these 
patients into hospital (Mental Health Act 1983:sections 47-48). But the 
Committee on Human Rights had noted that treating such a prisoner in a 
prison psychiatric wing rather than an ‘appropriate therapeutic environment’ 
could breach the European Convention on Human Rights (2005:para 67). As 
a result the Scrutiny Committee recommended that:
where those exercising the functions of clinical supervisor form the 
view that a prisoner or person on remand meets the conditions ... and 
recommend that he is transferred to hospital, the Bill proper contain a 
duty requiring the Home Secretary to order his transfer to hospital 
(2005:para 264).
The government opposed the recommendation on the grounds that the 
Home Secretary’s duty to protect the public justified and required unfettered 
discretion and that the Committee’s proposals would be unlikely to improve 
the provision of psychiatric care to transferred prisoners anyway (Department 
of Health 2005:25).
In the absence of direct attempts to end executive discretion, there was some 
scrutiny of how that discretion was exercised. Dissatisfaction about Home 
Office decision-making over restricted patients was expressed by legal 
advocates (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005:para 275); hospitals (Joint 
Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Memorandum from West London Mental Health 
NHS Trust (DMH 243) at 3.5); and during my interviews. Before the Scrutiny 
Committee, Home Office Minister Paul Goggins was asked whether there
38 I return to this statement below, in discussing this agenda of public protection.
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were ‘examples of the Home Office rejecting risk assessments made by 
professionals and substituting its own estimates of risk in relation to 
discharge?’ (2005b:Question 857, oral evidence, 19 January). He replied:
Clearly the judgment about discharge is made by the Mental Health 
Tribunal and the Home Secretary can make representations at that 
point, but in the end it is for the Tribunal to decide. What we then do of 
course ... in partnership with those in the mental health field is to 
supervise and to monitor those particular individuals and where there 
is deterioration, where they then become once again a risk to the 
community, then it is of course quite appropriate that they can be 
recalled (ibid).
The Minister’s response here was almost a non-sequitur, focusing on the 
Tribunal when the Committee had asked about the processes of executive 
decision-making. Of course, giving oral evidence can be a difficult process. 
But the answer conveyed a lack of clarity between the role of the Tribunal, 
which had power only to discharge restricted patients, and the role of the 
Home Secretary, whose authority included the power to discharge but also 
extended to all other aspects of the process. The Minister’s response was 
also interesting for acknowledging the work of the Tribunal in assessing risk. 
There were two ways his comments could have been interpreted. One was 
that the executive recognised that the Tribunal considered risk as a central 
aspect of its own decision to discharge restricted patients. However this 
recognition would have contrasted with the statements made by government 
representatives repeatedly during my research and elsewhere, that the 
Tribunal did not consider public protection in its decision-making. Elsewhere 
the government had noted:
The tribunal is not constituted to perform risk assessments, but to 
protect the patient’s rights. It is only on the basis of independent risk 
management for restricted patients that they can be diverted from 
prison sentences. The current system works exceptionally well with 
low rates of recidivism, and effective protection for the rights of 
restricted patients. The Secretary of State does not intend to give up a 
system which works well (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005:Annex 4 - 
Schedule of detailed comments on the draft Mental Health Bill with 
responses from the Government, 127(a)).
An alternative interpretation would be that the Minister’s reply was an 
acknowledgment that the executive monitored the Tribunal’s decisions in 
case the Tribunal got it wrong in terms of public protection, in response to
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which the Home Secretary could exercise the power to recall a patient. This 
second interpretation would have supported the evidence I discussed in 
Chapter Four, that the Tribunal was routinely monitored as part of the 
executive’s function across the system.
Once again, the government was caught at the intersection of treatment and 
control, conscious of its own priority in protecting the public from harm. The 
matter could not be reduced to one of merely selecting treatment over control 
or vice versa. Yet the legal framework traditionally approached treatment 
from the perspective of patient rights and clinical responsibilities; while the 
government’s approach prioritised control. Faced with the inevitable impasse 
of these competing priorities, the government could only seek to continue its 
discretion and resist that discretion being granted to any other body whose 
objectives might conflict with the government’s own.
As noted in Chapter Three, the case of MM was resolved after the 
completion of my fieldwork. Here, a restricted patient challenged the legality 
of two recall orders issued by the Home Secretary, in March and September 
2006 respectively (MM v SSHD 2007). The Home Office Mental Health Unit 
stated that it had sought confirmation from the treating psychiatrist of the 
Home Secretary’s intention to recall MM. The psychiatrist’s position was that 
the decision had already been taken by the Home Secretary when the Unit 
consulted him. The legal point turned on whether the doctor ‘expressed 
positive agreement that recall was appropriate or merely refrained from 
expressing disagreement’ (MM v SSHD 2007:para 28). The substantive 
question was whether the standard for up to date medical evidence was met 
by the communication that took place between the Home Office and the 
treating psychiatrist prior to the patient’s recall.
Ultimately, the Court found that the standard had been met; and that the 
appellant’s submission on what constituted up to date medical evidence was 
too stringent. The Court drew the following conclusion.
For the Home Secretary to recall a patient who has been conditionally 
discharged by a [Tribunal], he has to believe on reasonable grounds 
that something has happened, or information has emerged, of
Chapter 6: Reforming the Mental Health Act 1983 [220]
sufficient significance to justify recalling the patient. As I have said, it is 
not in dispute that he must have up-to-date medical evidence about 
the patient's mental health. Since in the nature of things the patient will 
have a [Responsible Medical Officer], it is hard to imagine that (save in 
the most exceptional circumstances) the Home Secretary would recall 
the patient without first seeking the RMO's clinical opinion whether it is 
appropriate for the patient to be detained for treatment. But I do not 
think that it would be appropriate for this court to lay down some form 
of test of general application extrapolated from the particular 
circumstances of this case (MM v SSHD 2007:para 50).
MM’s case was an important indication of how little the framework of law from 
the European Convention on Human Rights protected restricted patients 
(including the Winterwerp criteria on detention discussed in Chapter Three). 
Domestically, the Court’s conclusion prioritised the executive’s role in 
protecting the public by down-playing the stringency with which the criteria for 
detention needed to be met. In doing so, it endorsed the executive’s own 
interpretation of the primacy of the public protection agenda, within which 
factors like the criteria for detention and the evidentiary basis for those 
criteria were being considered. The Court also supported the Home 
Secretary’s unique authority in this regard, by resisting the opportunity to set 
down any further criteria or qualification to the exercise of that discretion.
Not One of Us! The Place of Forensic Patients within the Non- 
Government Lobby 
The Tenor of the Risk Debate
The discussion so far has examined how the government’s preoccupation 
with risk shaped its agenda for mental health law reform. As I have shown, 
the origins of this preoccupation lay in the desire to control dangerousness 
through existing criminal and mental health law, prompted by at least one 
extremely high profile case of an offence committed by a person with a 
history of dangerous behaviour. However, the preoccupation with 
dangerousness was also predictable within the so-called modern risk culture, 
in which ‘the concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both law actors 
and technical specialists organise the social world’ (Giddens 1991:3, as 
outlined in Chapter One). Simon and Feeley argue that, while 'public officials 
have long sought to control the dangerous classes', the modern risk society 
has manifested itself in crime policy in particular ways, including the
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perception that it is the responsibility of governments to protect people from 
risk, even as governments have realised how incapable they are of achieving 
this (1995:149). The sociological literature about risk was helpful for 
understanding the tensions in the management of mentally disordered 
offenders, where psychiatrists and policy-makers repeatedly clashed over the 
meaning and utility of risk technologies. Analyses of risk and its influence 
over public policy were even more relevant for understanding the agenda for 
controlling dangerousness and the way it came to imbue not just criminal 
justice but also mental health policy.
The extent to which risk should operate as a definitive paradigm within the 
restricted patient system was a source of constant tension between various 
actors. The belief that risk was central was evident in the government’s 
attempts to maintain its discretionary authority over restricted patients and to 
assert the detention powers of mental health law in the control of 
dangerousness. Yet practitioners rejected the notion that a risk-based 
approach offered a clear, definitive solution to the problem of dangerousness. 
As O’Malley has argued,
clinical risk thus appears not as a stable type of risk, but as an 
unstable assemblage in which diagnostic uncertainty and predictive 
risk may be aligned in significantly different ways. These alignments 
may change according to such considerations as the resistance of 
practitioners, discoveries of the 'unreliable' nature of planned 
techniques, and so on (2004:25).
Certainly in the restricted patient system, the uncertainty of the technologies 
of risk and the difficulty of relying solely upon them for predictions about 
individual forensic patients put clinical practice at odds with the political 
imperative of controlling risk as closely as possible. Moreover, as Douglas 
and Giddens (amongst others) have shown, risk is a culturally constructed 
entity as much as it is a reliable matter of numbers and probability (Giddens 
1991; Douglas 1992, as discussed in Chapter One). These differences of 
construction further increased the likelihood that there would be some divide 
between clinical understanding of risk technologies and.their utility from the 
perspective of executive decision-making.
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There was an even bigger split between government and non-government 
actors over the relevance of the risk-based approach to the entire population 
covered by mental health law. Even accepting that a risk-based approach 
might be necessary for those patients who posed a risk of serious harm to 
themselves or others, non-government actors criticised the government for 
allowing those ‘high end’ patients to have a disproportionate impact upon 
mental health policy. In the final discussion of this chapter, I will explore this 
tension from the perspective of symbolic politics, examining how risk shaped 
the positions of various actors, and to what extent mentally disordered 
offenders generally, and restricted patients specifically, occupied a central 
position within that debate.
Criticisms of the government’s approach were expressed most succinctly by 
a lawyer I interviewed who represented restricted patients before Tribunals 
and the Home Office. He said:
the whole approach of the government is risk driven. [The Richardson 
Report] was basically starting with a therapeutic approach, and dealt 
with risk through a benefit/therapeutic approach. An alliance between 
patients and those ... care teams, the hospital and the community. 
The government has taken a populist, risk-driven approach upfront 
and put therapy at the back. And that’s why Richardson was thrown 
out the window, and why definitions of mental disorder were left much 
wider. And why the initial reaction has been on constraint rather than 
treatment in relation to the Act. I think there’s some aspects of the Act, 
including some Tribunal stuff, which is better. Or possibly more liberal. 
But I think the philosophy behind the Act is regrettably regressive ....
From my discussion of the law reform process so far, the government’s 
agenda was informed by its preoccupation with managing a small but high- 
risk group of people who posed a serious danger to themselves or others. 
But the dominance of the risk agenda reflected a circular argument. The 
Home Office’s experience of mental health law came from its statutory 
responsibility in the restricted patient system. That experience with restricted 
patients may well have contributed to the government’s perception that 
mental health law was a mechanism for controlling dangerousness as an end 
in itself. At the same time, forensic patients generally were absent from many 
of the stated aims of government policy and from the lobbying undertaken by
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non-government and practitioner stakeholders. It is the position of forensic 
patients within the non-government lobby for law reform that I consider next.
The Position of Forensic Patients in the Non-Government Lobby
We welcome the improved safeguards for patients but remain 
concerned that there is an over-emphasis on compulsion and ‘high 
risk’ patients, which perpetuates the myth that mentally disordered 
people are dangerous when, in reality, only a tiny minority could be so 
categorised (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Memorandum from 
Nacro (DMH 156) at 9).
This statement was contained in Nacro’s written submission to the Scrutiny 
Committee, and was echoed by the Revolving Doors Agency during its oral 
evidence (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Question 520, oral evidence, 8 
December). Indeed the notion of high risk or high-end patients was frequently 
used by non-government stakeholders to refer to the patients who dominated 
the government’s agenda. Yet those advocating against the government 
agenda did very little to engage directly with issues relating to the 
management of mentally disordered offenders, or with the validity of defining 
those patients solely in terms of dangerousness. On the contrary, the general 
strategy of non-government organisations was to distance mentally 
disordered offenders from the majority of the mental health patient 
population.
Certainly, some participants in the reform process objected to what they 
implied was a punitive sentiment in the draft Bill 2004 in its attempt to strike a 
new balance between treatment and public protection. Professors Eastman 
and Maden, both forensic psychiatrists, opposed the inclusion of public 
protection issues in mental health legislation (Joint Scrutiny Committee 
2005b:Question 461, oral evidence, 8 December). Professor Maden stated: 
‘mental health legislation ... is meant to set out circumstances in which 
compulsory treatment may be appropriate, it is not meant to be a complete 
strategy for dealing with dangerous people’ (ibid). Meanwhile Professor 
Eastman was concerned that ‘the core of this Bill, particularly in the civil bits 
... is that it encourages an extraordinary blurring of the social roles of the 
justice system and doctors, and other mental health professionals’ (ibid at 
Question 463). These statements reflected the anxiety of many psychiatrists
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that clinicians would be turned into custodians through the proposed 
legislative reform. In response, the Scrutiny Committee told of a policeman 
who had expressed the view that the provisions of the draft Bill would give 
him a welcome opportunity to take dangerous people off the streets, whether 
they had committed criminal offences or not (ibid at Question 458). The 
policeman’s view had illustrated precisely the disjuncture between the 
various professional and policy voices speaking in the law reform debate and 
was an example of the gap in approach between the various agencies 
involved (as discussed in Chapter Four).
Clinical practitioners before the Scrutiny Committee argued that psychiatry 
had always attended to questions of risk and protection of the public. This 
view was enshrined in clinical imperatives, as evidenced by the literature 
discussed in Chapter One and the opinions of practitioners interviewed for 
my research. Obviously their position might differ from policy officials and 
politicians who, informed by political imperatives, had both a different role 
and consequently a different interpretive framework from which they 
approached questions of law and its reform. Yet even within these 
structurally embedded forms of knowledge, there was a tension between how 
much weight should be placed upon questions of risk and to whom the 
categorisation of high risk patients should be applied. Criticisms of the criteria 
for compulsion provided a good example of this impasse, as in Professor 
Eastman’s arguments before the Scrutiny Committee.
The risk criteria are set at incredibly low levels. For many it is 
protection of others, but from what and at what level and how likely 
and so on? But even for the so-called dangerous group, where there is 
supposed to be a substantial risk of serious harm, I am not convinced 
it is that high a threshold ... from my own experience of the courts and 
decisions on what ‘substantial’ means, it simply means ‘having 
substance and more than trivial’. Therefore, ‘a substantial risk of 
serious harm’ means a bit of risk of serious harm. I think there is a real 
issue about catching all sorts of people ... within this bill by virtue of 
this extraordinarily low threshold, and the lack of exclusions, the lack 
of therapeutic benefit test and so on ...(2005b:Question 490, oral 
evidence, 8 December).
The Mental Health Alliance agreed.
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The major change in the Bill, which we believe to be its fundamental 
flaw, is the new broad definition of mental disorder coupled with wider 
and less flexible conditions for compulsory treatment. We believe that 
this is likely to lead to a significant increase in the numbers liable to
compulsion across the board It is under criminal justice, where the
conditions for compulsion are even wider than for civil patients, that 
this increase is likely to be most evident -  particularly in under 
resourced forensic mental health services (Spencer-Lane and Bell 
2005).
Both these positions indicated the extent to which practitioners and non­
government organisations sought to distinguish between the civil and 
forensic populations being treated under the Bill. As a consequence, forensic 
patients were consistently relegated to a categorisation as ‘dangerous’ which 
marked them as different from civil patients. At the same time, the non­
government sector consistently argued that the criteria for civil and criminal 
justice patients receiving compulsory treatment in the community should be 
the same. Maca, a national mental health charity who worked in partnership 
with other organisations, argued that it should not be possible to:
give compulsory treatment to people who could not otherwise be 
made subject to it, and whose mental disorder is not considered to 
have been a factor in their offending behaviour, nor likely to lead to 
future offending behaviour (Joint Scrutiny Committee 2005:p 91 at 
para 269).
In summary, practitioners and non-government organisations consistently 
argued that the criteria for compulsory treatment under the Act should be the 
same for anyone, regardless of whether they were a civil or forensic patient. 
Simultaneously, these actors tried to distance the majority of the patients 
they represented from mentally disordered offenders and particularly from 
restricted patients. This tension was evident in the following excerpt from 
Nacro’s evidence to the Scrutiny Committee.
Clearly there are issues about the scope of the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal and the fact that it cannot order that leave or transfer be 
initiated. There are some benefits in the Home Office having an overall 
view of restricted cases because we are only talking about restricted 
cases. It is a very small number and it does relate to the patients who 
present the greatest risk to others (2005b:Question 523, oral 
evidence, 8 December).
Undoubtedly, restricted patients were among the proportion of people 
receiving compulsory mental health treatment who represented high levels of
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risk of harm to others. However Nacro’s description of restricted patients as a 
uniquely high risk category distanced the healthcare needs of restricted 
patients from those of the civil mental health patient population, while 
simultaneously obfuscating its own role in representing the interests of 
restricted patients in the law reform process.
It was widely acknowledged to me during my fieldwork that restricted patients 
were not well-represented by non-government organisations engaged in the 
reform process. A number of interviewees attributed this to the reform 
agenda established by the Richardson Report (1999), and the absence of 
any dedicated consideration of the offender provisions within the Mental 
Health Act 1983. As stated above, the Richardson Report had argued that 
the offender provisions within the 1983 Act fell under the responsibility of the 
Home Office, and recommended that they be examined as a separate case 
(Richardson 1999:para 15.6). As the Expert Committee under Richardson 
were engaged by the Department of Health, they had perceived the specific 
criminal justice provisions as tangential to their main concerns. There may 
also have been a far more pragmatic reason for why the Expert Committee 
did not spend more time on offenders. Mentally disordered offenders featured 
in the third section of the Act, after the civil provisions. This meant that the 
Expert Committee would have spent a long and arduous period of time 
deliberating over the legislation already when it eventually got to the forensic 
sections. The same might well have been true of the Scrutiny Committee. 
Either way, the failure to review the offender provisions of the Mental Health 
Act 1983 in detail resulted in the marginalisation of offender patients 
generally, and restricted patients specifically, in successive legislative 
proposals.
Beyond the structure of the law reform process, the political reality was that 
mentally disordered offenders were a difficult group to lobby for. One 
representative from a non-government organisation I interviewed explained 
to me that some non-government organisations would not touch restricted 
patient issues because they were dependent upon public funding. The 
inevitable stigma associated with mentally disordered offenders meant that 
restricted patients were simply excluded from the client group of that
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organisation. The prioritisation of resources across mental health care also 
worked against the interests of restricted patients. As a result, restricted 
patients were not prioritised on anyone’s agenda for advocacy or lobbying. 
This was no more evident than in the absence of restricted patients from 
submissions by mental health organisations to the Scrutiny Committee, even 
from those who represented mentally disordered offenders such as the 
Revolving Doors Agency (2004).
One lawyer I interviewed believed that it was inappropriate that risk should 
dominate the legislation just because of restricted patients, stating:
and I quite agree to that extent that the draft Mental Health Bill has 
been sort of high-jacked by the Home Office, essentially, whose 
inserted its definitions of risk and concerns about risk into the civil 
population where it’s not really a big issue.
However in his view it was neither useful nor valid to relegate particular 
categories of mental health patient to a status as uniquely dangerous in an 
effort to isolate them from the broader patient population. Nonetheless, as he 
explained, most organisations within the Mental Health Alliance did not work 
with or for restricted patients, so the issue was not central to their objectives 
before the Scrutiny Committee.
A member of the Mental Health Alliance agreed with that assessment during 
another interview with me:
... all the criminal justice groups in the alliance don’t really have that 
much interest in restricted patients which is crazy when you think 
about it. ... I mean you could develop the sort of stuff ... about 
whether you sort of have a criminal justice system which is supported 
by psychiatry and you go down that sort of line. And within that debate 
you’ve then got the restricted patients who are kind of separated from 
the general Part 3 [offender] patients who are very much seen as their 
own little breed really and someone almost that people don’t want to 
touch. I think one of the problems is that the organisations within the 
Alliance are also service providers ... they have a very broad remit to 
cover a lot of people and there’s always been a lack of places in the 
community who are going to take restricted patients. I mean no one 
really wants that sort of person. The residents are going to be up in 
arms or something like that so it’s the same sort of problem. I think 
they do tend to be just dealt with by statutory services and contact 
outside of those is quite limited. And therefore within the Alliance we 
just don’t get that sort of expertise.
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These examples point to the extent to which forensic patients were absent 
from the client group that most mental health organisations and practitioners 
were focussing on in their advocacy for law reform. Undoubtedly, forensic 
patients were a substantially smaller part of the mental health patient 
population than civil patients. At the time I conducted my fieldwork the 
restricted patient population numbered 1306 (according to statistics provided 
to me by the Home Office Mental Health Unit). The Royal College of 
Psychiatrists have reported that as many as 9 out of 10 prisoners suffers 
from a diagnosable mental disorder in a population numbering over 72,000 
(Royal College of Psychiatrists 2006); and the National Association for 
Mental Health (Mind) has estimated that mental health problems amongst the 
general population effect between one in four and one in six people (Hatloy 
2005). Thus restricted patients constituted a very small minority of people 
with mental disorder, both in and out of the criminal justice system.
Nevertheless, restricted patients were the group of mental health patients 
with whom government decision-makers, particularly in the Home Office, had 
the most contact. It was understandable, therefore, that government 
perceptions of those receiving compulsory treatment were informed by their 
first hand experience of assessing the risks posed to the community in the 
discharge from hospital of people with mental disorder. Consequently for the 
government, care and treatment under the 1983 Act were inextricably bound 
with questions of risk and controlling dangerousness. But those who based 
their rejection of the government’s agenda on the premise that forensics were 
a small minority of the total population covered by the legislation failed to 
recognise the broad-based political imperative to control dangerousness. The 
symbolic politics of public protection had transferred the rhetoric of managing 
dangerousness from one specific department to the whole of government 
(Newburn and Jones 2005). That imperative rendered the executive immune 
to criticisms that the government’s health agenda had been hijacked by the 
Home Office’s priority on public protection.
One non-government actor engaged in law reform distanced itself from 
restricted patients for very different reasons. As noted above, The Zito Trust 
did not join the Mental Health Alliance, being the only non-government body
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that openly supported the government’s agenda. The Zito Trust proposed a 
number of legislative reforms in the interests of victims, which were largely 
supported by the government. These reforms all related to mentally 
disordered offenders, and included access to information about discharge of 
restricted patients from hospital. As discussed in Chapter Five, such access 
to information about restricted patients was made years after it had been 
available to victims of offenders sent to prison. Importantly, The Zito Trust 
also supported the government’s agenda for compulsory care in the 
community; a proposal which, when put by the government, was fiercely 
contested by the Alliance. The political sensitivities of the system were 
particularly evident around victims’ issues. Despite its vehement opposition to 
the policy of compulsory community care, the Alliance never took issue with 
The Zito Trust directly. In an interview with me, one member of the Alliance 
suggested that this was because of the high degree of public and political 
sympathy for The Zito Trust, and therefore the risk to the reputation of 
anyone who opposed it. The Alliance had a hard enough time counteracting 
the stigma associated with mental health service users, without also 
appearing to oppose the interests of victims. Realistically, lining up against 
the victim lobby was seen as too damaging to the reputation of the Alliance, 
no matter how central were their points of disagreement. Consequently, the 
Alliance also had to be careful of how it campaigned on behalf of forensic 
patients, when The Zito Trust was advocating against the Alliance’s policies 
in that regard.
The prominence of victim-related issues in parallel developments elsewhere 
in the criminal justice system was also likely to have influenced the 
government’s agenda for mental health law reform. The government’s 
concern with victims of crime, reflected in other provisions being developed 
at the time such as the Victim's Charter, affected their approach to legislation 
enhancing the executive’s control over forensic patients. The increasing 
focus on victims was another aspect of government policy that non­
government organisations and practitioners did not engage with at all during 
the law reform process. In fact it was telling that during my research there 
were a number of participants who had given almost no thought to the role 
and effect of victims in forensic mental health.
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Clearly, there were a number of reasons as to why forensic patients (and 
restricted patients as a sub-population within that group) did not feature 
prominently in the advocacy by non-government organisations engaged in 
the law reform process. Essentially, the reasons came down to the tactical 
acknowledgement that forensic patients were a small proportion of the overall 
population covered by the Mental Health Act 1983, and were a political 
liability with the potential to tarnish as dangerous the reputation of the entire 
patient population.
Yet it would have been possible to ameliorate the construction of restricted 
patients as such a risky population simply by using the government’s own 
data. At the time of my fieldwork, less than 8% of discharged patients were 
reconvicted of a standard offence, and less than 1 % were reconvicted for a 
grave offence within 2 years (Ly and Howard 2004, discussed further in the 
next chapter). The government drew on these low reconviction rates to 
indicate that the restricted patient system operated successfully. However, 
and as I discussed in Chapter Four, practitioners used the same low 
reconviction rates to argue that executive decision-making was overly 
cautious. Whichever side the speaker took, there was considerable evidence 
to support the argument that restricted patients had a reasonably low rate of 
re-offending. Yet, throughout the law reform debate, terms such as ‘high-end’ 
continued to be applied collectively to all forensic patients without attempting 
to deconstruct that categorisation.
Non-government organisations attempted to distance forensic patients from 
general mental health users in order to refute the government’s agenda on 
controlling dangerousness through mental health law. In doing so, the non­
government lobby conflated forensic patients, including restricted patients, 
with people who did not necessarily have a history of offending, but whose 
mental disorder was associated with violence or dangerousness. That 
approach contradicted the Alliance’s own policy that mentally disordered 
offenders ought to be treated the same way as civil patients under the draft 
Bill. It was inconsistent to argue that everyone treated compulsorily under 
mental health legislation ought to have the same rights, while simultaneously
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asserting that one sector of the patient population posed disproportionately 
greater risks than all others.
I do not mean to suggest that assessing and managing risk was not an 
important factor in patient care and treatment. Moreover, forensic patients 
were so-called because they had a history of offending or of violent or 
dangerous behaviour. The question was not whether or not risk should be a 
component of patient care, but to what extent it should determine the overall 
framework for compulsory treatment. The problem with non-government 
arguments against the dominance of risk was that they accepted the 
construction of risk as a defining characteristic of one section of the mental 
health patient population, while at the same time insisting that all patients be 
treated the same under the legislation. Fearing that a label of ‘dangerous’ 
would tar everyone with the same brush, those opposing the government’s 
agenda merely strengthened the division between forensic and civil patients 
and so failed to challenge the dominant perception of dangerousness as a 
central characteristic of mental health patients. At the conclusion of the 
Scrutiny Committee hearings, the Alliance’s policy of treating all patients alike 
under the Bill had failed to win the support of the government. Minister 
Goggins made it expressly clear that offenders receiving treatment under the 
Act would not have the option to receive that treatment voluntarily (Joint 
Scrutiny Committee 2005b:Question 855, oral evidence, 19 January).
Essentially, the government’s approach to the reform of mental health law 
was to create a mechanism that would support the executive’s mandate for 
public protection. The principles of mental health law had always included the 
protection of others. But in the government’s approach, the potential for 
containment under the Mental Health Act 1983 provided a possible avenue 
for preventive detention of people who posed a risk of danger to others. 
Resolving the problem of dangerousness was a greater priority than adhering 
to the traditional principles of the compulsory treatment criteria. I put that 
assessment to a Home Office official during an interview after the completion 
of the Scrutiny Committee’s hearings. He said that the government had lost 
the argument about public protection largely because it had been too timid to 
acknowledge that the legislation was about preventing harm. The
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government’s intentions had been legitimate, he said, in wanting people to be 
treated when they needed it before they reached a crisis and harmed 
themselves or others. Yet mistrust of the government’s agenda of public 
protection had been heightened by the failure to identify the provision of 
increased resources to support effective treatment. Accepting that the Mental 
Health Alliance had interpreted the government’s agenda for harm prevention 
as against the interests of patients, the official stated that the opportunity to 
ensure that the law provided adequate public protection through effective 
treatment of mental disorder had been lost.
Conclusion: Forensic Patients as the Silent Subjects of Law Reform
One of the broader questions underpinning my research was whether the 
status of ‘patient’ retained its primacy or whether restricted patients were 
generally regarded as offenders by executive decision-makers. That question 
was prompted by the precarious status that restricted patients occupied, 
subject to compulsory treatment under mental health law, but supervised by 
a criminal justice department. In this chapter I have argued that, while 
restricted patients were marginalised by the non-government sector, and 
ignored by the government, they were in fact instrumental to the law reform 
process. They shaped the agendas on both sides, yet were never directly 
acknowledged. In my concluding comments I draw together the data I have 
presented here to consider the implications of my analysis.
Legal theorists and non-government organisations alike have argued that the 
government’s agenda for law reform was dominated by its preoccupation with 
risk. My data suggest that this agenda was clearly evident through the 
government’s desire for flexibility within the legislation; and through the 
strong hold the government maintained on its executive discretion over 
restricted patients, at the exclusion of any expanded role for the Tribunal. I 
was interested in whether the effect of the risk agenda on mental health law 
had a broader relevance for the criminal justice system. Reform of the Mental 
Health Act 1983 offered the possibility of establishing a framework for 
coercion and control of people on the basis of potential behaviour and 
assessed risk of dangerousness. Such a framework would operate beyond 
the existing powers of the criminal justice system, which required a person to
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be charged with an offence before they could be detained. The coupling of 
the executive’s central mandate of public protection with the fact that 
protection of others was an already-established principle within mental health 
law made the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 an ideal opportunity for 
the government to strengthen its mechanisms for detaining people who 
posed a risk of dangerousness. The draft Mental Health Bill 2004 was 
important because it demonstrated the extent to which the government was 
willing to redress this gap (as the government perceived it) through mental 
health law.
The ability of the government’s opponents to resist effectively the 
government’s agenda was seriously diminished by their failure to recognise 
the symbolic politics of public protection, which led to the dominance of what 
had been perceived of as a Home Office priority in what was ostensibly 
health legislation. The symbolic importance of public protection transcended 
the traditional boundaries of policy portfolios and bureaucratic departments. 
The preoccupation with controlling dangerousness, and the timing of mental 
health law reform, made the Mental Health Act 1983 the ideal vessel to 
support the government’s much-needed mechanism for control.
Meanwhile, forensic patients were consistently represented as dangerous, 
reinforcing the fear and stigma that attached public perceptions of mental 
health care users with dangerousness. Those advocating for and on behalf of 
mental health patients failed to effectively resist these constructions of 
dangerousness, even though the government’s own data on low reconviction 
rates could have been used to argue that many of those under ongoing 
executive discretion were being detained unnecessarily. Patient advocates 
chose instead to try and distance forensic patients from the vast majority of 
people covered by mental health law. While understandable, that strategy 
meant that the government’s critics never wholly engaged with the political 
preoccupation with dangerousness.
Moreover, as previous chapters have shown, the law itself created ambiguity 
by constructing two alternative decision-making authorities in the executive 
and the Mental Health Review Tribunal, each with a separate basis for
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discharging restricted patients. While the complexities of balancing public 
fear with public opinion made it difficult to establish cast-iron, rational 
processes, the realities of decision-making often militated against the 
application of universalistic principles like least restrictive care in favour of 
case-based decision-making and in the interests of public protection.
Yet there was one other avenue of the law which purported to offer an 
alternative resolution of these challenges. It was a widely-held view amongst 
people I interviewed that the Mental Health Act 1983 was only reviewed 
because it had become incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998 (see also Richardson and 
Thorold 1999). In my final substantive chapter I consider how the human 
rights framework interacted with the issues of care and control in the 
restricted patient system, and whether it provided any resolution to this 
ostensibly dichotomous paradigm.
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CHAPTER 7 
PROTECTING PATIENTS?
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RESTRICTED PATIENT SYSTEM39
Introduction
So far my thesis has argued that the Home Office defined its overall role in 
terms of public protection and that it perceived all other considerations as 
secondary to that priority. The centrality of public protection was evident in 
the perception of Mental Health Unit staff that their responsibility to the public 
was a specific and unique task of the Home Office. The belief that other 
actors did not share the responsibility for public protection further 
strengthened the resolve with which Home Office staff approached this 
objective. The protection priority was also demonstrated by the dominance of 
controlling dangerousness in the government’s agenda for the reform of the 
Mental Health Act 1983.
The executive’s discretion in the restricted patient system derived from the 
Mental Health Act 1983, which was a legal framework ‘based on the 
prevention of risk to self and others and grounded in notions of social 
protection and medical paternalism’ (Richardson 2007:76). Nonetheless, 
patients had rights too, and these were enshrined in a number of statutes. So 
far I have focussed on the Mental Health Act 1983. Now, I turn to the rights 
that were set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and 
were subsequently incorporated into English law through the Human Rights 
Act 1998. The question I shall consider is how the Home Office balanced its 
emphasis on public protection with the principle of patient rights. The public 
protection agenda derived from the Home Office’s legislated mandate but, as 
I have already shown, some of the constructions it relied upon - including 
those of patients, of ‘the public’ and of protection - were a product of internal 
processes. Essentially, Home Office decision-makers understood ‘the public’
39 I am grateful to the Monash Centre, Prato, for hosting me during the initial drafting of this 
chapter.
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as a population exclusive of restricted patients themselves. How, then, did 
they strike the balance between public protection and the rights of patients?
My final chapter explores the notion of human rights as constructed in the 
restricted patient system. The language and processes of human rights were 
part of the many elements that informed the decision frame of executive 
discretion in the release of restricted patients, and warranted attention for 
that reason alone. However they were also an interpretive framework in their 
own right, constructing subjects in particular ways which, in turn, had a 
structural impact upon the system. In this chapter I focus on how restricted 
patients were constructed through the framework of human rights law. I 
suggest that the language of human rights provided an alternative 
construction of patients to that of ‘risky individuals’, as already discussed. 
Yet, I argue, the framework of human rights also led to a further 
entrenchment of the perceptions at the Home Office that the protection of the 
public was something separate from and distinct to the protection of patients. 
In other words, the human rights framework re-enforced the notion that 
patients were not a constituency within the greater public to whom the Home 
Office was responsible.
Establishing Rights for Patients: The Origins of Tribunal Decision- 
Making
Under the Mental Health Act 1959, the Mental Health Review Tribunal had no 
authority to discharge restricted patients; the executive had sole discretion 
over their supervision and release. Executive discretion has always been 
justified on the grounds that the risks restricted patients posed to themselves 
or others made their release a matter of public interest. In 1979, the Dutch 
case of Winterwerp before the European Court of Human Rights established 
the need for objective medical evidence of mental disorder of a sufficient 
nature or degree, and its continued existence, to justify deprivation of liberty 
(Winterwerp v The Netherlands 1979). Two years later in the same court, the 
case of X  v The UK (1981) established that the restricted patient system 
contravened article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights which 
requires that ‘the lawfulness o f ... detention be decided [speedily] by a court’ 
(article 5:4). It became necessary to have a judicial body not just reviewing
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the basis for detention, but also with the power to discharge in the event that 
deprivation of liberty for compulsory treatment did not meet the Winterwerp 
criteria (Jones 2004). The new Mental Health Act 1983 addressed these 
inconsistencies by granting the Tribunal - in addition to the Home Secretary - 
the right to discharge restricted patients.40
In the literature, the system prior to 1983 is presented as one of indefinite 
detention, initially at Her Majesty’s pleasure, and subsequently at the 
government’s discretion (Verdun-Jones 1989; Richardson 1993; 2005). Prior 
to the 1983 Act, those pursuing mental health law reform were not 
necessarily interested in human rights per se. However there was certainly 
unease at the absence of safeguards for patients in the system and it was 
believed that the 1983 Act would improve this situation by ensuring a 
procedural mechanism to protect the rights of patients through Tribunal 
decision-making. As practice under the 1983 Act developed, however, 
scholars pointed to the inadequacy of the protections offered by the Tribunal. 
Two concerns were principal in these critiques. The first was the burden of 
proof required to demonstrate that a patient was not detained lawfully: 
patients had to show that they were no longer suffering from a mental 
disorder warranting compulsory treatment in hospital in order to be released. 
This relied upon the extremely difficult task of proving a negative (Eastman 
and Peay 1999). The matter was resolved when the English and Wales Court 
of Appeal (EWCA) made a declaration of incompatibility between the Mental 
Health Act 1983 and the European Convention on Human Rights, which 
resulted in a change to domestic law through statutory instrument (R v MHRT 
2001).41 As a result, the problem was addressed by reversing the burden of 
proof so that hospitals now had to prove that a patient met the criteria for 
ongoing detention (as opposed to patients having to prove that they no 
longer met it).
40 The Tribunal already existed in relation to mental health patients in the civil system.
41 By declaring the Mental Health Act 1983 to be incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the EWCA indicated that it could not interpret the 1983 Act in 
accordance with the requirements of European human rights law. In order to address this 
problem of incompatibility, the government changed the Mental Health Tribunal Rules by 
way of statutory instrument.
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The second key concern was that the Tribunal had no power to move 
patients through the system towards release, including via transfer to other 
hospitals. The power to order (or otherwise facilitate) the steps necessary to 
aid a patient’s rehabilitation towards release was vested entirely in the hands 
of the Home Secretary. This remained central to criticisms of the system, and 
was still the situation when I completed my doctoral research. Thus, ten 
years after the 1983 Act, Richardson warned that while the acquisition of the 
new power to discharge by the Tribunal was ‘without a doubt... of immense 
formal significance ... its significance in practice should not be overestimated’ 
(Richardson 1993:285; see also Richardson and Thorold 1999). Despite 
these criticisms, the Tribunal is consistently presented in much of the 
literature as the appropriate body to be making these decisions, and as the 
major safeguard for patients in the system. For example and as discussed in 
previous chapters, recent efforts to reform the Mental Health Act 1983 did not 
take issue with the fact of executive discretion as fundamentally limiting the 
ability of the Tribunal to guard the interests of patients. Even if one accepts 
that there were pragmatic reasons why non-government organisations did 
not actively seek an end to executive discretion in the reform of the 1983 Act, 
in the literature the Tribunal continues to be regarded as an effective 
safeguard for restricted patients. The present chapter contradicts that 
perception through an empirical analysis of the construction of patient rights 
and the extent to which those rights are protected in the restricted patient 
system.
In terms of the measurable effects of the Mental Health Act 1983, there has 
been a marked shift in the process of release. Home Office data show that 
the Tribunal is now responsible for making almost 90% of release orders 
(Johnson and Taylor 2002).42 However, a Home Office official interviewed for 
this research stated that while the 1983 Act had dramatically changed the 
process of decisions to discharge restricted patients by giving it to the 
Tribunal, nothing had changed in terms of the proportion of restricted patients 
who were discharged every year. The following data enable a consideration
42 From 1991-2001 the number of restricted patients in hospital ranged from 2107 to 3002 
(Johnson and Taylor 2002). During this time there was an average of 324 discharges per 
year (ibid).
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of the claim that there had been no increase in the number of patients being 
discharged from the system following the granting of decision-making power 
to the Tribunal.
Table 1: Restricted patients discharged (d/c) by Home Secretary or 
MHRT, 1975-198443
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
TOTAL
detained
2018 2017 1930 1912 1884 1864 1812 1816 1780 1708
D/c to the 
community
N
(%*)
Home
Secretary
171
(10)
136
(8)
152
(9)
142
(8)
147
(9)
151
(10)
146
(9)
128
(8)
100
(8)
63
(6)
MHRT
5
(0)
110
(6)
TOTAL
discharge
199*
(10)
160
(8)
176
(9)
162
(8)
172
(9)
180
(10)
171
(9)
148
(8)
150
(8)
208
(12)
* Difference between number disc narged and total discharged accounl s for people
absolutely discharged, who are included in the total.
Table 2: Restricted patients discharged (d/c) by Home Secretary or 
MHRT, 1994-200344
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
TOTAL
detained
2288 2478 2549 2650 2749 2842 2858 2969 2989 3118
D/c to the 
community
N
(%*)
Home
Secretary
43
(2)
24
(1)
35
(1)
29
(1)
34
(1)
34
(1)
23
(1)
27
(1)
24
(1)
32
(1)
MHRT 147
(6)
140
(6)
136
(5)
163
(6)
173
(6)
162
(6)
212
(7)
196
(7)
223
(7)
263
(8)
TOTAL
discharged
211
(9)
178
(7)
181
(7)
197
(7)
213
(8)
205
(7)
242
(8)
236
(8)
269
(9)
217
(7)
* These figures represent discharged patients as a percentage of the total restricted
population. All figures rounded to the nearest whole percentage.
43 Data sourced from 'Statistics of Mentally Disordered Offenders, England and Wales 
1975-1985’, provided by Mental Health Unit, Home Office.
44 Data sourced from (Ly and Howard 2004).
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Caution should be exercised with respect to some of these data. For 
example, in both tables the base population was made up of detained 
restricted patients. Therefore it excluded patients already on conditional 
discharge and residing in the community. However, from the percentage 
figures (last row) in each table, it appears that patients released as a 
percentage of the detained restricted patient population fluctuated by around 
10% in the 10 years preceding and immediately following the introduction of 
the 1983 Act In the decade from 1994 the percentage was approximately the 
same; if anything, it was slightly less. These data supported the suggestion 
that the rate of release remained constant following the shift from discharge 
at the authority of the Home Secretary to the sharing of that responsibility 
with the Tribunal.
As I discussed previously, Home Office participants perceived the Tribunal as 
incautious. Yet, the Tribunal was legislatively required to have regard for the 
safety of the patient and the public [Mental Health Act 1983:section 
72:1 (a)(ii)]. Additionally, research contradicted the perception of Tribunal 
cautiousness. Specifically, some research suggested that Tribunals often 
sought to justify decisions not to release patients based on their concern 
about the risks posed to the patient or the public regardless of whether they 
could have equally found that the patient no longer met the criteria for 
detention under the 1983 Act (Peay 1989; Holloway and Grounds 2003; 
Perkins 2003). Perkins found that
there was a recognition that the MHA 1983 gave tribunal members the 
freedom to take risky decisions. In the observed tribunals, however, 
the risks of ‘getting it wrong’ seemed so great that members appeared 
to gather evidence to justify not discharging rather than actively 
pursuing the possibility of discharge (2003:109, see also Holloway and 
Grounds 2003).45
With the notable exception of Peay (1989), most of the research conducted 
on the Mental Health Review Tribunal has been on the civil jurisdiction, and 
therefore did not cover restricted patients specifically. However, given the 
preoccupation with risk in relation to forensic patients as outlined earlier, it
45 Perkins’ study did not cover Tribunals for restricted cases. However, as discussed in 
Chapter One, decision-making in relation to restricted patients was likely to be more 
cautious, not less.
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was likely that these critiques applied equally to restricted cases, if not more 
so.
The idea that a preoccupation with risk prevented Tribunals from discharging 
patients even when they no longer met the criteria for detention was reflected 
in the evidence of a number of practitioners involved in my research. One 
lawyer I interviewed who represented restricted patients at Tribunal hearings 
commented:
I mean Tribunals aren’t, there is real caution in the way Tribunals 
operate. In restricted cases they are, I mean they’re judges or 
recorders who sit on Tribunals. And they’re not trying to find all the 
arguments they can to release somebody. Some judges and some 
Tribunals are very cautious. And sometimes they’re right to be, on the 
facts. But it’s not a, it doesn’t operate as a court, from that point of 
view.
The conservatism of quasi-judicial decision-making processes had also been 
observed in comparable bodies such as the Parole Board. Padfield et al note: 
‘we were struck by the cautiousness of the decision-making ... The Parole 
Board’s responsibility to “protect the public” too easily swamps the rights of 
the individual prisoner, whereas it is part of their “core function” to test 
whether the prison and probation services are respecting the rights of the 
prisoner’ (2003:114). While it may not have been surprising that tribunals and 
Parole Boards erred on the side of caution, it was not in keeping with the 
intention of the law. The Mental Health Act 1983 placed the emphasis on the 
presumption to discharge unless there was a risk of serious harm to the 
patient or to others. This implied quite a different process to that actually 
followed by decision makers on the Tribunal. An important additional point 
was that both the Parole Board and the Tribunal were much less likely to be 
criticised publicly and politically for being too cautious than for being too 
liberal. I have already observed this phenomenon in relation to the Home 
Office (a consequence of having the ‘first bite of the cherry’ in discharging 
patients as discussed in Chapter Four). Because the patients coming before 
the Tribunal were necessarily the most difficult cases, they were likely to 
pose significant concerns about risk to the public or other contentious issues. 
This factor may have explained the conservatism of Tribunal decisions to 
discharge, but it was equally an important reality for any consideration of the
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Tribunal as an effective safeguard for patients. I shall return to this issue 
shortly.
To summarise the discussion so far, the Tribunal obtained the power to 
discharge restricted patients to meet the European Convention requirement 
for independent review of detention. Critics of executive discretion claimed 
that this would increase the rate of discharge for a section of the patient 
population who no longer met the criteria for detention under the 1983 Act, 
yet who had not been released by the executive because of concerns about 
public protection. As the data presented here indicate, no such increase in 
discharges occurred. Simultaneously, an emerging body of literature argued 
that the current powers of the Tribunal were insufficient to deal with the 
inappropriate detention of forensic patients who were unable to progress to 
less secure conditions of detention because hospital beds were being 
blocked by the slow flow of patients into the community. The Tribunal had no 
power over the steps that would speed up the flow; accordingly it could not 
safeguard patients who might be unnecessarily detained as a result. The 
question that emerged for my research was to what extent the Mental Health 
Act 1983, designed to improve the protections for restricted patients, actually 
did so.
The impetus for the legislative reform that resulted in the 1983 Act provides 
an important context for one of two key points I make in this chapter. The 
changes to the 1983 Act were necessitated by the requirements of 
compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Yet there are 
important questions to ask about how substantive these changes actually 
were. Firstly, were human rights reforms limited to legislative and policy 
changes, having had little actual effect in improving the protection of the 
human rights of restricted patients? How were the subjects of human rights 
frameworks constructed? And what effect did the mobilisation of international 
instruments of human rights have on executive decision-makers’ own 
responsibilities to uphold the rights of patients? The following discussion 
considers these issues further.
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Constructing Patient Rights
In Chapter Five I discussed how Home Office decision-makers’ constructions 
of the public often excluded restricted patients. That discussion laid an 
important basis for the question at the heart of the present chapter. If the 
Home Office phrased its responsibility entirely in relation to the public, but 
conceptions of ‘the public’ excluded patients, what did Home Office decision­
makers perceive to be their responsibility to patients?
In my interviews and observations of Home Office officials they talked of a 
balancing act in which the therapeutic benefit to patients was balanced with 
the interests of the public in each and every decision. Yet, at the same time, 
there was a clear priority that lay with the protection of the public over the 
interests of patients. When I asked Mental Health Unit staff how they 
maintained patient rights within the priority on protection, it proved to be the 
one area of my fieldwork where the views of Mental Health Unit staff 
contrasted with each other. While they had been entirely consistent about the 
Home Office’s responsibility for the public protection agenda, there was far 
more variance in considering its responsibility to patients.
One official stated that the Home Office’s only duty was public protection and 
therefore the official had no responsibility to patients. In his view, 
responsibility for patients lay entirely with care teams. The official would 
explain that to patients to ensure there was no confusion about the Home 
Office’s role. Interestingly, he felt that care teams had a dual responsibility to 
patients and to the public when considering whether patients were ready for 
discharge to the community. But such duality of role was not something he 
shared as a Home Office official. He understood his duties to be devoted 
entirely to protecting the public.
The perspectives of other Mental Health Unit staff differed here. For example, 
another official claimed that meeting the interests of patients was vital to 
ensuring the public were protected. In her view, public protection was best 
served by ensuring that restricted patients were well supervised, and that 
went to the heart of patient interests. Her perspective echoed the sentiments
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of staff who were concerned about patient welfare when decisions to permit 
leave exposed patients to the risk of negative public or media attention, as 
discussed in an earlier chapter. Staff were particularly sensitive to cases 
where victims or other members of the community were vociferous in their 
opposition to a patient spending time in the community, because that 
opposition could jeopardise the patient’s safety in the community, or in 
seeking transfer or release. Clearly, the interests of patients were a high 
priority within the decision frame of some Home Office staff, but not for all. 
Thus within the bureaucratic mandate of public protection, the way in which 
patients or members of the public were defined was not simply a matter of 
interpreting the law, but was also dependent upon subjective processes that 
differed between officials. The variation in responses from Home Office staff 
about their responsibilities to patients led me to wonder how these processes 
influenced the perception of patient rights.
At the official level of executive decision-making, due attention was paid to 
the language and legislation of human rights. As I have discussed, there was 
a particular shift perceived with the introduction of the Mental Health Act 
1983. One senior official explained that the restricted patient system rested 
upon a balance between the rights of the patient and the protection of the 
public. Under the previous Mental Health Act 1959, this balance had been 
developed entirely within the Home Office: the Home Secretary alone had 
had to weigh the cost of depriving a patient of their liberty with the protection 
of the public. According to this official, when the Tribunal obtained the power 
to discharge patients, the Home Secretary was relieved of the responsibility 
for the rights of patients. The balance was now maintained via a clear 
division of labour, wherein the Tribunal was responsible for the rights of 
patients, and the Home Office was responsible for the protection of the 
public. Unit staff did not refer to case law or statute to support this 
explanation of the division of labour. Their analysis was a product of how 
Home Office staff viewed the system, and was informed predominantly by the 
priority placed on public protection within their own bureaucracy.
In the words of one official I interviewed, everything the Home Office did in 
the restricted patient system was human rights-oriented. In his view the
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restricted patient system was a leader in human rights terms because, he 
believed, England was the only country in the world where a mentally 
disordered person could be convicted of a very serious offence, anything 
short of murder, and be diverted from punishment into a system of 
therapeutic care.46 When I asked what effect the European Convention on 
Human Rights had on the restricted patient system, he replied that it was 
‘absolutely fundamental’, because it had led to the 1983 Act that gave the 
Tribunal the responsibility to protect the human rights of restricted patients. In 
many ways his comments reflected how the European Convention worked. 
Before incorporation, challenges to an action on the basis of human rights 
had to be determined in Strasbourg. Once the European Convention was 
incorporated into English law through the Mental Health Act 1983, English 
mental health law was brought into line with the European human rights 
framework (or at least its procedural requirements). Eventually, following the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 all new legislation had to be 
certified for its compliance with the European Convention.
Another important way in which the European Convention had had an impact 
upon the restricted patient system was through the case law that emerged. 
One official said that this case law had fettered the discretion of the Home 
Office. In his assessment the human rights framework was reasonable in 
principle, but quite difficult to operate in practice. He gave the example of 
recall of patients on conditional release in the community. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, case law from the European Convention had established that 
a patient could never be recalled - except in an emergency - without a 
medical opinion that the individual was mentally disordered (K v The UK 
1998). While this interviewee accepted the reasoning of the judgment, he 
was deeply concerned at the consequential constraint on the operations of 
the Home Office. As I have shown repeatedly, there was a clear perception 
amongst Home Office staff that they were the only ones in the system who 
considered public protection. This was despite the legislative requirement on 
the Tribunal to do so; the professionally established practice of clinicians
46 In fact other jurisdictions do have this provision in their laws, for example the Australian 
jurisdiction of Victoria has introduced similar powers to defer convicted offenders from prison 
for compulsory treatment in hospital.
Chapter 7: Human Rights and the Restricted Patient System [246]
having due regard to public safety; and the evidence that the Tribunal was 
equally conservative about risk when making decisions to discharge patients. 
Despite all that, Home Office staff expressed unease that the human rights 
framework might restrict their discretion to act in the interests of public safety. 
Once again, I was back to the question of how Home Office staff balanced 
the prioritisation of public protection with the protection of rights required by 
the human rights framework.
Consistently, when speaking with Mental Health Unit staff, they explained this 
balance through the existence of the Tribunal. In other words the balance did 
not take place in the Home Office. Rather, it was achieved across the system 
by the Home Office priority on public protection, and the Tribunal balancing 
that with its own responsibility for patient’s rights. Thus Home Office staff 
conceived of human rights entirely within a legal and procedural framework. 
In the perceptions of many staff, the rights of restricted patients were 
guaranteed merely by the existence of the Tribunal, including its authority to 
discharge.
Yet, the Home Office was aware of the limits of the Tribunal’s power: its own 
commissioned research had strongly criticised the operation of the Tribunal’s 
review mechanism, particularly in relation to recall. In their study of the 
discharge and supervision of restricted patients, Dell and Grounds found that 
‘less than 8% of patients had tribunals within the first three months of recall; 
33% waited four or five months; 51% waited between six months and a year, 
and three waited for over a year’, data which they argued rendered the 
compulsory tribunal process post recall ‘a totally inadequate safeguard’ 
(1995:xiii). They stated:
This is a matter which warrants urgent attention. The Home 
Secretary's authority to recall is an immensely powerful weapon, 
giving him unfettered discretion to remove people from the community 
and to detain them in hospital. Those who advise him are instructed to 
err on the side of caution, and they administer the system on the 
understanding that a tribunal will soon meet to review the need for the 
patient's detention. In practice, however, this safeguard is a chimera 
since people can be detained for an unlimited length of time, waiting 
for a tribunal to convene. The situation is clearly unacceptable (Dell 
and Grounds 1995:xiii).
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The denial of rights brought about by delayed Tribunal hearings was 
compounded by other factors such as the debatable nature of the Tribunal’s 
independence (evidenced by the Home Office’s ongoing review and 
willingness to challenge Tribunal decisions as discussed in Chapter Four).
Despite Dell & Grounds’ clear criticisms of the exercise of the Home
Secretary’s recall powers ten years earlier, by the time of my research the
Home Office was continuing to construe the protection of patient rights
entirely through the Tribunals’ decision-making powers.
Clearly, the Home Office was not accountable for the operations of the 
Tribunal. But as the available research called into question the effectiveness 
of the Tribunal as a safeguard, this undermined the position of Home Office 
staff who disavowed their own role in protecting or promoting the rights of 
patients. Undoubtedly, those rights were enshrined in European human rights 
law. The question at issue was how the processes and procedures of the 
system ensured them.
The Tribunal, the Home Office and the Department of Health were all 
autonomous bodies, and such agencies would not usually take kindly to 
interference in their operations and duties. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic 
mandates in the restricted patient system appeared to be slightly more fluid 
than usual. Firstly, as I established in Chapter Four, the Home Office was the 
lead department within the restricted patient system. While Health was 
responsible for the facilities in which restricted patients were detained, the 
Home Office had the responsibility for executive decision-making authority 
throughout the system. Therefore, it housed the Mental Health Unit which 
conducted the supervision and monitoring of all patients and, as I have 
shown, of care teams and the Tribunal as well. Secondly, the Home Office 
frequently reviewed Tribunal decisions, and brought about judicial review if it 
felt those decisions were seriously lacking (again, see discussion in Chapter 
Four). Equally, as I examined in Chapter Six, there was a strong suggestion 
that the Home Office (or at least its priorities) were very much engaged in the 
Department of Health’s review of the Mental Health Act 1983. What these 
data suggested, however, was that interaction with other bureaucratic 
mandates took place in the interests of public protection only. There was no
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indication from my data that these engagements took place, or ought to have 
done, in protecting or promoting the human rights of restricted patients. On 
the contrary, many of the Home Office staff I spoke with relied solely on the 
Tribunal to ensure that patient rights were protected.
The construction of human rights protections was maintained within a limited, 
administrative framework. When I pressed a Mental Health Unit official on 
whether the Home Office had a responsibility to restricted patients, he said 
there was one, but that it was not explicit. He returned the question to one of 
the balance of the system:
we [the Home Office] are on one extreme of the spectrum: our primary 
concern is risk. The Tribunal is at the other: their primary concern is 
human rights. But everybody is operating the same balance.
He reiterated the view that because the Tribunal was there to protect patient 
rights, the Home Office could be that much more focussed on the question of 
risk. For example, if a Home Office decision not to discharge was challenged 
on human rights grounds, there could be no argument that the prioritisation of 
risk undermined patient’s rights, because there was an alternative avenue for 
release. In other words, the balance was preserved elsewhere. This gave 
Unit officials the ability to act as they saw appropriate in the interests of 
public protection, safe in the knowledge that there was a structure in place 
(albeit elsewhere in the system) to protect patient rights. Essentially, this 
balance came down to the proportionality of infringing the rights of an 
individual restricted patient against the likely harm to others if the 
infringement was inadequate.
These data posed a serious challenge for my analysis, as they appeared to 
suggest that the executive was ignorant of (or ignoring) the extent of its 
obligations to protect and promote the human rights of patients within the 
restricted system. The government was still subject to the requirements of 
the European Convention, not withstanding the existence of the 1983 Act, 
nor the determinative authority of the Mental Health Review Tribunal. In 
particular, detention had to meet the criteria set out in Winterwerp v The 
Netherlands (1979). As Jones states: 'In Winterwerp the European Court of 
Human Rights held, inter alia, that in order for the detention of a person of
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unsound mind to be lawful the mental disorder from which the patient is 
suffering must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement' 
(Jones 2004:para 1-047, p.38). At the Home Office, the ‘Winterwerp criteria’ 
were set out in the Mental Health Unit’s manual on precedents, entitled 
‘Summary of relevant caselaw’, and provided to me during my fieldwork. That 
document reported on Winterwerp in the following terms:
The European Court established the criteria that must be met for
deprivation of liberty on the grounds of mental disorder. These are:
• Objective evidence of mental disorder
• That the disorder is of a nature or seriousness that justifies 
detention
• That the disorder persists at the time of the review.
Clearly, then, the Mental Health Unit was cognisant of the fact that there 
were clear criteria for detention for compulsory treatment of mental disorder 
as established by European human rights law, and further that restricted 
patients were subject to it. Nevertheless, within that criteria, the executive 
interpreted ‘nature or seriousness that justifies detention’ to facilitate what it 
perceived as its over-riding responsibility for public protection.
In this thesis I have not undertaken a critical assessment of how the human 
rights framework came to construct problems and offer solutions in the 
restricted patient system. Such an approach would presume that rights were 
a straightforward and clearly superior framework, when in fact there was a 
much more complicated process involving the negotiation between rights and 
protection. These would be fascinating directions for analysis, but would 
constitute another topic entirely.47 Neither did I set out to criticise how the 
Home Office constructed its responsibilities in terms of patients. Its powers 
were born of statutory authority and were the legacy of decades of concern 
for the public interest in difficult decisions about release. I was interested in 
how human rights operated within the restricted patient system, because it 
seemed to lie at the heart of the question of whether protection of the public
47 For example, Zagor cites immigration law as an example of ongoing uncertainty between 
the application of individual and collective rights, despite the assertions to the contrary of 
many human rights and legal scholars (2006).
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was necessarily antithetical to the interests or rights of patients. Structurally, 
the Home Office was bound to the framework of human rights as dictated by 
the European Convention and the Human Rights Act 1998. These in turn 
stipulated procedural and policy requirements on the executive. Yet within 
this context there was still discretion in how and whether rights were 
conceived as within or parallel to the public protection agenda. As my data 
show, Home Office decision-making constructed patient rights in parallel to 
the public protection agenda. Yet there were alternative possibilities in this 
regard, as I shall explore further below in relation to other practitioners in the 
system.
A growing body of literature has challenged criminology to recognise the 
‘changes in the structure and parameters of penal communications’ (Pratt et 
al 2005:xv). The notion of ‘penal communications’ conveys the sense that the 
expansion of penality has been so great as to constitute its own context, its 
own process of communication, quite apart from how penality is applied in 
criminal justice or criminology. For example, the places where penal policy is 
designed and shaped include not just government departments but non­
government organisations, academia and other research environments, the 
media and public opinion. Similarly, the implementation of contemporary 
penal policies is taking place not just in a plethora of detention facilities, but 
in an ever-expanding range of community-based initiatives. Consequently, as 
a number of authors have argued, progressive penal politics, and 
criminology’s engagement with those politics, need to engage with the 
changing nature of public interest and its effect on policy and practice in this 
area (Garland 1990; Brown 2005; Ryan 2005). I was interested in the work of 
the Home Office within these growing demands on government and the civil 
service. The level of public pressure and expectation on the Home Office had 
increased significantly in recent years. One example of this was the furore 
during the period of my research over the release of prisoners who, under the 
government policy at the time, should have been considered for deportation 
and were instead released (see for example Weaver 2005). The outcry 
included a prolonged attack directly challenging the competency and
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efficiency of the Home Office.48 Ministers can be slow to defend their 
departments, and civil servants working in such environments may be 
mindful of the consequential risk to their own jobs. Their commitment to a 
particular philosophy about how the system should operate may be metered 
by these preoccupations. Additionally, the bureaucracy is ever mindful of 
scandals, and concern to avoid them has often resulted in changes to 
criminal justice policy (Pratt 2005).
At the same time, the legal structures stipulated by human rights conventions 
and laws meant that breaches of those rights could not be ignored. However, 
by defining patients in opposition to the public, and its constitutive groups 
such as victims, the Home Office enabled itself to define the interests of 
patients outside its mandate to protect the public. It could do this without 
jeopardising the legality of its decision-making because, as excerpts from my 
interviews above illustrate, it relied upon the Tribunal to protect and promote 
the rights of restricted patients. The Home Office’s construction of the public 
protection agenda did not just prioritise it over the rights of patients, but to the 
exclusion of them. As Unit staff stated, this was justified on the grounds that 
the human rights framework had established a whole other mechanism 
independent of the Home Office to protect patients.
The perspective of different groups in the restricted patient system was 
crucial to understanding how all actors in the system interacted around the 
framework of human rights. Home Office officials were clearly moulded by 
the environment within which they operated, an environment which was 
influenced by political, social and economic factors: the politics of criminal 
justice policy, the publiG interest in the management of high-risk offenders, 
and the economics of the resources necessary to provide adequate care and 
treatment to restricted patients. While these influences may have affected all 
actors throughout the system, the extent to which that influence took shape 
varied. In the next section I discuss the views of other actors within the 
system and how they varied from those of the Home Office, not just in terms
48 The then Home Secretary Charles Clarke was eventually forced out of the Ministry. The 
next Home Secretary, John Reid, was subsequently quoted as stating that the Home Office 
was 'not fit for purpose’, bringing the department into another round of public criticism and 
media condemnation (see for example Richards 2006).
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of the description of rights, but in how they perceived the effect of those 
constructions on decision-making about restricted patients.
Alternative Perspectives: the Views of Non-Government Actors
As I have established throughput this thesis, non-government actors49 in the 
restricted patient system were generally sympathetic to the Home Office’s 
role in protecting the public. However, they strongly disagreed that its brief 
alleviated the Home Office’s responsibility to safeguard the rights of patients. 
Some people said that ‘public protection’ included the protection of patients. 
For others, the public protection agenda was intended to be balanced with 
the rights of patients, not against them. Finally, there were those who claimed 
that the Home Office’s approach to rights was a narrow interpretation that 
ignored the fundamental principles at the heart of both mental health and law.
One lawyer who represented restricted patients argued that the problem with 
the Home Office’s conceptualisation of the public was that it excluded 
patients. She stated that its approach to public protection impeded the 
progress of patients through the system because it was neither methodical 
nor constructive in its decisions about patient applications:
[i]t seems to me that what they’re doing is wrong because they are 
impeding people’s progress, and that’s one thing, but they are also, as 
a result of that, preventing other people who are seriously in need of 
treatment, from getting into hospital... [later in the interview] whatever 
the Home Office may say about the public interest... the law relating 
to detention and transfer ... is perfectly clear. People should be 
treated in the least restrictive alternative possible; people should only 
be detained in the interests of their own health and safety or the 
protection of others’.
As I showed above, one official had stated that everything the Home Office 
did was ‘ECHR-sensitive’. This meant that everything done under the Mental 
Health Act 1983 had to be compatible with the European Convention, and 
subsequently the Human Rights Act 1998. However, practitioners interpreted 
what it meant to be ‘human rights friendly’ differently from Home Office staff.
49 To re-iterate, I use 'non-government actors’ to refer collectively to mental health and other 
non-government organisations, legal practitioners, clinicians, care teams and hospitals.
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For the lawyer quoted above, the human rights framework was intended to 
ensure adequate care of patients through the system, including their 
progress towards release. Therefore, in her view, even if the Home Office 
was acting lawfully, it was not necessarily operating within the spirit or overall 
objectives of the human rights framework.
Another lawyer was particularly concerned about the human rights of people 
in prison suffering mental disorder. In an interview with me this lawyer stated 
that the UK had argued successfully before the European Court of Human 
Rights that the mere existence of the restricted patient system meant that 
there was no further onus on the government regarding people suffering from 
mental illness in prison. In other words, the fact that courts could order a 
person to be detained in hospital following his or her conviction meant that 
when the courts chose not to make this order, there was no further onus on 
the government to ensure the prisoner received appropriate treatment in 
prison. This was the case despite the fact that evidence of mental disorder 
was not necessarily introduced in court, even where relevant to explaining 
the commission of an offence.50
Other lawyers I interviewed also told me of cases where the Mental Health 
Unit had rejected an application in the first instance, but had been amenable 
to submissions from lawyers who disagreed with the Unit’s position, and had 
even reversed decisions following such correspondence. Lawyers observed 
that these examples were indicative of a cultural shift that had taken place at 
the Home Office in response to the human rights framework. In particular, 
lawyers expressed the view that the Home Office did not want to make 
decisions that got them into trouble in terms of human rights law. A number 
of lawyers had found the Home Office more receptive to their submissions as 
a result. However, some lawyers believed that the increased receptiveness 
was motivated more by a desire to avoid appeals to European human rights 
law, than by a genuine concern to safeguard the rights of restricted patients.
50 For example, one lawyer I interviewed told an anecdote of a defendant who was brought 
to trial from hospital each day and returned to hospital each night. Because the defendant 
chose not to raise a mental illness defence, the court never knew that he was receiving 
mental health treatment in hospital. The example illustrated the point that evidence of mental 
disorder was selectively used in court proceedings even when it was central to 
understanding the state of the accused.
Chapter 7: Human Rights and the Restricted Patient System [254]
For example, they felt that there was insufficient concern about delays in 
decision-making in the system. Whilst delays were more often encountered 
at the Tribunal than with the Home Secretary, the inability to review detention 
could result in an extended period of unlawful detention for a patient. Thus 
some lawyers suggested that the human rights framework provided no more 
protection of patient’s rights in practice, than had existed before the 1983 Act.
Of course, tensions between legal practitioners and a decision-making body 
are not in themselves remarkable, even if it was unusual (in a legal context) 
for the decision-maker to be the executive. One might argue that lawyers 
who accused the executive of acting in bad faith in terms of human rights 
were simply doing their job, advocating as hard as they could in the interests 
of their clients. Equally, it could be argued that the very presence of the 
Home Secretary as a parallel decision-maker to the Tribunal was in itself a 
safeguard for patient rights, ensuring an alternative avenue to review 
discharge in the event that Tribunal proceedings were delayed or otherwise 
unavailable. I shall discuss this further below.
The perspectives of psychiatrists differed subtly from those of lawyers. 
Psychiatrists practising in this system were often extremely well-informed 
about its socio-legal dimensions (see for example Eastman and Peay 1999; 
Buchanan 2002; Mullen 2002). Many of the psychiatrists interviewed or cited 
in my thesis had pursued legal or criminological studies and had published 
widely on the social, legal and clinical aspects of risk assessment and 
management of forensic patients. Nevertheless their engagement with the 
question of human rights was understandably a practitioner-oriented view of 
the patient, as compared with the legal standpoint taken by lawyers and (to 
some extent) the Home Office. This further demonstrated how the particular 
position and environment from which actors operated in the system 
structured their viewpoints differently.
For example, one psychiatrist I interviewed found the Home Office assertion 
that the restricted patient system was amongst the most human rights 
friendly to be ‘disingenuous’ because the same system that enabled a 
hospital order following a conviction for manslaughter also facilitated
Chapter 7: Human Rights and the Restricted Patient System [255]
‘preventive detention through indeterminate detention well beyond what 
would have been the tariff in the original offence, in a homicide’. He argued:
you have to look at the reality of how it operates, not just the formality 
of the law. And it then depends on how mental health processes 
function, tribunals function, and also how the Home Office functions in 
terms of exercising its discretion ... because if they don’t properly 
exercise discretion but rather they see this as a tug of war between 
them and the Tribunal, urn, well, if they think it’s a human rights- 
friendly system it doesn’t look as if their heart’s in the right place with 
regards to the human rights of those that they’re [targeting].
This rejection of the ‘formality of the law’ implied that ensuring the human 
rights of patients required adherence to principles as well as to structure; that 
intention and outcome mattered as much as process. Even then, this 
practitioner noted that ‘the European Convention isn’t very good at protecting 
the rights of the mentally disordered’. His view was supported in the 
literature. For instance Richardson has noted that the European Court of 
Human Rights ‘has made a significant contribution to improving the 
procedural safeguards available to detained patients in England and Wales, 
but has played little part in questioning any more substantive aspects of our 
mental health law’ (Richardson 2005:129). In other words, protecting the 
human rights of patients required more than the mere existence of institutions 
like the Tribunal, even if its role was to safeguard patient rights.
Introducing the Human Rights Bill in the House of Lords, the then Lord 
Chancellor said, ‘our courts will develop human rights throughout society. A 
culture of awareness of human rights will develop’ (Hansard 1997). In his 
analysis of the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the Home Office, 
Rock describes how the Act was ‘intended by the Government to lend 
authority to a renewed discourse of rights and citizenship which had hitherto 
been somewhat alien to the British constitution’ (Rock 2004:218). Rock 
shows that this legislative intention was mirrored by a cultural shift from 
Ministers down through their departments, as the basic framework through 
which they viewed their work and responsibilities shifted in the direction of 
human rights (ibid). The idea that human rights shaped the culture of the 
system in which decisions were made resonated in the restricted patient 
system. One woman I interviewed had extensive experience in policy and
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lobbying work for non-government organisations active in the sector. In her 
opinion, the European human rights framework ‘made a huge difference’. 
However, she said, this was particularly on issues relating to the correlation 
between a patient’s incapacity to consent to treatment because of their 
mental disorder and the particular process applied to detain them in hospital. 
In her view, case law on these issues had produced a shift in the opinion of 
the executive about the use of preventive detention, such that there was now 
great concern about how and when it could be used appropriately. She said 
that these were positive changes and that they were cultural, affecting 
approaches and behaviour generally, as well as in individual cases.
Her view was supported by a psychiatrist I interviewed who had experience 
in both the restricted patient system and in comparative jurisdictions including 
Australia. He felt strongly that the effect of European human rights law on the 
English system made a significant difference to the culture of the system, as 
well as to the specific legal parameters of how the system operated. He told 
me of an Australian case in the jurisdiction of New South Wales (NSW) 
where a forensic patient had escaped from hospital, was re-captured and 
was subsequently detained in a maximum-security prison because the 
Commissioner of Corrective Services assessed him to be a security risk.51 As 
a forensic patient he was legally required to be detained in a hospital. 
Accordingly, the NSW Mental Health Review Tribunal advised the Minister for 
Health, in whom the formal authority over forensic patients was vested, that 
the patient should be transferred from prison to hospital. Indeed legal advice 
from the Department of Corrective Services itself had found the patient’s 
detention in prison to be unlawful. Yet no action was taken to transfer the 
patient. This interviewee commented that, had this happened in England, the 
patient could have appealed through the human rights framework. Indeed, he 
believed that the mere threat of ‘taking a case to Europe’ affected the culture 
of the system in England and Wales so much that such a case would be 
unlikely to occur there in the first place. However, the absence of an 
equivalent to the European Convention on Human Rights in Australia meant 
that the executive was not held to account with respect to principles of
51 The Department of Corrective Services manages prisons and community sentences in 
NSW.
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human rights in its decision-making about forensic patients. Consequently, 
he concluded, the presence of a human rights framework in England 
provided essential parameters to the exercise of executive discretion over 
restricted patients.
What emerged from these data was the perception across government 
officials, practitioners and non-government organisations that human rights 
played an important role in shaping the restricted patient system. 
Interestingly, though, there were stark differences amongst these various 
actors about the nature and consequences of the human rights effect. In the 
concluding discussion of this chapter I focus on the effects of the construction 
of human rights: firstly on restricted patients; and secondly on the executive 
as decision-makers.
Unintended Consequences? The Impact of the ECHR on Constructions 
of Patient Rights
A central tenet of my thesis has been that some of the protection offered by 
executive discretion in the restricted patient system was best understood as 
an example of symbolic politics, wherein decisions and policies were as 
important for what they said about the system as for their outcomes 
(Newburn 2002:175). The way in which the language and framework of 
human rights constructed their .subject depended upon certain symbolic 
associations of their own, including agency and entitlement. However as 
Peay notes, any sense of agency by restricted patients was constantly 
undermined by the executive’s authority over them and by the hospitals 
within whose walls they were detained.
Patients generally have no right to a particular form of treatment, but 
equally health care professionals have an ethical and legal duty to 
provide care of a particular standard. The relationship is perhaps best 
conceived as an axis of entitlement and duty. However, the situation is 
further complicated by the way in which mental health law sustains the 
anomalous position whereby patients with mental health problems 
who retain their capacity (but who are not subject to the Mental Health 
Act 1983) have an absolute right to refuse treatment but those 
suffering with similar problems who are subject to the 1983 Act have 
no right to refuse treatment for their mental disorders even if they 
retain all of the elements required to satisfy the notion of legal
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capacity. Yet those very same people will enjoy an absolute right to 
refuse treatment for their physical disorders (Peay 2003:139).
Similarly, any sense of entitlement (for example to particular levels of service 
or to liberty from the hospital environment) was considered within strictly 
legal parameters which were, as I have been illustrating, frequently 
contested. As such, it was difficult for restricted patients to gain access to the 
mechanisms (such as courts) which would establish the nature and extent of 
their rights. Most importantly, the rights already established for people 
detained under mental health law were undermined in the case of restricted 
patients, because they were continuously being balanced against the priority 
on protecting the public that dominated the decision frame of the Home 
Office.
This is not to say that the executive deliberately undermined the rights of 
patients. The situation was far more complex than that. The tension between 
the human rights of patients and the public protection was a problem rooted 
in the intersection of law and the system that supported it. That tension was 
complicated even further by the fact that there were actually a number of 
different laws and a number of different systems operating, sometimes 
intersecting, sometimes in parallel. By way of example, I return once again to 
the Mental Health Review Tribunal as an alternative decision-making avenue 
to the Home Secretary. The right to review detention and the extension of 
decision-making power over the discharge of restricted patients had been 
granted to the Tribunal in order to satisfy the legal requirements for 
safeguarding patient’s rights. However the systemic problem of Tribunal 
delays was at best a denial of procedural fairness. At worst it created the 
potential for prolonging the infringement of a patient’s human rights, if it was 
found that the person was being unlawfully detained. Delays at the Tribunal 
were a problem over which the Home Office did not have control. However, 
attributing the safeguarding of patient rights to the Tribunal in the face of a 
well-established critique of its process undermined the protection of patient’s 
rights across the system. As a result, the questioned returned to one of how 
the executive exercised its discretion in balancing the rights of restricted 
patients with the public protection agenda.
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In previous chapters I have discussed the contrast between the health 
system operating on a model of individual patient need, and the legal 
principles of due process that underpinned criminal justice. One of the ways 
the health model of individual need took shape was through the adoption of a 
particular language that attempted to subvert the stigma often experienced 
by mental health patients. In the UK mental health patients often used the 
term ‘service user’ to describe themselves. Those who lobbied in the 
interests of people with mental disorder were often termed ‘consumer 
advocates’. In other countries terms like ‘stakeholder’ or ‘mental health 
consumer’ served the same purpose. This nomenclature established a 
framework in which patients claimed legitimacy in the public and political eye, 
through a form of health citizenship expressed through rights, entitlements 
and how they were treated and protected within the remit of mental health 
law. This was evident in the law reform process discussed in Chapter Six, 
where members of the Mental Health Alliance and others giving evidence to 
the Joint Scrutiny Committee described themselves as ‘service users’ rather 
than patients, or ‘service providers’ rather than clinicians, clinics or hospitals.
These terms imply a certain type of relationship between doctors or other 
health staff and their patients; between ‘service provider’ and ‘service user’. 
The implications are that the service is of a known quantity; that it is a service 
that was sought by the consumer; and that the provider has the skills, 
expertise and resources to provide the service to a particular standard. It is a 
language that suggests choice on the part of the consumer, and is intended 
to empower mental health patients by resisting the stigma associated with 
compulsory mental health treatment.
However Richardson (amongst others) has argued that stigma is inherent in 
a legal system which provides a framework for compulsory treatment of 
patients even when they have the capacity to consent to that treatment but 
choose not to (Richardson 2007). She argues that, whilst one might agree 
with the principle that therapeutic need outweighs individual autonomy in 
some cases, it is inherently discriminatory to apply that principle to the case 
of mental disorder but not physical disorder (ibid, see also Dawson and 
Szmukler 2006; Thornicroft 2006).
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Goffman also talked about this issue, although in different terms, when he 
discussed the tensions in the relationship between a patient and their 
psychiatrist.
In many psychiatric settings, one can witness what seems to be the 
same central encounter between a patient and a psychiatrist: the 
psychiatrist begins the exchange by proffering the patient the civil 
regard that is owed a client, receives a response that cannot be 
integrated into a continuation of the conventional service interaction, 
and then, even while attempting to sustain some of the outward forms 
of server-client relations, must twist and squirm his way out of the 
predicament (Goffman 1961:320).
Here, Goffman illustrates how terms like service ‘provider’ and ‘receiver’ 
ignore the coercive power in the hands of psychiatrists administering 
compulsory treatment under mental health law. While coercive treatment is 
not an inevitable outcome in mental disorder, the fact of its potential must be 
acknowledged as a significant factor in shaping the relationships between 
psychiatrists and their patients in hospital. In that context, a language of 
empowerment is unlikely to challenge the underlying, structural discrimination 
towards mental health patients that is built into the system.
Challenging the structural discrimination of the mental health system was 
even harder in the case of restricted patients. With some notable exceptions, 
mentally disordered offenders had generally been convicted of a criminal 
offence which was likely to have eroded some of their basic entitlements, 
such as the right to liberty.52 Forensic patients often entered the mental 
health system from a position of curtailed liberty (to varying degrees), which 
was then compounded by compulsory mental health treatment. The extent of 
their empowerment as consumers was further challenged by problems with 
the availability and quality of forensic mental health treatment (as discussed 
in Chapter Six). For these reasons, the implications of autonomy in the 
terminology of ‘service user’ were significantly marginal when applied to the 
context of the restricted patient system in England and Wales.
62 Exceptions include people found unfit to stand trial and those found not guilty by reason 
of insanity. However both findings may still result in a period of detention, including 
indefinitely.
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In their study of patient satisfaction in medium secure units (where many 
restricted patients are detained), Carlin et a/note the following.
Levels of user involvement and satisfaction are central to government 
policy in health service provision and user satisfaction is recognised 
as a valuable measure in evaluating the performance of NHS services. 
[Yet] ... The concept of the user as a ‘consumer’ and evaluator rather 
than passive recipient of NHS services is more readily accepted in 
some areas of medical service provision, such as primary care, than in 
psychiatric services, in which less emphasis has been placed on 
surveying user opinion (Carlin eta! 2005:715).
Their study found that involuntary patients were less likely to report 
satisfaction with services than voluntary patients (Carlin et al 2005). Further 
research indicates that restricted patients suffer more stigma than other 
mental health patients, including particularly negative media attention (Ardron 
2007); and fears and experiences of victimisation in the community peculiar 
to their status as restricted patients (Colombo 2007). As my own research 
has shown, these dynamics were not just indicative of patient relationships 
with health care professionals and in hospital. They also underpinned the 
nature and extent of the attention paid to restricted patients by the mental 
health consumer lobby. In the previous chapter I suggested that the strength 
of the civil mental health lobby did not extend to supporting or advocating for 
the needs of mentally disordered offenders generally, and particularly not for 
restricted patients. Such distancing was also evident in the literature (see for 
example Richardson 2005). Thus, while conceptions of patients as service 
users whose rights could be established applied in theory to restricted 
patients, in practice they were precluded from many of these entitlements by 
the combination of their compulsory treatment, their indefinite detention, and 
by the stigma associated with being offenders and mental health patients.
This brings me to the first conclusion of my analysis in this chapter. The 
purpose of my discussion here has been to establish the terrain upon which 
the human rights of restricted patients were asserted. In both the construction 
of rights and the conditions necessary to obtain those rights, restricted 
patients were disadvantaged by virtue of their legal status as indefinitely 
detained; by their symbolic identity as dangerous people and accordingly 
subject to executive discretion; and by their political isolation as a result of
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the difficulty or unwillingness of many mental health organisations to 
advocate on behalf of forensic patients. The rights of restricted patients were 
themselves symbolic, in much the same way I have argued that the public 
protection was. A conception of rights informed the decision frames of legal 
and clinical practitioners, and indeed of the executive, far more than the 
extent to which rights had actually been tested and established before the 
courts. Certainly, some rights had been established in law, but these were to 
a small degree. In reality the extent and nature of human rights for restricted 
patients was greatly limited. Nevertheless conceptions of rights continued to 
occupy an important place symbolically, in terms of how different actors in 
the system approached their responsibilities for, and obligations to restricted 
patients.
Mental health policy has been much-criticised for being rhetorically focussed 
on patient care but not actually achieving the objectives of treatment or 
rehabilitation. These criticisms have tended to focus on issues such as care 
in the community, or mental health service consumer empowerment (see for 
example Chapman et al 1991; Pilgrim 1991). In the restricted system, I 
suggest, the notion of patient rights was another example of a rhetorical 
principle that was difficult to sustain in practice. Patient rights were 
acknowledged in law; accepted in the narratives told by officials and 
practitioners; and even protected in theory, through the symbolic safeguard 
provided by the Tribunal. But in practice, patient rights were overshadowed 
by the routine priority placed on the public protection agenda, within the 
framework of executive decision-making.
The second conclusion of my analysis relates to the effect of the construction 
of rights on executive decision-making. As I have shown, Home Office 
decision-makers repeatedly conferred on the Tribunal the responsibility for 
protecting patient rights. This was a consequence of the particular approach 
taken by the executive towards the public protection agenda. According to 
Home Office staff, the assertion of a human rights framework via the 
establishment of a quasi-judicial structure guaranteed the protection of the 
rights of restricted patients. This guarantee was not perceived as 
complementary to the work of the Home Office. On the contrary, there
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seemed to be a much more fundamental shift in the conceptualisation of 
human rights by the executive; specifically what those rights were, and 
whose responsibility it was to uphold them. In this shift, the extension of 
Tribunal powers into the domain of restricted patients facilitated a perceived 
handover of responsibility for those rights entirely: from the executive, in the 
authority of the Home Office, to the Tribunal. This was despite evidence of 
some significant problems in the efficacy of the Tribunal in protecting the 
rights of restricted patients, including delays in Tribunal hearings and over­
caution in relation to risk.
Relegating the protection of patient rights to another body enabled a 
complete reconfiguration of how the executive constructed its role in the 
system, away from attention to the rights of patients, to primary 
preoccupation with the protection of the public. In the perspectives of my 
research participants, the Mental Health Act 1983 had resulted in a notable 
change in this regard. Clearly, these perspectives were the product of the 
particular environment in which the Home Office operated. Alternative 
perspectives suggested that Tribunals were not free from consideration of the 
protection of the public. In assessing the appropriateness of a discharge from 
hospital, the Tribunal had to consider the safety and protection of the public. 
Similarly, and as one interviewee noted, clinicians had a responsibility to 
consider the safety of the public when they recommended a patient for leave 
or release. Moreover, the notion that the Home Office was concerned with 
patient rights under the previous legislative regime could well be contested 
by those outside the government. Nevertheless, in the way they 
conceptualised the system and their responsibilities within it, Home Office 
participants constructed a dichotomy between the rights of patients and the 
protection of the public; and defined their own responsibility solely in terms of 
the latter.
These observations suggested two important points regarding the human 
rights of restricted patients. Firstly, there were a range of interpretations 
about what it meant to operate within a human rights framework. The views 
of Home Office staff consistently reflected the primary responsibility to the 
public. Beyond that, however, some officials felt a responsibility towards the
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rights of patients that was not shared by all their colleagues. Meanwhile, 
other actors in the system did not see these responsibilities as mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, practitioners generally saw the question of human rights 
as broader than the specific instruments available in law. They believed 
patient rights to be a central tenet of the principles of mental health law and 
argued that intention and outcome were as integral as process in 
safeguarding these rights.
Consequently there were two alternate constructions of human rights at play 
in the restricted patient system. The first was essentially an administrative 
interpretation of human rights by decision-makers acting on behalf of the 
executive, in which rights were de-limited by the structure of legislation and 
the stipulation of case law. The second view constructed the scope of human 
rights as a framework which, in the views of non-government actors, should 
have shaped all decision-making, even within the context of the public 
protection agenda.
While the responsibility for public protection was enshrined in statute, my 
study of executive discretion has suggested that the meaning or practice 
ascribed to protecting the public was very much a matter of interpretation, 
both by the various institutions and individuals engaged in the restricted 
patient system, and even across different people working within the same 
institutions. It was the prerogative of the executive in whose authority and 
responsibility the discretion to protect the public lay, to determine who was 
protected, and how. Yet the Tribunal was also required to consider the safety 
of the public; and as I have shown, it was extremely cautious in this regard. 
As a result, both the Tribunal and the Home Secretary made decisions about 
restricted patients detained under the specific criteria of the Mental Health 
Act 1983, yet both placed significant emphasis on public protection in their 
decision-making (albeit often to a different extent and outcome). It was likely 
that the competing constructions of human rights I have outlined would 
continue to exist as long as there was a tension between the principles of 
patient rights on the one hand and the public protection on the other. 
However, while the decision-making power to discharge patients was vested
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in the two alternative bodies of the executive and the Tribunal, it was a 
tension that might never be resolved.
Conclusion [266]
CONCLUSION
Precis
The role of executive discretion in the restricted patient system derived from 
the executive’s mandate to protect the public. My research explored how ‘the 
public’ was constructed and what ‘protection’ meant in terms of executive 
decision-making. I found that the executive construed its mandate as 
separate to the objectives of care and treatment under the Mental Health Act 
1983. That is to say that the executive perceived its function solely in terms 
of public protection, and that it perceived itself as the only actor in the 
restricted patient system who was concerned with this objective. Moreover, 
those making decisions on behalf of the executive constructed a notion of 
‘the public’ that was exclusive of patients. That conception created a divide 
between the interests of patients and of the public within the decision frame 
of executive discretion.
The Mental Health Act 1983 included the principle of public protection 
alongside the healthcare objectives of compulsory treatment. But it was the 
discretion to interpret how it exercised its own mandate that led the executive 
to an exclusive preoccupation with protecting the public. The interests of care 
and treatment were continuously subsumed within that preoccupation. The 
tension between public protection and patient rights was both produced and 
reinforced by the structure of the restricted patient system. It was also a 
tension that imbued the relationships between - and the decisions made by - 
all actors in the system.
In the contemporary context of law and order politics and increasingly 
punitive populism, the interaction between criminal justice and other systems 
is an apposite concern for criminology. My study of the restricted patient 
system points to important shifts in the utility and purpose of mental health 
legislation that expanded the frameworks available for preventive detention in 
the interests of public protection. While there may be a close correlation 
between serious or violent offending and dangerousness, they are not the
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same thing. The significance of the mental health system and the 
government’s agenda to reform it was that it offered a mechanism for 
preventive detention of dangerous people regardless of whether or not they 
had previously committed a serious or violent offence.
Research Questions
My doctorate commenced as an inquiry into the role and effect of executive 
decision-making in the restricted patient system. The first part of my inquiry 
was readily explained by reference to statute, in the form of the Mental 
Health Act 1983, and by the policies of the Home Office: the role of the 
executive was to protect the public. From this stated objective of executive 
discretion flowed the much more interesting questions of what the public 
protection agenda was; who it protected; and how that protection was 
achieved. My specific research questions were as follows.
1. How was the central conception of ‘the public’ constructed and to what 
extent did that construction have an impact upon decisions made 
about restricted patients?
2. How did the executive meet its mandate of public protection?
3. How did the various actors view the role and effect of the executive in 
the restricted patient system?
An extensive body of literature formed the conceptual tools of analysis for 
this research. It included the criminological literature on detention, 
prevention, public protection and victim involvement in criminal justice; 
existing research and analysis of the restricted patient system in England and 
Wales; theories of risk and management of mentally disordered and serious 
offenders; and socio-legal approaches to decision-making. I used this 
literature to explore the extent to which symbolic politics provided one 
account of public protection in the restricted patient system.
Findings
In the restricted patient system there were a number of actors involved in 
decision-making and each had a different decision frame. For example, the 
therapeutic benefit of the individual patient was the dominant objective
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guiding decisions by psychiatrists and other clinical practitioners to apply for 
leave or discharge, while the Mental Health Review Tribunal was charged 
with safeguarding the rights of restricted patients. But it was the exercise of 
decision-making power by the executive over applications for leave and 
discharge that formed the subject of my study. The dominant objective in the 
executive’s decision frame was public protection. Consideration by the 
executive of the public protection was enshrined in statute, via the Mental 
Health Act 1983. However the extent to which that agenda should have been 
the sole priority of executive decision-makers was a matter on which the 
views of actors varied throughout the system. The dominant perception of 
those I spoke to at the Home Office was that the public protection agenda 
was exclusive to other considerations; and that it was unique to the role of 
the Home Office. According to Home Office participants in my research, 
protecting the public was not an objective they shared with other actors in the 
system.
Moreover, public protection as defined by the executive seemed to be 
understood in opposition to the interests of patients. Those interests included 
both the formal rights of restricted patients as set out in mental health and 
human rights law; and the therapeutic progress of patients receiving care and 
treatment. In arguing that executive conceptions positioned public protection 
in opposition to patients’ interests, I am not suggesting that the rights of 
patients were deliberately undermined or violated in order to protect the 
public. The mandate of public protection enshrined in the Mental Health Act 
1983 vested in the executive the discretion to conceive that agenda as it saw 
fit. The construction of these various elements of mental health law as 
competing with each other was a logical consequence of the legal structure 
of the system, particularly given the two alternative routes for decision­
making by the executive and the Mental Health Review Tribunal. However, I 
conclude that the opposition between patients and the public was also a 
consequence of the exercise of discretion within the climate of law and order 
politics that marked public policy at the time (Garland 2001; O'Malley 2004b; 
Lacey 2007; Reiner 2007). While government decision-makers perceived the 
system to balance the rights of patients with the public protection, they saw
Conclusion [269]
that balance to have been achieved by virtue of the executive and the 
Tribunal operating as parallel avenues for decision-making.
By contrast, other actors in the system perceived the Mental Health Act 1983 
to require a balance between public protection and patient rights even within 
the context of executive decision-making. They rejected the executive’s 
construction of the public as exclusive of patients and argued that the effect 
of the priority on public protection was to undermine the treatment and 
rehabilitation of patients.
The question of where the balance lay between patient rights and public 
protection became a central concern of my thesis. I found that the balance 
was largely symbolic. It was spoken of frequently by decision-makers 
representing the executive and was central to the decision frames described 
by both government and non-government participants in the research. But 
when it came to decisions about leave or discharge by the executive, the 
interests of individual patients were continually subsumed within the 
dominance of the public protection agenda. In practice, the nature of the 
executive’s discretionary powers, coupled with the executive’s mandate for 
public protection, produced an imperative to control patients through the 
prolonged use of preventive detention. These decisions resulted in the 
routine prioritisation of preventive detention in the interests of public 
protection over clinical recommendations for less secure detention or 
discharge. As such, the notion of balance operated symbolically, featuring in 
how executive decision-makers spoke about the system more than in their 
exercise of discretion.
The key marker of symbolic politics in the restricted patient system was the 
preoccupation with control over care. Practitioners suggested that the 
rejection of leave and discharge applications in the interests of protecting the 
public was short-sighted, because it resulted in the stalling of patient 
treatment and rehabilitation; a consequence that practitioners believed was 
counter to effective public protection in the long-term. Moreover, practitioners 
suggested that the preoccupation with public protection sometimes resulted
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in patients not being treated in the least restrictive environment possible, 
which was a key principle of mental health law. For example, applications for 
leave or discharge were often granted with an accompanying measure that 
restricted the clinical regime being proposed in order to facilitate closer 
monitoring by the Home Office of the patient’s behaviour in the community. 
Conditions were sometimes attached to patient discharge even though they 
carried little direct force. Conditions were relatively meaningless when 
challenged directly. Much of their power was coercive; a finding which 
supported Dell and Grounds’ analysis that the threat of recall was used by 
the executive as a mechanism to control patient behaviour (1995).
The function of conditions of discharge was a good example of how symbolic 
politics operated in the system. Conditions of discharge attempted to reduce 
the likelihood of particular incidents associated with a patient’s medical or 
offending history. For example, if a patient was known to become mentally 
unwell when he or she drank alcohol, the conditions of their discharge might 
include abstinence from alcohol and random screening to test the person’s 
compliance. However conditions of discharge also operated as a mechanism 
of reassurance for the public. Victims were often assured that they would not 
encounter a restricted patient in public because of conditions on that patient’s 
movements. As my data showed, these conditions carried little weight in 
practice. Nonetheless they were important symbolically as evidence that the 
executive had listened to and acted upon the concerns of victims in its 
decision-making about restricted patients.
I do not argue that meeting the public protection agenda was purely 
symbolic. There were clear indications of direct action by the Secretary of 
State to protect the public. These included maintaining a certain level of 
security while a patient was detained or issuing an order for a patient’s recall 
based on the deterioration of their mental state. However, these direct 
actions were accompanied by the exercise of a symbolic politics which 
operated simultaneously, serving to reassure the public that decision-making 
was being undertaken in their best interests. The symbolism of this
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reassurance against public fear was as important as the actions taken to 
protect the public in the face of threats to their safety.
The patient/public divide
Not everyone I observed or interviewed subscribed to the notion that patients’ 
interests and public protection were diametrically opposed. Some 
practitioners and a minority of Home Office officials expressed the view that 
protecting the public was best achieved through ensuring the therapeutic 
progress of patients. That stance raised the question of whether or not 
restricted patients constituted members of the public themselves. According 
to legal and clinical practitioners in my research, restricted patients were 
detained solely for treatment of their mental disorder. Yet for government 
decision-makers, the executive’s discretion derived from concern about 
protecting others if these patients were released. As a result, restricted 
patients were constructed by the executive predominantly in terms of the 
danger they posed to the public. Essentially, this construction required 
making a distinction between patients and the public. In many ways it was a 
distinction produced by the legislative structure itself. Yet for those actors 
who were responsible for the care and treatment of restricted patients, their 
decision frame placed the priority on patients as individuals with health 
needs, even as they operated within the same framework of mental health 
law as the executive.
Defining restricted patients in terms of dangerousness reflected the particular 
logic which underpinned the executive’s mandate for public protection. 
Nevertheless, the perception of restricted patients as risky individuals also 
imbued the perspectives of others outside the sphere of government, most 
notably those of non-government organisations involved in law reform. 
Concerned about the harshness of measures proposed to control risk in the 
reform of mental health law, non-government actors attempted a strategic 
distancing of the majority of the population receiving compulsory treatment 
for mental disorder from the small proportion of that population who 
constituted forensic patients. While such distancing was understandable 
within the broad political objectives of mental health advocacy, it served to re­
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reinforce the dominant representation of restricted patients as risky 
individuals. I do not mean to argue that risk was irrelevant for restricted 
patients. The very nature of their restriction derived from an assessment of 
the risks they posed to the public. However, I do argue that the 
representation of restricted patients as uniquely risky was a product of the 
political climate at the time. That climate saw the government trying to tackle 
fear of crime and its effect on public perceptions of law and order (Reiner 
2007). Within such pervasive constructions of risk and dangerousness, any 
notion of the rights of restricted patients was even further relegated to the 
domain of symbolic - rather than practical - consideration.
When determinative authority was extended to the Mental Health Review 
Tribunal, the executive interpreted this as a signal that its primary and 
exclusive responsibility was to protect the public. In other words, if the rights 
of patients were protected by the Tribunal, they no longer needed to be 
considered within the executive’s decision frame. I have shown how this 
interpretation led the Home Office to focus solely on public protection. 
Although the Tribunal’s responsibility was undoubtedly to safeguard patient 
rights, other actors in the system contested the idea that the executive no 
longer had any responsibility for the rights of patients. Non-government 
actors including clinical practitioners and lawyers asserted that the executive 
was still responsible for ensuring that patients were detained lawfully under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 and in accordance with European human rights 
law. That responsibility increased, according to practitioners and lobbyists, in 
the face of the mounting evidence of the apparent ineffectiveness of the 
Tribunal as a safeguard for patient rights.
Another way that symbolic politics operated in the system was in the way ‘the 
public’ was constructed through specific groups who came to the attention of 
Home Office decision-makers. These groups included the victims and, to a 
lesser extent, the families of restricted patients. The reliance on particular 
groups to reflect the concerns of the general public went along with the 
presentation of policy changes that took place during the course of my 
research. Those policy changes reasserted the construction of victims and
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offenders as opposing categories, in contrast to the close relationships 
(including familial) that existed between victims and offenders in the 
restricted patient system. A consequence of these public statements was that 
policy itself represented the interests of victims and offenders as 
oppositional, even though such oppositions were not reflected in the 
perceptions of practitioners or the experiences of many of the victims and 
offenders who were involved in the restricted patient system.
The purpose of detention
A considerable body of contemporary criminological literature has been 
concerned with criminal justice policy shifts under the symbolic politics of law 
and order. I used these theories to examine how the interaction between 
mental health and criminal justice in the restricted patient system was 
illustrative of a similar effect. I suggested that criminal justice was 
increasingly turning to alternative frameworks like mental health law to 
resolve problems that were beyond the scope of criminal justice. One such 
problem has been how to contain people who pose a danger to others, but 
who have not committed an offence to warrant a criminal sanction. While the 
strategy of containment was an attractive option, and might appeal to the 
punitiveness of contemporary penal populism, there was the potential for it to 
conflict with traditional principles of criminal law such as proportionality. By 
contrast, the framework of mental health law offered an existing mechanism 
of preventive detention, as it was an essential element of the provisions for 
compulsory treatment. I am mindful of Garland’s caution not to ‘exaggerate or 
extrapolate’ about the broader application of criminal justice policies (Garland 
2001:21), and I do not seek to suggest that the reform of the 1983 Act or the 
processes of the restricted patient system were the blueprints for an entirely 
new criminal justice system. Rather, I suggest that the agenda of controlling 
dangerousness resulted in some slippage between the traditional boundaries 
of criminal justice and mental health policy.
The utility of detention in criminal justice lay in its sanction against and 
deterrence for crimes committed, whereas in health it was a mechanism to 
enforce therapeutic intervention. Applying the framework of mental health law
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to the agenda of controlling dangerousness indicated a blurring of those 
traditional boundaries under the policy priority of public protection. As Mitchell 
put it, ‘in the absence of any legally sanctioned method of extending prison 
sentences, a medically sanctioned method will suffice’ (Mitchell 2003:82, 
emphasis in quotation). Mechanisms of detention in the interests of public 
policy were increasingly evident in a range of areas.53 The restricted patient 
system was another example of public policy moving beyond the parameters 
of criminal justice and utilising the powers of detention in alternative 
legislative frameworks to meet an ever-expanding agenda of risk prevention, 
security and public protection.
The exercise of discretion
There was a wide degree of acceptance throughout the system of the 
executive’s priorities and a degree of satisfaction with how the executive 
carried out its role. However criticisms of the exercise of that discretion 
consistently focused upon the question of how to balance patients’ interests 
with public protection. As long as patients and the public were seen as binary 
opposites, the political agenda of the executive and the health agenda of 
practitioners might never be reconciled. Yet one practitioner I interviewed 
argued that the tendency of the Home Secretary to reject applications for 
leave or discharge indicated a failure to exercise the executive’s discretion. 
His comment alluded to an alternative conception of the function of executive 
discretion, wherein the objective of public protection could be met through the 
rehabilitation of patients in the community instead of through prolonged 
detention. That possibility supported the comments of some Home Office 
officials who suggested that patient progress in treatment was in the interests 
of public protection. However that view was held only by a minority of 
officials.
The cornerstone of my argument about symbolic protection was the extent to 
which the executive sought to assuage public fears in its decision-making.
53 For example the extended detention of immigration and asylum seekers; the preventive 
detention of terrorism suspects; and the introduction of Control Orders, in which extended 
terms of suspicion enabled surveillance or control of people in the absence of their 
prosecution before a court.
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Yet, if public protection was actually about managing public fear, then the 
interests of patients and the interests of the public could have been 
constructed in much closer alignment. In Chapter Five I discussed the 
example of the patient who met with victims at the police station where he 
had committed his index offence. That example illustrated how victims’ fears 
could be exacerbated by their lack of knowledge about the progress of 
treatment for restricted patients. Here, the fears of the victims dissipated 
once they met and understood the progress made by the restricted patient. 
The example pointed to the possibility of an alternative conception of 
executive discretion wherein the objectives of patient rehabilitation and public 
protection could have been constructed in tandem with each other, rather 
than in opposition.
The role of rights
So far I have talked broadly of patient interests including, but not limited to 
their human rights. My data revealed a very interesting effect of European 
human rights law on the restricted patient system. For the Home Office, 
compliance with human rights law was achieved when decision-making 
authority was extended to the Tribunal. This measure ensured the protection 
of patient rights through the establishment of a dedicated structure and 
process as required by law. In turn, Home Office decision-makers perceived 
that they were no longer responsible for the protection of patients’ human 
rights, which was something they had already been finding hard to balance 
with the public protection agenda. Yet, as the discussion in Chapter Seven 
showed, there was considerable evidence that the Tribunal was an 
inadequate safeguard for the rights of patients. Even if the formal structure of 
the system met the requirements for the protection of patient rights, the 
realities seemed to raise serious doubts about how those rights were 
balanced with the priority on public protection in practice.
Equally, non-government bodies relied upon the formal construction of 
human rights to protect the interests of restricted patients, even though 
pursuing those interests was beyond what those organisations could afford to 
pursue within their own advocacy for patients of mental health services. Once
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again, the symbolic value of rights appeared firmly entrenched in the 
language applied to the explanations given about how the restricted patient 
system worked. Yet the extent to which those rights were instructive in the 
decisions made and the outcomes of the system appeared far less definitive.
Conclusions
The restricted patient system was not designed to be punitive. However it 
was one of preventive detention. Decisions about leave and discharge were 
predominantly made on the criterion of preventing risk of harm to others 
through prolonged containment and close control, rather than through 
treatment and rehabilitation. While executive authority derived from the 
Mental Health Act 1983, the application of that authority prioritised public 
protection over all other principles of mental health law. Yet there were a 
number of other principles that could have operated in parallel with the 
executive’s objectives of public protection. Traditionally, mental health law 
comprised the dual objectives of compulsory treatment in the least restrictive 
circumstances alongside the protection of the patient and the public. The 
exercise of executive authority could have presented those principles as 
coterminous; the executive could have approached the discharge of patients 
to test their readiness for the community as a component of public protection, 
not a challenge to it. As Peay reminds us, such dual considerations had 
informed the executive’s decision frame in the past.
Even before the 1983 Act, if patients were not suffering, there would 
have been no basis for continuing detention even if they remained a 
risk to the public. However, where in the Home Secretary's opinion, 
such a risk to the public existed, the view was repeatedly taken that 
the absence of the disorder had to be established beyond all doubt 
before patients would be discharged. Thus ... the conflict between 
individual and societal rights was resolved, in practice, by Home 
Secretaries adopting, on the one hand, a narrow view of individual 
rights and, on the other, a broad interpretation of what society should 
rightfully be protected from (Peay 1989:12).
My research suggested that by 2005 the executive’s consideration of the 
criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 was subordinated to 
the concern for public protection. Where once compulsory treatment was
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weighed alongside public protection by executive decision-makers, now the 
preoccupation with public protection dominated to the point of over-riding the 
therapeutic benefits of ongoing detention for individual patients.
By conceptualising the public protection agenda in opposition to the interests 
of patients, executive decision-making necessarily resulted in patient rights 
and interests being subsumed within decisions in the interests of public 
protection. As a result, the balance between patient rights and public 
protection was largely symbolic. However, symbolic politics played a central 
role even within the considerations of public protection which structured the 
executive’s decision frame. In a climate of heightened fear of crime, a large 
part of the public protection agenda came to focus on reducing those public 
fears. As such, the symbolism of how the executive was seen to exercise its 
discretion became as important as the extent to which it provided tangible 
public protection.
Conclusion [278]
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Table of Fieldwork Participants
PARTICIPANTS CONTACTED INTERVIEW OBSERVATION
Home Office
Mental Health Unit 3
Probation and Parole Service 2
Victim and Confidence Unit 1
TOTAL 6 9
Mental Health Review Tribunal 3 3
Clinical Practitioners
Psychiatrist 5
Nurse or Social Worker 2
TOTAL 7 -
Lawyers 4 1
Non-Government Organisations
Mental Health 2
Victim 2
TOTAL 4 -
TOTAL 24 13
This table reflects the location of people who participated in my research, 
categorised according to their position within the restricted patient system, 
either as a member of a government department, as a practitioner, or as a 
representative of a non-government organisation.
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Appendix 2: Leave Guidance
The ‘Guidance for Responsible Medical Officers’ was a document prepared 
by the Mental Health Unit and available to care teams and clinicians involved 
in the management and supervision of restricted patients. It served the 
purpose of advising clinicians how to make applications for leave for patients 
detained in hospital. Attached to it was a checklist of ‘points considered by 
the Home Office in examining the cases of restricted patients’. The checklist 
is included here in its entirety. The following version was issued in March 
2006 and was almost identical to the version contained in the MHU 
Casework Manual of 1998.
CHECKLIST OF POINTS CONSIDERED BY THE HOME OFFICE IN EXAMINING THE 
CASES OF RESTRICTED PATIENTS
The role of the Home Office in the management of restricted patients is to protect the 
public from serious harm. To carry this out effectively, the Home Office needs to 
know:
i) why a patient has been dangerous in the past;
ii) whether they are still dangerous (if so, why; if not, why not and in what 
circumstances they might be dangerous again), and
iii) what the treatment plan is.
The following list is not exhaustive, but it is intended to cover some of the points that may 
need to be addressed when reporting to the Home Office or seeking the Secretary of State’s 
consent to Section 17 leave, trial leave or conditional or absolute discharge. Not all points 
will apply to all patients; but all sections (not just that covering the main diagnosis) that apply 
to a particular patient should be completed. Attaching relevant reports is always 
encouraged.
Reports to the Home Office should reflect the views of the multi-disciplinary team. Please 
indicate whether the team has been consulted.
For all patients
1. Should the patient still be detained and for what reason?
2. If yes, which level of security does the patient need?
3. What is the team’s current understanding of the factors underpinning the index 
offence and previous dangerous behaviour?
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4. What change has taken place in respect of those factors (i.e. to affect the perceived 
level of dangerousness)?
5. What are the potential risk factors in the future (e.g. compliance with medication, 
substance abuse, potential future circumstances, etc)?
6. What are the patient’s current attitudes to:
• the index offence,
• other dangerous behaviour and
• any previous victims?
7. What is the outward evidence of change (i.e. behaviour in hospital, on leave,
attitudes towards staff and patients and potential victim groups)?
• how has the patient responded to stressful situations?
• describe any physical violence or verbal aggression.
8. Have alcohol or illicit drugs affected the patient in the past and did either contribute
to the offending behaviour? If so,
• is this still a problem in hospital?
• what are the patient’s current attitudes to drugs and alcohol?
• what specific therapeutic approaches have there been towards substance
abuse?
9. Which issues still need to be addressed, and
• what are the short and long-term treatment plans?
10. What is known about circumstances of the victim, or victim’s family?
Patients with mental illness
11. How is the patient’s dangerous behaviour related to their mental illness?
12. Which symptoms of mental illness remain?
13. Has stability been maintained under differing circumstances? Under what 
circumstances might stability be threatened?
14. Has medication helped and how important is it in maintaining the patient’s stability?
15. To what extent does the patient have insight into their illness and the need for 
medication?
16. Does the patient comply with medication in hospital?
• Is there any reluctance?
• would they be likely to comply outside?
Patients with personality disorder
17. What are the individual characteristics of the personality disorder?
18. What have been the treatment approaches to specific problem areas?
19. Is the patient now more mature, predictable and concerned about others? Please 
give evidence.
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20. Are they more tolerant of frustration and stress? Please give evidence.
21. Does the patient now take into account the consequences of their actions and learn 
from experience? Please give evidence.
Patients with mental impairment
22. How has the patient benefited from treatment/training?
23. Is their behaviour more acceptable? Please give evidence.
24. Is the patient’s behaviour explosive or impulsive? Please give evidence.
25. Does the patient now learn from experience and take into account the
consequences of their actions? Please give evidence.
Patients with dangerous sexual behaviour (all forms of mental disorder)
26. Does the patient still show undesirable interest in the victim type?
27. Describe any access to the victim type and the patient’s attitude towards this group?
28. What form has sexual activity in hospital taken?
29. What do psychological tests or other evaluation indicate?
30. What is the current content of fantasy material?
Patients who set fires (all forms of mental disorder)
31. What interest does the patient still have in fires?
32. Have they set fires in hospital?
33. What access do they have to a lighter or matches?
34. In what way do fires appear in current fantasy material?
35. Does the patient have insight into previous fire setting behaviour?
And, finally
36. Please give any other relevant information that would be useful to the Home Office.
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Appendix 3: Timeline of reform - the Mental Health Act 1983
1997: Department of Health think tank on reform of mental health law
1998: Department of Health establishes Expert Committee to conduct 
Scoping Study for the review of the Mental Health Act 1983, chaired 
by Genevra Richardson
1999: Publication of the report of the Expert Committee (Richardson 1999). 
Key recommendations include: a formal, independent inquiry into the 
offender provisions (section 3) of the 1983 Act, that ongoing attention 
be paid to the human rights of offender patients; that offenders be 
treated under the same legislative framework that applies to civil 
patients; that the MHRT be granted the power to order leave and 
transfer (this recommendation included condemnation of the current 
system of executive-only power as failing human rights obligations); 
support for the Home Office’s role in protection of the public; an 
advisory and expertise role for the Home Office, with decision-making 
vested in the MHRT; and that the Home Office continue responsibility 
for monitoring in the community.
Publication of Green Paper on the Reform of the 1983 Act at the same 
time as the Richardson Report.
2000: Publication of White Paper on Reforming the 1983 Act
2002: Introduction of draft Mental Health Bill (2002) and consultation 
document
Publication of House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee 
on Human Rights Report on the draft Mental Health Bill (2002)
2004: Introduction of revised draft Mental Health Bill (2004)
2005: Publication of House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Scrutiny 
Committee report on the draft Mental Health Bill (2004)
Publication of the Government's response to the Joint Scrutiny 
Committee's report
2006: Government announces draft Mental Health Bill 2004 abandoned in 
place of proposed reforms to MHA 1983 via Mental Health Bill 2006
2007: Mental Health Act 2007 receives assent, amending MHA 1983 and the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005
